Unidentified gunmen shot and killed Brahmi outside his home in Ariana, a northern suburb of Tunis, before fleeing on motorbikes, according to Tunisian radio station Mosaique FM. Notably, this was not the first time Brahmi had been targeted. Unidentified assailants reportedly tried to kill him in January 2011, though the details of that attack are still unclear.
Brahmi was a former secretary-general of the Nasserism-inspired People's Movement, or Echaab Movement. On April 9, he announced that his party had joined the Tunisian Popular Front, a coalition of a dozen or so secular, leftist political parties and independents united in their opposition to Islamism. Belaid, who was killed in January, was a former coordinator of that coalition.
Competing Powers
Tunisia has been gridlocked politically ever since Ben Ali was forced from office. Ben Ali's power derived from his consolidation of the Constitutional Democratic Rally. In some ways, his administrations continued the policies and traditions of former President Habib Bourguiba and his Neo Destour party. Through a strong, unified party, Ben Ali dominated Tunisian politics, including the influential labor unions, the military and the country's various tribes. Municipal councils were elected only with the blessing of the central government. Ben Ali also built up the country's internal security forces and relied on them extensively. Unlike Egypt, Tunisia does not boast a large, politically influential military.
After Ben Ali's fall, Tunisia's various political parties competed for control of the country. Ennahda won the most seats in the interim National Constituent Assembly during the October 2011 elections. Compared to other regional Islamist parties, Ennahda has tried to work with its ideological rivals, as evidenced by its partnership with the secular Ettakatol and Congress for the Republic parties. Other political actors include the Tunisian Popular Front, which represents a small, left-wing and secular opposition contingency, and the Salafist Ansar al-Sharia group, which provides social services throughout the country but has not coalesced into a viable political party.
Also among the political opposition is the Call for Tunisia party, founded by former interim Prime Minister Beji Caid el Sebsi and made up of centrists, union members and former members of Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally. The increased popularity and influence of Call for Tunisia — and el Sebsi in particular — shows that remnants of the Ben Ali era still retain some influence. Moreover, a coalition of six parties united to form the Free Destourian movement on May 6. The movement claims to carry on the tradition of the Neo Destour party. Notably, unlike neighboring Libya, Tunisia has struggled in recent months to pass laws excluding officials of the pre-revolutionary era from holding office. (The assembly's failure to pass the bill has only added to the perceived ineffectiveness of Tunisian officials.)
So far, these various competing forces have prevented Ennahda's ruling coalition from passing a constitutional draft and setting a timeline for presidential elections. A fourth draft was presented in June, but 60 members of the National Constituent Assembly immediately signed a petition against it. Even President Moncef Marzouki said he was dissatisfied with the bill, telling Al Jazeera on June 17 that he would not run for political office again unless the draft was modified.
The assassination of Brahmi is simply the most recent indication that the political stalemate is destabilizing Tunisia's political and security environment, and other indications abound. Multiple groups in Tunisia have watched recent events in Egypt and tried to form their own version of the Tamarod grassroots opposition movement (though without the same kind of military backing available to Egypt's movement, it is hard to imagine how effective Tamarod Tunisia can be — its claim to have collected more than 800,000 signatures notwithstanding).
In addition, a vigilante group called the League for the Protection of the Nation and Citizens emerged recently, saying it must protect Tunisian citizens because the government has failed to do so. Meanwhile, the Tunisian General Labour Union said it would launch a new round of political dialogue to try to map the way to presidential elections, and Prime Minister Ali Larayedh has continued to insist that he is working to hold elections by the end of the year.
Legitimacy Lost
No one has yet claimed responsibility for Brahmi's death, but Ennahda will likely bear the brunt of popular unrest as it did when Belaid was assassinated six months ago, despite its immediate condemnation of the assassination. Elements from the previous regime will try to capitalize on the current popular unrest to undermine Ennahda's ruling position, while jihadists and other radical Islamists in the country will try to use the fallout to bring down the ruling coalition for their own reasons.
Since 2011, Tunisia and Egypt have both experienced major governmental upheaval; old regimes were deposed, and elections brought Islamist political parties into power. In July, the Egyptian military decided to end that experiment and assert control over the country. But Tunisia is the birthplace of the Arab Spring, and what happens there can gauge the potential for democratization in the Arab world and for relations between Islamists and secularists.
In some ways Tunisia has been more stable than Egypt. Ennahda has not been accused of the same incompetence as ousted Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood — though Tunisia's challenges were less daunting — and Tunisia has taken concrete steps forward, such as obtaining a $1.75 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund in June. But there is also no stabilizing force in Tunisia like the Egyptian military that can enforce order if the situation deteriorates.
The Islamist-led government in Tunis will face a serious challenge in the wake of the Brahmi assassination, and elements of Ben Ali's former party and radical Islamists will hope to take advantage of it. While there is no institution in Tunisia like the Egyptian military, the elements of the Ben Ali regime retain considerable influence and maintain ties with the unions and internal security forces.
Ennahda has shown itself willing and capable of cooperating with ideological rivals for the sake of political progress. It has also proved resilient to previous political violence and social upheaval. But the ruling coalition has not demonstrated an ability to move Tunisia forward by fulfilling its mandate to draft a new constitution, and realities can change quickly when legitimacy is lost. The interim government now faces the question of how many blows its provisional authority can sustain before public patience runs out.
