On Oct. 23, Tunisians will head to the polls to elect a 217-member National Constituent Assembly, tasked with drafting the country's new constitution and overseeing the formation of the new government. The first of any "Arab Spring" country to hold elections, Tunisia will also be conducting what is considered by many to be the country's first free democratic elections. The elected assembly is likely to consist of individuals from several political parties, including the moderate Islamist Ennahda party, previously banned under the regime of former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The outcome of the elections will serve as a test case for other regional countries facing similar unrest. Although Ben Ali has been removed from power, elements of his regime, including the military and the former ruling party, remain quietly behind Tunisia's political structure and will facilitate the elections in various capacities. Chief among many Tunisians' concerns regarding the elections is electoral fraud, which, if it occurs or is even suspected of occurring, will likely spark demonstrations and necessitate adjudication. The subsequent events will be important to monitor because whoever oversees that adjudication, be it the military or forces loyal to the interim government, will indicate who truly holds power in the country.
The Elections in Context
Tunisia garnered a great deal of media attention in mid-December 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi
set himself on fire to protest Tunisia's lack economic opportunity, spurring
demonstrations not only across Tunisia but across several Middle Eastern and North African countries. Protests and strikes have continued since Ben Ali's ouster, and while many Tunisians are pessimistic about the expected results of the upcoming election, others believe that this election will solidify the former regime's removal and pave the way for democracy. It is important to remember that even though Ben Ali was ousted, Tunisia did not undergo regime change; elements of the old regime are still operating and will continue to play a role in the new government. The military was instrumental in the Ben Ali's ouster whether they orchestrated it or allowed it to happen, and soon after vowed to protect the "
revolution" of the Tunisians. Since mid-January the military has helped fill the void left by Ben Ali, and its primary function has been to guarantee the success of the elections. Though interim Interior Minister Farhat Rajhi banned Ben Ali's former party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), on Feb. 6, RCD members continue to be a part of the political apparatus. Under the Tunisian constitution, former speaker of the parliament and RCD member Fouad Mebazaa became the interim president Jan. 15. Then on Feb. 27, Mebazaa appointed current interim Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi, who was also a part of the Ben Ali regime. Moreover, roughly 16 of the new political parties running in the Oct. 23 elections are either schisms of the RCD or are led by former RCD members. The four most prominent of these groups are Al Watan, headed by Kamel Morjan, who served as foreign minister and U.N. ambassador under Ben Ali; Al Mubadara, headed by Mohamed Jegham, former interior and defense minister under Ben Ali; the Justice and Liberty party, headed by former RCD member Souheil Salhi; and the Independence for Liberty Party, headed by RCD member Mohamed Lamine Kaouache. The interim government claims to have rid the political structure of RCD members, but an individual does not have to be an RCD member to be considered part of the regime. An individual's relationship to the regime elite can implicate him or her with the regime. These individuals are harder to pinpoint and eradicate from the political realm.
Other Participants
The Oct. 23 elections will take place in one round, wherein more than 60 political parties and 1,400 candidates are registered to participate. The Islamist party Ennahda is said to have the most support among Tunisians and is certainly the most popular Islamist party. This is due in part to the organization's funding and strong organizational structure. Ennahda's platform advocates women's rights, proposes a single-chamber parliament, and calls for an electoral system whereby the president is elected through the parliament. The legalization of Ennahda, which was banned in 1989, has spurred a strong reaction from secular individuals. Secularists believe Tunisian culture is under siege by Islamists and Muslim Brotherhood affiliates. However, Ennahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi, who had been living in exile in London until his return Jan. 30, is relatively more liberal than the more conservative Muslim Brotherhood leadership. Ghannouchi is aware some Tunisians distrust Ennahda, so he has tried to liken his party to Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), presenting it as a moderate party that is committed to democracy. That Ennahda's members remained in Tunisia after the party was banned has provided a grassroots infrastructure that has allowed the group to access a wide reach of individuals and cities. As a result, Ennahda is projected to garner a fair amount of support in the elections. But even if Ennahda wins a significant number of seats, the elections are unlikely to yield a clear majority party due to the saturation of participants and parties in the elections. Another notable party is the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), considered the largest secular party and the best-suited counter to Ennahda, despite its failure to gain the full support of the nation's youth. The PDP is relatively well-organized and well-funded compared to Ennahda, and it aims to enact a U.S.-style presidential system. Following the PDP in popularity is the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties (FDTL or Ettakatol), a social democratic party oriented somewhat to the left of the PDP.
What to Expect from the Elections
Only eight political parties participated under Ben Ali's rule, so many Tunisians understandably are overwhelmed or otherwise confused by this new process. Some do not even know they are electing a National Constituent Assembly, and even more are unsure as to the platform of each party and individual. The interim government has had a substantial amount of oversight in the upcoming elections and even postponed the original election date of July 24 to ensure transparency. Although transparency may have been a factor, the decision to postpone was made early on because Ennahda was by far the most organized and had the most support — the interim government wanted to make sure the election pool was well-populated to ensure that no one party gained a majority of seats. It is likely that elements of the regime Ben Ali left behind, including the military and RCD members such as the interim president and prime minister, were primarily concerned with Ennahda's gaining a clear majority, dramatically changing the political apparatus to which they had become accustomed under Ben Ali. These elements of the regime will allow the development of a civilian government and would not object to an arrangement whereby the new government is held responsible by the citizens, provided their political primacy is not threatened. Just as the interim government has concerns over the elections, so do Tunisian citizens. One major concern among voters and political parties is electoral fraud. To allay this concern, the interim government created the Higher Independent Authority for the Elections (ISIE), which will facilitate and monitor the elections alongside international election observers, including the Carter Center and the International Republican Institute. The police and armed forces will guarantee the safety of the elections and the military will be tasked with handling the election's logistics, including the transportation of ballot boxes. The regime likely will not interfere with election results — unless Ennahda or any other party win a majority and drastically change the political landscape that existed under Ben Ali. To put it bluntly, elements from the interim regime may interfere if the outcome threatens the status quo. Such a result would be circumscribed by the regime, which is trying to achieve a divided assembly that would not pose a threat to the interests of the establishment. Ghannouchi has already said Ennahda will return to the streets in protest and overthrow the elected assembly and the government if the results of Oct. 23 are marred by electoral fraud. Ennahda has touted that it will receive 50 percent of the popular vote and has said it will declare the elections rigged if it does not receive a large portion of the seats. Absent a clear majority, the results of the elections are somewhat irrelevant; there will always be a marginalized group who will be quick to denounce the validity of the elections. What is important is how the subsequent disputes are dealt with. It therefore will be important to watch for which force — military, interim president, prime minister or other factions of the government — will be responsible for adjudicating any claims of fraud made by Ennahda or other parties or groups. The governmental authority that assumes the role of adjudicator will reveal which force truly holds sway in post-Ben Ali Tunisia.
