Notably, infiltration and insider attacks are not new trends; there have been instances of insider attacks and infiltrations across the world. For example, in November 2009, U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Hasan killed 13 people and injured 42 others at an army base in Fort Hood, Texas. In May 2012, a soldier with the Yemeni Central Security forces blew himself up during a military parade rehearsal in an apparent assassination attempt against the Yemeni defense minister. While the defense minister survived, roughly 100 soldiers were killed. In any case, the attack failed to capture U.S. attention and thus failed to affect the training assistance mission in Yemen. Indeed, these more recent attacks typically have not been as severe or as frequent as those in Afghanistan.
The dangers of having an army riddled with insurgent sympathizers or colluders are apparent in the ongoing Syrian conflict. The Syrian regime was never able to unleash the full force of its military on the rebels due to concerns over the troops' loyalty. The regime had to rely extensively on its elite forces and Shabiha paramilitary force to carry out most of the arduous clearing operations.
The Afghan Model
Over the past decade, few places have seen as many insider attacks as Afghanistan, which in some ways is ideally suited for such tactics. Culturally, Afghanistan and the United States differ drastically, so it should come as no surprise that their military cultures likewise differ. In fact, some customs common in the U.S. military are considered grievously insulting to Afghan troops. For example, platoon sergeants frequently use vulgarities when speaking to recruits — something Afghan troops deplore. That is not to say that vulgarities directly precipitate physical retribution. Rather, customs that seem to disparage local troops can create discontent, which can lead to insider attacks if nurtured by further perceived insults.
Other factors in addition to cultural differences facilitate insider attacks. Literacy rates are low in Afghanistan, and institutional recordkeeping has been scarce since the 1970s due to a breakdown in institutional infrastructure and bureaucracy. Conducting comprehensive background checks on recruits in such conditions is extremely difficult, making it relatively easy for insurgents to infiltrate the Afghan military to carry out insider attacks.
Intuitively, there is a significant NATO presence in Afghanistan and that means there are ample opportunities for insurgents to attack foreign troops. Unlike Russia during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, NATO coordinates closely with the Afghan National Security Forces — the alliance participates in training and joint patrols, for example. NATO recently has prioritized such operations so that the Afghan National Security Forces can learn to perform their duties adequately once NATO withdraws its troops. Naturally, this leads to more troop interaction, which in turn creates more opportunities for insider attacks.
The uniqueness of Afghanistan is apparent when one compares it to other countries with similar security environments. In Yemen and Somalia, for example, the potential for insider attacks exists, but the sparse interaction of foreign troops at the most basic levels of military operations impedes insurgents' efforts to carry out insider attacks against U.S. personnel in the country. There simply are not that many foreign trainers, and they tend to be assigned to the local military's elite units.
Insurgents around the world likely will learn from what is currently taking place in Afghanistan and Syria, and they may seek to mimic some of these insider attacks through government and military infiltration. But given Afghanistan's singularity, replicating the success of insider attacks in Afghanistan will prove difficult.
