Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov will meet with his NATO counterparts June 9, where the main topic of discussion will be Europe's future ballistic missile defense (BMD) network. The network is the largest point of contention between Washington and Moscow, with the Kremlin opposing Washington's recent moves to finalize the emplacement of SM-3 interceptors (the interceptors, still in development, are the ground-based version of a successful sea-based system) in Romania by 2015. Russia fundamentally opposes the system not because it threatens Moscow's nuclear deterrent, but because it represents an entrenchment of U.S. forces near its buffer states — Ukraine and Belarus in particular.

Europe's 21st Century Battlefield

BMD is only a small part of a wider geopolitical shift occurring in Europe. The Central European corridor, comprising the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria — the so-called Intermarium Corridor — is emerging as the area of contention between Russia and U.S.-supported states in the region. This means that the battle line dividing Europe between two Cold War-era blocs has moved eastward, and countries along that line are looking to respond. BMD is just one of those responses. (click here to enlarge image) This transformation is the result of a two-step process. The first step was the end of the Cold War, when Soviet Russia withdrew from its positions established by the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, and former Communist European states — including the Baltic states, eventually — entered the NATO alliance. The second step was Russia's resurgence into its former Soviet sphere of influence, a process that gained momentum in 2005 and culminated with the formal reversal of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine at the beginning of 2010 as well as the integration of Belarus further into Russian structures. The first step formally released Central Europe from Soviet control; the second step showed that Moscow's withdrawal was temporary. The next phase in Europe's geopolitical evolution was Germany's response to the first two changes. Berlin welcomed Russia's withdrawal at the end of the Cold War because it allowed Germany to reunite and created a new buffer between Berlin and Moscow: the Central European NATO member states. When the Cold War ended, Germany was no longer the chessboard upon which Soviet Russia and the United States played a 40-year geopolitical game. Germany thus was able to become what it is today: an independent actor that has begun returning to its position at the center of continental affairs — a "normal Germany." The end of the Cold War also moved the U.S. focus eastward to the Central European NATO member states. Moscow interpreted this as a direct confrontation but could do nothing about it at the time. Washington considered its ability to move eastward inevitable — a strategy that would limit Russian power in the future. But once Russia began resurging, Washington realized it would have to consolidate its influence in the region and face Moscow head on once again. Germany and to a lesser extent other Western European powers, such as France and Italy, have a fundamentally different view of Moscow's resurgence. Unlike the Intermarium Corridor countries, on which foreign powers are now making geopolitical moves as they were in Germany during the Cold War, Berlin is not troubled by Moscow's resurgence. Germany is wary of Russia's renewed strength but is not exposed to it directly on its borders. The Western European attitude toward Russia has created something of a division in the European Union and in NATO. Germany is looking to redesign the European Union, specifically the eurozone, to fit its national interests, and it is using the European sovereign debt crisis to facilitate its designs. Meanwhile, NATO's latest Strategic Concept, the alliance's mission statement formulated at the end of 2010 at the Lisbon Conference, is inadequate for the alliance because it tries to consolidate incompatible national interests and threat assessments. In the document, NATO tries to amalgamate Germany's push for an accommodating view of Russia with the Intermarium's apprehensions about Moscow's intentions. It also attempts to take into account U.S. commitments outside the Eurasian theater that, contrary to Central Europe's needs, prevent Washington from taking on the Russian resurgence fully. A military alliance that fails to consolidate around a unified threat perception will not be effective for long. (click here to enlarge image)

The Intermarium's New Reality

"Intermarium" is a term borrowed from inter-war Polish leader Gen. Jozef Pilsudski, who understood that Germany and the Soviet Union would not be permanently weak. His solution was to propose an alliance stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, encompassing countries west of the Carpathians. Today, this term is useful as a way to group together countries abutting Russia's sphere of influence that are wary of Berlin's relationship with Moscow. This essentially includes the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. It also could include Sweden and Finland, since the two are likewise wary of Russia and have interests in maintaining the Baltic states' independence from Moscow because they see the Baltic region as their own sphere of influence. (In the adjacent map, we included Sweden and Finland in the Nordic group, since they are largely leaders of that bloc.) The Intermarium wants to counter the Russian resurgence and understands that it cannot rely on Germany in doing so. These countries are also concerned that the U.S. engagement in the Middle East has made Central Europe a second-tier security priority for the United States. This concern is evidenced by Washington's decision to alter its BMD plans in September 2009 in exchange for Russian concessions in the Middle East. Although the BMD plan was later reconfigured, that initial trade-off between Washington and Moscow showed the Intermarium that the United States would not hesitate to put its more immediate concerns in the Middle East ahead of long-term strategic reassurances to Central Europe. (click here to enlarge image) The Intermarium countries are responding to this situation with two main strategies. The first is to maintain U.S. engagement as much as possible. The second is to create regional political and/or military alliances independent of NATO that can serve as alternatives to the preferred strategy of U.S. engagement in the region. The BMD network and its various components are the main example of the Intermarium's efforts to ensure a U.S. presence in the region. However, the United States has also made arrangements with individual countries, such as the temporary rotations of elements of a Patriot air defense missile battery and upcoming rotational deployments of U.S. F-16s and C-130s in Poland, along with the permanent stationing of support personnel. "Lily pad" logistical bases — pre-surveyed and prepared sites that can rapidly be made to serve as logistics hubs in a crisis — in Romania are another example of cooperation, as is the emphasis on network security (also called cybersecurity) in the U.S.-Estonian relationship, with the U.S. Secret Service recently opening an office in Tallinn focused on network security. Joint training under NATO and offers to host NATO infrastructure components in the region, such as the housing of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters in Poland, are also part of this engagement strategy. The problem is that the United States is engaged in two wars in the Middle East. While Washington is extricating its forces from Iraq, it is still heavily engaged in Afghanistan. Given these circumstances, the Intermarium countries are also turning to two regional alliances to build relationships with one another and with other actors similarly concerned with Russia's resurgence and Germany's acquiescence: the Visegrad Group (V4), which includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, and the Nordic-Baltic grouping. These two groups are only loosely affiliated, especially the Nordic-Baltic bloc (which sometimes includes the United Kingdom and Ireland), and have yet to formalize military components. The Nordic-Baltic grouping is also relatively new; the first formal meeting of its leaders took place in London in early 2011. The V4 decided in May to form a Visegrad Battlegroup under Polish command by 2016. The actual capacities of this battlegroup are yet to be determined, but the decision shows very clearly that the V4 is evolving from a primarily political grouping to one that places security at the forefront of its mission. Nordic countries share the same suspicion of Russia as the Intermarium countries; Sweden and Finland have interests in the Baltic States, and Norway is concerned with Russian activity in the Barents Sea. These countries and the United Kingdom are also concerned with the emerging German-Russian relationship. The Nordic-Baltic countries have a military component that was formed several years before the Nordic-Baltic political grouping came together: the Nordic Battlegroup, created in 2008 under the EU Battlegroup format. Its current members are Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia and Ireland, with Lithuania set to join in 2014. There are signs that the wider Nordic-Baltic political grouping could enhance its military component beyond this battlegroup by signing a comprehensive security agreement that would cover everything from peacetime natural catastrophes to common responses to military threats. The United Kingdom recently has shown interest in becoming involved with such a military alliance. The military components of the two regional alliances are thus in their infancy. Before such components can be formalized, there are many decisions to be made, including the decision as to which countries would actually be involved in security cooperation. They also need to decide under what auspices — and with what capabilities — that cooperation would be performed. It is unclear whether the countries involved would be prepared to accept the risks and costs of shared security structures, including providing the capital needed to create a meaningful military alliance. Integrating military operations and building interoperabilities require focus, time and sustained investment. Nonetheless, the V4 Battlegroup and Nordic-Baltic security cooperation must be viewed in the framework of the BMD relationship between the Intermarium and the United States. The fledgling military components are also clear examples of how NATO is fracturing into sub-regional alliances that better serve the national interests of the Intermarium and Nordic countries.