In the first quarter of 2013, there has been a 47 percent increase in Taliban attacks compared to the first quarter in 2012, according to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office. Attacks against local Afghan forces and civilians have dramatically increased, while attacks against coalition forces have dropped substantially. This fits with the International Security Assistance Force's new security strategy and withdrawal of combat forces since last year.
According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 2013 is on pace to match the violence in 2011, the most violent year in the Afghan war in terms of casualties and attacks. Despite some spectacular assaults in 2012, the overall number of attacks last year declined by nearly a quarter. The quality of attacks was also lower in 2012, with a few notable exceptions such as insider attacks, often referred to as green-on-blue attacks. This type of incident has come under control since the International Security Assistance Force made several procedural adjustments in how its personnel interacts with local forces, but there has been an accepted sacrifice in training quality and cooperation. Since the beginning of 2013, the quality of attacks on Afghan National Security Forces has risen, producing consistently high body counts.
One of the main drivers of the increased violence is that the United States and its allies have significantly reduced their overall footprint on the small, exposed and more vulnerable forward operating bases that were scattered throughout the countryside during the surge. More than 80 percent of such bases have been closed down or handed over to Afghan forces, while the International Security Assistance Force has concentrated its remaining troops. In addition, coalition forces no longer conduct the majority of presence or security patrols, having been replaced by local forces that receive limited support. There are also fewer troops and less materiel in the country. These changes have resulted in an international force that is smaller and continuing to shrink — one that is less accessible to Taliban militants and still qualitatively better than its local counterpart.
While coalition forces are seeing their role and presence decline, local forces have seen theirs increase. The natural result for the Afghan National Security Forces is that they — and the places they protect — are becoming steadily more vulnerable. The Taliban and their various factions are capitalizing on this shift by seizing territory whenever possible and attempting to discredit the government of President Hamid Karzai through continued challenges to Afghan security. In many ways, the International Security Assistance Force is putting Afghan forces in a position where they must learn and adapt quickly or risk failure.
The crux of the fighting has shifted from southern and central Afghanistan to the more rugged eastern portions bordering the Pakistani tribal regions. The terrain in this area facilitates the militants' logistical trains from sanctuaries in Pakistan. Many of the coalition forces who have left the forward operating bases had been located in these remote and largely inaccessible areas. The Afghan troops who have replaced them do not enjoy the air mobility of helicopters or the ability to amass firepower quickly through air assets and artillery — capabilities that are critical in combating militants in the mountains.
The decreasing security on the Afghan side of the border has caused a reciprocal effect on the Pakistani side. Cross-border militant raids against the Pakistani military have increased, and the Pakistanis has responded by shelling parts of Afghanistan and conducting large-scale operations in Afghan tribal regions. The increased instability is having a direct effect on peace talks. The Karzai government has called attention to Pakistan's violations of Afghan territorial sovereignty to stoke nationalist sentiment, similar to the way Karzai has publicly lashed out against the United States. For Pakistan, the situation has acutely demonstrated what Afghanistan could look like after 2014, when the International Security Assistance Force drawdown is set to be completed, and how that could impact Pakistan's own security. Talks between the various sides have been limited at best and lacking progress. In an effort to break the impasse, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has called a meeting between himself, Karzai and Pakistani officials in Brussels on April 24.
The Afghan National Security Forces will continue to have a bloody year while the International Security Assistance Force quietly leaves the country. The immediate question is whether Afghan forces can withstand the stress and losses. Coalition forces, especially air power and special operations forces, will likely not let the Afghan National Security Forces fail through 2014. However, the long-term question is whether Afghanistan can forge a competent fighting force despite the challenges ahead, or whether small fractures that form this year will lead to all-out rifts, clearing the way for a complete breakdown of the sovereignty of the Afghan government. The answer to that question will have direct implications not only for Afghanistan's internal stability, but also for the surrounding region.
