On April 4, officials from Myanmar's National Democratic Force party said that Beijing had invited representatives from the party to visit China later in the month. The National Democratic Force is an opposition group founded by former members of the National League for Democracy — Myanmar's largest opposition party, led by Aung San Suu Kyi — who broke away after the latter group was temporarily barred from participating in the 2010 election. The invitation came after China's semi-official Huanqiu news published an editorial in mid-March calling on the Chinese government to change its position and invite Suu Kyi to China — an outreach that would be the first official contact between Beijing and the opposition since the National League for Democracy's landslide electoral victory in 1990 was immediately nullified by the junta.
For much of the past 20 years, Beijing's strategy toward Myanmar consisted of engaging primarily with the military government, the dominant force in Myanmar. Using this approach at a time when the junta was isolated internationally allowed Beijing to expand its strategic interests in the country. During this period, Beijing built up oil and natural gas infrastructure in Myanmar for use as an alternative energy corridor to the Strait of Malacca and gradually anchored the junta as a diplomatic ally for Beijing. Nonetheless, as Myanmar has moved forward on scaling back official military rule and reducing its international isolation, Beijing has grown concerned that Myanmar may be able to look beyond China and find other patrons.
Coinciding with Myanmar's external opening, domestic political reforms have allowed the country's internal conflicts — which have long existed but were suppressed during military rule — to publicly emerge and proliferate. Domestic political players, including opposition parties supported by the West, ethnic rebels along the borders who have historically fought with the central government, and Buddhist political activists, have capitalized on the opportunity to challenge the military as the dominant player in the political scene. Beijing's close relationship with Naypyidaw has been a main point of criticism by those opposed to the junta, putting China's presence and a number of prominent investment projects launched with the support of the military government in Myanmar at risk, including the massive Myitsone hydropower dam currently under construction in Kachin state.
Well before Myanmar embarked on the reform process, Beijing understood it could no longer rely on the military government alone to protect its interests. Still, as Beijing's strategic interests in the country deepened, particularly the need to secure access to the energy corridor, it found its options for reaching out to other groups in the country limited for fears of angering the military government. Now that Naypyidaw is pushing ahead with reforms intended to woo the West, Beijing is concerned that its core interests on energy security and border stability are at stake. Consequently, China has turned its attention to rebuilding relationships with various political movements in Myanmar, particularly the ethnic rebels who once had close ties with Beijing and the opposition parties. Beijing hopes to diversify its alliances within Myanmar and to form a counterbalance it can use as leverage on Naypyidaw.
As Beijing shifted its position on Myanmar's opposition, those groups also showed an interest in boosting ties with China as part of an effort to be taken seriously as pragmatic political actors. In past decades, Beijing reportedly considered approaching Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, but the Chinese were constrained by the party's criticism of Beijing's relationship with the military junta, not to mention the opposition's campaign for Western-style democracy in Myanmar — an issue that has prevented the Chinese government from appearing too close to the movement.
In addition, because the National League for Democracy intends to compete and possibly take power in the 2015 national elections, the party will inevitably need the Chinese to agree not to undermine the reform process or instigate ethnic tensions, particularly with Myanmar's various unsettled internal conflicts. As part of this effort, Suu Kyi has shifted from criticizing China's influence in Myanmar to a more reconciliatory approach, reiterating the importance of Sino-Myanmar ties and expressing interest in visiting China. Meanwhile, the investigatory commission led by Suu Kyi on a controversial China-backed copper mine in northeastern Mandalay region gave a surprise pass to the Chinese company to continue mining at the project, despite environmental concerns and local opposition. This was widely interpreted as Suu Kyi's rapprochement with Beijing.
Complicating Beijing's effort is the fact that Myanmar's opposition movement is divided amongst itself. The National Democratic Force, which broke away from the National League for Democracy in 2010 because its founders did not want to be subjected to the latter group's temporary ban from politics, has not reconciled with its parent party and is intent on remaining independent. Within the National League for Democracy, a dispute has emerged between older and younger members, with the elder leaders accused of being unwilling to make room for younger generations and appeal to young people; given these differences, the party is likely to continue fragmenting.
Moreover, the National League for Democracy's perceived inability to address the country's ongoing ethnic and religious tensions has led to the formation of other movements, such as the 88 Generation Students Group, which are looking to challenge the National League for Democracy's dominance of the opposition. That dominance has largely stemmed from Suu Kyi's international recognition as a Nobel Peace Prize recipient and formerly a high-profile political prisoner, but her party lacks governmental experience and has not yet introduced a systematic political agenda.
To a degree, none of the opposition parties in Myanmar could be considered politically mature organizations with clear policy goals or ideological beliefs. For this reason, Beijing sees the current moment as the right time to begin courting opposition parties while maintaining its ties with the leaders of the former military junta, thus diversifying its potential alliances within the resource-rich and strategically important country.
