Recent political activity in Colombia suggests that open negotiations with the 1,500-member National Liberation Army, or ELN, could begin soon. Former Colombian Sen. Piedad Cordoba said Dec. 2 that talks could begin before the end of the year and that Santos would announce the talks after his return from a Dec. 3 state visit to the United States.
ELN leader Nicolas Rodriguez told a Colombian TV news channel Nov. 29 that the group had named two national commanders and three regional ones as negotiators for talks at an unknown future date. Rodriguez also said the rebels have been ready to start talks for at least a year. On Dec. 1, ELN rebels in Bolivar department released a Colombian engineer held hostage for 16 months. It is not known whether a ransom was paid or whether it was a sign of good faith prior to any negotiations. Like FARC in 2012, the ELN also proposed a mutual cease-fire with the government to indicate both sides' willingness to reach a peace agreement.
The Colombian government's confidential contacts with the ELN have not produced any open negotiations. Colombian Vice President Angelino Garzon claimed in September that talks would begin that month and that an agreement could be reached before the end of the year, but no public meeting was held. The ELN and the government had been holding exploratory talks for months before the announced meeting but, for undisclosed reasons, it did not occur.
The Colombian government's main goal in bringing the ELN to the negotiating table is to eventually end the group's politically motivated attacks on security forces and energy targets. In September, the group increased attacks on oil pipelines, energy company employees, soldiers and police in Arauca department. These attacks were part of increased militant activity across Colombia prior to the government and FARC reaching an agreement on the rebels' future political participation.
Opening talks with the ELN poses some political risks for Santos. His administration must show some progress in the FARC negotiations by the May 2014 presidential election. Starting a separate negotiation with the ELN prior to the election may negatively affect voters' approval of Santos if the ELN increases attacks during the talks to force concessions from the government. Also, the ELN has not publicly agreed to abstain from kidnappings, as FARC did prior to starting its negotiation. The government has previously asked the ELN to release all of its hostages as a condition for negotiations.
The ELN's operational capacity for successful attacks on soldiers, police and energy infrastructure is also a major risk. The group killed 14 soldiers during an ambush in Arauca on Aug. 24. It has also increased the tempo of its attacks against oil pipelines and energy workers since September. Like the FARC, the ELN will likely not end such attacks during the negotiations. These attacks could be used to pressure the Colombian government during talks and could reduce support for the peace process if they cause significant damage or casualties.
Despite these problems, the Colombian government has two advantages that may help it open a peace process with the ELN. Even with significant domestic political unrest in 2013, Santos' political support remains relatively high. A poll released Nov. 27 showed that 36 percent of respondents would vote for Santos in the presidential election, compared to about 12 percent for his closest competitor, Democratic Center candidate Oscar Zuluaga. However, about 30 percent of the electorate remains undecided, which could make the presidential vote closer than the poll suggests.
The president has also demonstrated some progress on talks with FARC, reaching partial agreements on land reform and political participation. A majority of the Colombian public supports a peace deal to end the decadeslong conflict. Therefore, progress on the politically sensitive militant negotiations has maintained public support for them. This support could enable Santos to conduct two negotiations simultaneously.
The length and pace of ELN talks may differ significantly from those with FARC. Despite the two groups' ideological similarity and occasional cooperation, they are separate organizations. Any agreements on political participation or immunity from prosecution will have to be negotiated according to the ELN leadership's individual demands. Because of the secrecy surrounding the preliminary talks with the ELN, it remains unclear whether the group's talks with the government will be as lengthy as the FARC negotiation.
Beginning negotiations with the ELN will undoubtedly present political risks for the Santos administration. However, the president is in a better position to negotiate now that the FARC talks have progressed and he has outpaced his closest rivals in the electoral race. Despite the political risks, the current negotiations represent Colombia's best chance to end the country's insurgency and are likely a gamble Santos is willing to take.
