Since participating in the 2006 Palestinian elections, Hamas has struggled to reconcile its goal of being the premier Palestinian resistance movement and being a legitimate government. Hamas gained favor among Palestinians with militant resistance, not with its political credentials. Even in the Gaza Strip, where support for the group is strongest, Hamas has felt pressure to highlight its pedigree of resistance. This is due in part to increased boldness from Salafist-jihadist groups, which could undercut Hamas' authority if they appear more anti-Israel than Hamas. Moreover, Hamas cannot risk appearing to follow the same path as Fatah, which is now considered weak, corrupt and inefficient because of its failure to achieve Palestinian self-determination through negotiations.
Hamas has meanwhile struggled to gain legitimacy outside of the Palestinian territories. Regional neighbors and the United States do not condone Hamas' radical position toward Israel. However, the group has recently taken small steps to increase its credibility, especially since Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi won the Egyptian presidency and since Fatah's influence has waned. Hamas cannot allow a Palestinian state to be formed without its involvement.
The long-stalled reconciliation process between Fatah and Hamas is one way for Hamas to ensure that it will be part of the process. Joining the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which the international community considers the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, would give Hamas a chance to wield broad political power in Gaza and in the West Bank, and it would endow Hamas with the power to shape future negotiations with Israel. In addition, joining the Palestinian Liberation Organization would bestow on Hamas international recognition without it having to publicly moderate its position on the existence of Israel. Operating under the Palestinian Liberation Organization's umbrella would help Hamas mitigate its political vulnerabilities in dealing openly with Israel. In an April 4 interview, Hamas' deputy foreign minister reiterated that Hamas even accepts the idea of a Palestinian state within 1967 borders, though he still maintained that Hamas would not recognize Israel.
An Untenable Arrangement
Israel, on the other hand, has fewer constraints than Hamas. Compared to the varying levels of instability on Israel's borders, the Palestinian issue is relatively minor. Of course, Israel would prefer that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip be quiet. Israel does not want to face rockets from Salafist-jihadists as it prepares to meet more serious challenges on its borders: chemical and conventional weapons falling into the wrong hands in Syria, political and economic uncertainty in Egypt and the looming threat of Iran.
Israel deals with the Palestinian issue cyclically. It undergoes periods of peace negotiations followed by low-level military conflict. How it deals with the Palestinian territories depends on what is most effective at the time and the level of political pressure from regional neighbors and the United States. Israel's need for tranquility amid regional instability — and Hamas' evolution as a state-actor responsible for governance of physical territory — are two things that could bring Israel and the Palestinian territories closer together.
However, it is not in Israel's interest to recognize Hamas as a partner or to help bring about a Palestinian reconciliation that could extend Hamas' influence to the West Bank. Israel would prefer that the Palestinians remain divided, with Hamas responsible for security in Gaza and with Fatah responsible for the West Bank. That arrangement has become increasingly untenable as Hamas' popularity has risen.
In this context, Israel's April 30 airstrike in Gaza served two purposes. It deterred future rocket attacks from Gaza, and it put Hamas in a difficult position. Egypt and Qatar, two of Hamas' most important supporters, were represented in the Arab League delegation that met with Kerry on April 30, and it was the Qatari prime minister who addressed the media on behalf of the Arab League. But Qatari pledges are not going to be enough to bring Israel to the negotiating table with Hamas. And when Israel undertakes even limited military action in Gaza, Hamas is forced to embrace its role as a resistance movement, rather than move closer to engaging Israel directly.
A Matter of Timing
For Israel, it is unclear whether now is the time to enter negotiations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made Justice Minister Tzipi Livni responsible for Israeli negotiations with the Palestinians, but he has also supported a proposed law that would require a national referendum on any treaty involving relinquishing land under Israeli sovereignty. Such a law would subvert Livni's legitimacy in negotiations.
The referendum issues aside, Israel would need more than the Qatari prime minister's statement to pursue that path. Indeed, even Livni, who is among the most outspoken advocates of negotiating with the Palestinians, admitted that the Arab League Initiative would not allay all Israel's concerns. Israel probably would require from Hamas some form of recognition before accepting it as a partner — something Hamas simply cannot do. And so far, Netanyahu has kept silent on the matter.
For its part, the Arab League's involvement is guided by self-interest. Regional and global powers have always used the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for political reasons, but the Arab Spring made Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and especially Qatar much more cautious. They are seeking to establish a sense of regional order while pushing back against Iranian machinations by bringing Hamas into the mainstream.
Security interests in Sinai and the Muslim Brotherhood's affinity for Hamas make Palestinian stability important to Cairo. The United States seems to be pushing this re-engagement the most, perhaps hoping that an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians could help stabilize the region.
Ultimately discussions and agreements happening far away in Washington do little to alter the realities on the ground. Israel remains internally divided on the issue and has ample reason to be suspicious of Hamas as a potential partner. Hamas' need to maintain its military arm and to brandish its resistance credentials limit its ability to make the kinds of political overtures that would be necessary to make negotiations palatable for Israel, even as Hamas has taken small steps to moderate its political position. And without tangible signs of buy-in and sacrifices from Hamas and Israel, the fate of this latest revival of peace talks will be the same as that of Oslo, the Roadmap and the Arab Initiative.
