Colombia's most recent agricultural strikes began Aug. 19, when small groups of disgruntled farmers set up roadblocks in their communities. The areas most affected were the southwestern departments of Cauca, Narino, Putumayo, Caqueta and the more central but still poor rural departments of Quindio, Risaralda, and Caldas. Protests and roadblocks soon spread into the much more critical departments of Boyaca, Cundinamarca, and into the capital city of Bogota.
Initially, the protest groups were relatively fragmented, each with their own set of grievances and demands. However, the movement consolidated and built a common platform and negotiating team. A confederation of sorts was formed called Dignidad Agropecuaria, or Agricultural Dignity, and is composed of potato, cacao, rice, milk, onion, bean, cereal, legume, flower and sugarcane producers, as well as several truck driver unions protesting the high cost of fuel.
Realizing that it could no longer ignore the protests, the Colombian government entered negotiations with Dignidad Agropecuaria in Tunja, Boyaca department, on Aug. 29. At first the negotiations looked promising — the government immediately agreed to scrap import tariffs on agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides to prevent budget cuts from affecting the sector. But negotiations collapsed later that day when protests spread into the country's major cities, including Medellin, Cali and Bogota. Riots even erupted in poor neighborhoods on the outskirts of Bogota, such as Suba, Engativa, and Ciudad Bolivar, leaving two people dead.
In response, the government implemented a dry law and a curfew and deployed some 50,000 soldiers throughout the country to take down roadblocks. It also sent military aircraft to deliver supplies to areas where there were food and fuel shortages. It is unclear whether Dignidad Agropecuaria incited the violence, but Bogota blamed the group nonetheless and suspended negotiations. For the government, the show of force was politically expedient to demonstrate that it takes public security seriously, but crackdowns do not constitute a long-term solution to this kind of socioeconomic issue.
Negotiations have since resumed, though they have yet to generate any substantial agreements. In light of the gridlock, the Colombian Cabinet resigned Sept. 2 so that President Juan Manuel Santos can reshuffle the ministers. His administration has called for a National Pact for the Agricultural Sector and Rural Development to take place Sept. 12. He hopes this meeting will settle the dispute, but a resolution seems unlikely: Dignidad Agropecuaria has said it will not participate in the meeting because it was declared unilaterally and because Bogota has not responded to the group's demands.
Promises Not Kept
The farmers groups are protesting because they believe the government has abandoned them. Since the tenure of former President Alvaro Uribe Velez, Colombia has implemented many free trade agreements with most of the country's major trade partners, including the countries of North America and the European Union. These agreements increased market size and gave Colombian products duty-free access to some of the world's largest consumer markets — at least for the sectors that could compete internationally.
However, given that most of the country's agriculture production, with the exception of coffee and flowers, is consumed domestically, trade liberalization has opened up the country to cheaper imports, against which Colombia's domestic producers cannot compete. The price of agricultural goods has decreased, but the costs of producing these goods have remained constant. For many products, production costs exceed the price received at market. According to the farmers, trade agreements with the United States and the European Union will only imbalance the situation further.
Naturally agricultural producers oppose the free trade agreements and have called on the government dissolve them. Most likely the Colombian government will not roll back these agreements, but it may slow down the liberalization process and refocus on policies to bolster domestic production. In fact, in mid-July Colombian Finance Minister Mauricio Cardenas made a landmark statement that went largely unnoticed outside Colombia. He suggested that Colombia was at an inflection point and that the country should focus more on domestic production and less on market-expanding free trade agreements. This corresponds to a canceled meeting between Colombian and Chinese delegations analyzing a potential free trade agreement.
In addition to their opposition to the trade agreements, agricultural groups are also angry because Bogota has yet to follow through with agreements signed earlier in the year regarding subsidies, credit, imports and reduced prices for seeds, combustibles and fertilizers. The government will likely try to address the grievances in a way that does not require resorting to the kind of protectionism that would violate the terms of the agreements. Bogota will begin with cost-free measures such as reduced tariffs on inputs and cheaper and more readily available credit, but it will eventually be forced to implement measures that will cost the state money, such as guaranteeing minimum prices. But given the government's conservative management of the economy, Bogota probably will be able to tolerate increased expenditures in the agricultural sector. Because farmers remember the empty promises of the past, they will wait until these are implemented before calling off the protests.
Some Colombians have referred to this season of protests as the "Colombian Spring" — the obvious differences from events in the Middle East and North Africa notwithstanding. Already facing criticism for ineffective negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Santos cannot allow these protests to escalate if he wishes to be re-elected next year. While the free trade agreements already signed are ironclad, the government will likely be forced to implement measures long promised but never implemented.
