Poland's strategic imperatives were made evident in recent statements from Polish politicians, whose remarks highlight Warsaw's enduring concerns over Central and Eastern European affairs. On Sept. 16, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nalecz said that the United States should show deeper political commitment in Central and Eastern Europe through actual visits to the region and through political support for the Eastern Partnership initiative. Then on Sept. 25, Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski said that he would like to see "active participation" from the United States, potentially including a visit by President Barack Obama to the 25th anniversary celebration of Poland's first partially free elections in June 2014.

These notions are somewhat in line with recent statements made by former Polish President Lech Walesa, co-founder of the Solidarity trade union and a champion of Polish democracy. On Sept. 20, he said that Poland's relations with Russia should be "as smooth as possible" because both countries "are fated to be neighbors." Then on Sept. 24, he said that Poland and Germany should expand economic and defense cooperation to create "a single state." While these comments generated some controversy in Poland, Walesa was in fact lobbying for deeper EU integration.

This succession of statements comes as Poland sees troubling developments throughout the world. To its west, it sees a weakening eurozone and a fragmenting European Union. To the east, it sees a Russian government that is willing to apply political and economic pressure to preserve its traditional spheres of influence. It also sees Central and Eastern European countries that are either mired in economic and political crises (Bulgaria), hampered by government fragility (the Czech Republic) or alienated from their Western allies through their own unorthodox policies (Hungary).

Outside Europe, Warsaw sees a United States that is significantly less involved in Central European affairs than it was during the Cold War — or even the mid-2000s, for that matter. Moreover, it sees an Obama administration that is willing to compromise with Russia to avoid military intervention in Syria.

These events worry Warsaw. Because of its location in the heart of the North European Plain, Poland historically has been subject to invasion, occupation and even partition by its powerful neighbors to the west and east. Thus Warsaw has always been concerned about events beyond its borders, and has tried to adapt to the region's political and economic environment.

Poland has several strategic imperatives. First, it needs to acquire as much strategic depth in the North European Plain as possible; doing so expands its regional influence and discourages invasion. This explains Warsaw's constant efforts to have some degree of political cooperation with Lithuania. It also explains why it tries to limit Russian influence in Ukraine and Belarus while extending its own influence there. The Eastern Partnership initiative is a clear tactical example of this strategy. Poland's membership in the Visegrad Group, which includes Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, is a similar attempt to develop some degree of political leadership in Central Europe.

Second, Poland needs to develop relatively good working relationships with its powerful neighbors. Currently, this strategy involves developing economic and political ties with Germany and keeping cordial relations with Russia. Poland receives most of its energy from Russia, though it is also trying to diversify its energy sources.

The German economy is growing modestly despite the European crisis, and Chancellor Angela Merkel has been re-elected for a third term, making Berlin one of the most stable governments in Europe. Warsaw understands that it is essential to keep a significant level of political and economic coordination with Berlin. Poland is already a part of the German supply chain, and Germany is Poland's main trade partner. Moreover, the European crisis has conferred on Berlin a leadership role on the Continent, particularly at a time when the French government is unpopular domestically and the French economy is struggling to grow.

But history has taught Poland that it cannot rely only on European powers for its security and well-being. This explains a third element in Poland's strategy: attracting a foreign power to better its fragile position in Central Europe. After the end of the Cold War, Warsaw joined NATO and developed good relations with the United States. But now Warsaw wants Washington to confirm and indeed expand its security commitment in the region independently of NATO, which is going through an identity crisis. 

These trends are not new; they have been developing for years. With the United States focusing first in the Middle East and then in East Asia, Poland is looking for additional options. Warsaw is trying to ingratiate itself with Germany without significantly irritating Russia as it tries to bind Germany to a more integrated (and eventually militarized) European Union. Poland's main challenge is the sustainability of its strategies because its geographic position puts Warsaw in a situation of permanent strategic uncertainty.