Although the protests in Bahrain were nonviolent when they began, one opposition group called the February 14 Movement started to employ more violent tactics toward the end of 2011, involving the targeting of security forces and infrastructure with Molotov cocktails and setting fire to debris and tires on major highways. In April 2012, the group escalated its tactics and began constructing and detonating improvised explosive devices. Despite close scrutiny from the security apparatus and large-scale arrest campaigns, these tactics have continued, but their effectiveness and sophistication have not increased.
The explosive device used in the July 17 attack was constructed using a combination of homemade explosives and a gas cylinder. The device did not bear any distinct differences from previous devices used in Bahrain. However, the group responsible for the attack was not the February 14 Movement or any of its affiliated groups; it was Bahrain's youngest rebel group, the Al Ashtar Brigade, which has claimed responsibility for several bombings targeting security forces since the group's establishment on April 28.
The Al Ashtar Brigade shares the February 14 Movement's goal of bringing down the regime of Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa. Additionally, both groups follow the popular Shiite cleric Sheikh Isa Qassim — whose followers also include more mainstream and nonviolent opposition groups such as Al Wefaq. Moreover, both groups have said they want to construct large and effective explosive devices, but neither has demonstrated the capability.
There are, however, some distinctive differences between the groups. The most notable difference is that although the February 14 Movement clearly looks to Qassim as a religious leader, it does not claim to act in the name of religion, whereas every statement issued by the Al Ashtar Brigade invokes Allah and begins with a relevant passage from the Koran. All of the media the group produces has a prominent religious undertone, which is not seen in any other radical opposition group in Bahrain. Additionally, media reports and Bahraini security officials say that the group is connected to Iran through Bahrain's Shirazi religious movement. However, the government is quick to blame Iran for any incident of discord in the country, so it is not clear if the group has any real connections to Iran.
The other major difference is that unlike the February 14 Movement, which took a year to develop its more radical and violent tactics, the Al Ashtar Brigade was founded upon the use of violence to achieve its goal. The Brigade also appears more committed solely to the use of improvised explosive devices, while the February 14 Movement more often is involved in large protests, throwing Molotov cocktails and lighting fires in the streets.
Although the Al Ashtar Brigade aspires to launch attacks against the regime using explosives, it appears to face the same setback as the February 14 Movement: they lack the ability to procure the resources, materials and perhaps even know-how to create large, sophisticated devices. The difficulty of bringing illegal material into Bahrain is evident because the only explosives, weapons and firearms the rebels have been known to use are constructed using homemade explosive mixtures and rudimentary materials.
One way to determine if the Al Ashtar Brigade truly has connections to a foreign benefactor is to carefully track the group and whether it obtains the skills and materials necessary to construct sophisticated and tactically effective devices. Until then, low-level attacks against security forces are likely to continue, as elements of the anti-regime opposition grow even more disenchanted and marginalized by the Bahraini government.
