Officials from the attorney general's office intend to appeal the March 27 ruling, in which Morsi's appointment of Talaat Abdullah as prosecutor general in November 2012 was overturned. The judgment had more to do with the political competition between the courts and the government than with the actual legality of the appointment, and a resolution to the issue does not appear to be imminent.

The tensions over the appointment highlight just how inherent an aspect the government's adversarial relationship with the courts has become in Egyptian politics. To an extent, preserving the judiciary's independence and authority is in the interest of the military — still the ultimate guardian of the Egyptian state — since it prefers there to be a system of checks and balances to help contain those in power. The military also wants to avoid becoming too openly involved in politics. But if the government is delegitimized by the Brotherhood's continued disagreements with the judiciary, the military could be pressured to act.

Legal Wrangling

Since the Muslim Brotherhood took power in June 2012, its relationship with Egypt's sprawling judicial system has been delicate at best. The two branches became openly adversarial in November 2012, when Morsi issued a series of controversial constitutional decrees that aimed to limit the courts' ability to challenge or overturn executive measures. The moves sparked intense public backlash and eventually forced the president to withdraw most of the measures in question. But Morsi did not completely backtrack; his order replacing former Prosecutor General Abdel Meguid Mahmoud with Abdullah remained.

Morsi believed that Mahmoud's unpopularity among Egyptians would legitimize the move. Mahmoud had been appointed to his position by former President Hosni Mubarak, and the prosecutor general came under scrutiny in October 2012 when 24 former government officials accused of organizing protests in favor of Mubarak during the Egyptian revolution were summarily acquitted. Morsi then tried to remove Mahmoud from the post by giving him the ambassadorship to the Vatican, but he refused the transfer.

Morsi thought replacing Mahmoud would help appease the opposition, but the move backfired. Fault was found with Abdullah anyway, and opposition groups and Egypt's judiciary have, for various reasons, been calling for his removal ever since. On March 26, elements from several opposition groups — the National Association of Revolutionary Forces, the April 6 youth movement, the Dostour Party, and the Popular Alliance — marched on Cairo's high court in protest of Abdullah's alleged pro-Brotherhood bias. The opposition believes Abdullah is too close to Morsi and has been angered particularly by Abdullah's order on March 25 to arrest five political activists on charges of organizing violent protests outside the Muslim Brotherhood's headquarters a week earlier.

The Elections Issue

The March 27 ruling is only the most recent manifestation of competition between the judiciary and the Muslim Brotherhood. On March 6, an administrative court overturned a decree by Morsi that had scheduled the beginning of parliamentary elections for April 22. The case has been referred to Egypt's Supreme Administrative Court, but a decision on the matter has already been delayed twice, most recently on March 24 when the ruling was pushed back to April 7. At an Arab Summit in Doha on March 28, Morsi reportedly said he expected the elections to be held in October. But given the government's inability to build consensus over elections so far and its interests in holding them, Morsi's statement deserves a healthy dose of skepticism.

In the meantime, the challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood will be managing Egypt's security and economic issues without undermining the legitimacy of the Morsi government. For now, the Brotherhood can weather electoral delays and the occasional embarrassment of a judicial ruling against Morsi, but there are limits to how long the Brotherhood can wait for elections, especially if security in the country deteriorates.

The military has as much an interest in Morsi's government remaining in power as it does seeing that power limited by the judiciary. But the competition between the two branches could undermine Morsi and become a lightning rod for social discontent in the form of, say, police strikes, discontent among internal security forces, or even a proliferation of vigilante defense groups. The military could thus find itself in an increasingly uncomfortable situation — one that would require it to take on a more public role of maintaining order.