The outcome of the recent war in Gaza has enhanced Hamas' political fortunes. The group had already been on an upward trajectory since the beginning of the Arab Spring, especially after Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi assumed the Egyptian presidency. The most telling sign of Hamas' new confidence is Meshaal's visit to Gaza. It was the leader's first visit to any Palestinian territory since he left the West Bank after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and it was his first ever visit to Gaza. The Egyptian government under former President Hosni Mubarak opposed such a visit because it saw the Palestinian Islamist movement as a threat to its national security; Israel, of course, did not allow Meshaal to visit the territories and actually tried to assassinate him in Jordan in 1997.
A sympathetic administration in Cairo and the cease-fire that ended the Gaza war in November created the right conditions for Meshaal to visit. The visit follows Hamas' attainment of recognition from regional players, including Qatar, Jordan and other Arab capitals, after the group decided to end its relationship with Syria. The Hamas leader spoke at a large rally that was also attended by representatives from Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Indonesia and Malaysia. Meshaal made a key comment in reference to the power struggle between Hamas and Fatah, saying it was time for both sides to put their mistakes behind them. Hamas has come out in support of the Fatah initiative that led to the Nov. 29 U.N. General Assembly vote that recognized Palestine as a non-member state.
Tough to Reconcile
Past attempts at reconciliation between the two groups have failed, in large part because the Arab world was aligned toward Fatah while Hamas was in the Iranian-Syrian camp. Because of the sweeping political changes in the region, the latest reconciliation efforts have a far greater chance to succeed. Stratfor has learned that the Turks will be urging Abbas to take the lead on international affairs and to allow Hamas a greater role in matters of governance, especially in the West Bank.
The rivalry between the two groups seems to have subsided, but it has not disappeared. Fatah is in a position of weakness and likely would not want to enter into an agreement that would undermine its position in the long term. But isolating Hamas has not worked; the Islamist movement has grown in spite of Fatah's efforts to block it. For Fatah, a better way of trying to contain Hamas is thus to enter into a power-sharing agreement. The region's emerging Arab regimes, along with Turkey, see the formation of a coherent Palestinian state as being in their interest. Such an entity would help them gain leverage over Israel.
Abbas is in Turkey because he knows the Turkish government is close to Hamas and that Ankara can push the latter to work with Fatah. Meanwhile, Hamas, Turkey and other regional players realize that even a weakened Fatah cannot be ignored, and they know that Hamas and Fatah must work together if the Palestinians are eventually to have a state.
Both sides have signaled a willingness to accommodate each other in their respective territories. Fatah has given Hamas permission to organize its 25th anniversary celebrations in the West Bank town of Nablus on Dec. 13; Hamas will allow Fatah to do the same in Gaza next month on the 48th anniversary of the secular Palestinian movement.
A Tilted Playing Field
Still, there is a growing imbalance of power. While Hamas has grown stronger — especially after the recent Israel-Gaza war — Fatah has stagnated, and its recent successful push at the United Nations has not halted its slide. Abbas and his top associates have had to acknowledge Hamas' gains, and Fatah's decision to push ahead with the U.N. vote was likely informed by the need to make some gains of its own.
The move at least gives Fatah some room to bargain with Hamas over the pending power-sharing deal. Under any such agreement, Fatah will have to allow Hamas room to re-establish itself in the West Bank. Hamas in turn can allow Fatah space to operate in Gaza, seeking thereby to balance the presence of jihadist and Salafist groups.
Hamas stands to gain far more from resurgence in the West Bank than Fatah can hope to accomplish in Gaza, since Islamist factions dominate politics in the Gaza Strip. Fatah is also burdened by the perception that it is the Palestinian manifestation of the kind of secular Arab regime that is in retreat in the region.
In the West Bank there is a general disappointment with Fatah and its governance. There are signs of frustration and of a loss of faith in Fatah, and the West Bank Palestinian leadership is seen as geriatric, corrupt and ineffective. This creates an opening that Hamas can exploit.
Fatah is thus due for a generational leadership change. Under Abbas and his top associates, Fatah has lost coherence as an organization. The second-tier leadership, meanwhile, is unlikely to accept Hamas as a controlling force in a restructured Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization — the way to prevent Hamas from dominating the Palestinian political scene is to limit the extent to which the Islamist movement can operate in the West Bank. The process of reaching a deal, and the attendant internal debate, will likely exacerbate fissures within Fatah that Hamas could exploit down the road.
The West Bank is not that secular — in the 2006 election, Hamas routed Fatah, particularly in the West Bank, winning 74 of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. There is thus plenty of political space for Hamas to exploit, especially considering Fatah's current decline. Meanwhile, Gaza is much more Islamist than the West Bank is secular. The evidence is the presence and authority of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Salafists and jihadists. Fatah will not make much headway in Gaza.
The Regional Actors
Jordan's cooperation is another key factor determining Hamas' comeback in the West Bank. The Hashemite regime's favorable view of Hamas is evidenced by the two visits paid to the kingdom by Meshaal — a Jordanian citizen who was exiled from the country for 13 years — and his meetings with Jordanian King Abdullah II. In fact, the Jordanian monarch has sought Meshaal's assistance in trying to get the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood to end its boycott of the parliamentary election slated for late January.
Amman has a number of reasons for working with Hamas. First, Jordan simply cannot ignore Hamas, especially since the group (which is essentially the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood) is ascendant. Meanwhile, Fatah's decline has created a need for a more reliable Palestinian partner — Hamas needs Jordan, which means it will not seek to undermine Amman. Finally, the unrest throughout the Arab world has made it clear that governments cannot ignore popular sentiment, and cooperation with Hamas will help Amman domestically.
While Amman has welcomed Hamas leaders back into the country, it is not clear to what extent it will allow the Islamist movement to use Jordan in its efforts to re-establish itself in the West Bank. Amman's position has weakened during the Arab Spring. Hamas could bring some stability to the West Bank, and Amman's cooperation would come only in exchange for guarantees that would ensure the stability of the Jordanian regime.
But Hamas will not succeed in expanding in the West Bank unless Israel allows it. The ideological divide and conflict among the Palestinians was ideal from an Israeli point of view. When divided, the Palestinians pose little threat to Israel, and the latter can justify resisting negotiations on the creation of a Palestinian state by pointing out the lack of a credible negotiating partner.
That reality is fast changing, and regional players have accorded increasing recognition to Hamas. Israel is doing so itself, in fact, by not blocking Meshaal's visit to Gaza. Israel may not be able to do much about Hamas in Gaza, but it is not in Israel's interest to have to deal with Hamas in both territories.
Still, with Arab states and Turkey growing more supportive of Hamas, it may become quite difficult for Israel to keep Hamas out of the West Bank. Furthermore, Israeli-Hamas negotiations (albeit indirect and on tactical matters) in recent years have proved more durable than talks with Fatah, and Israel could negotiate more meaningfully with a Hamas-led Palestinian government.
It will still be a long time before Hamas can regain its former stature in the West Bank — let alone supplant Fatah as the leader of the Palestinian national movement. But the changed geopolitical dynamic in the wider region has extended to the Palestinian territories, where it has accelerated an already emerging trend: the rise of Hamas. This is the new reality that Israel is now figuring out how to manage.
