The military prefers to stay out of Egypt's day-to-day affairs, but its brief period of direct rule exposed the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to public ire. Not wanting to antagonize Egypt's protest movement further, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces delegated loyal security forces to quell the public — a move the military has made countless times before — which enabled the military to retain its prominence.

Joining the Protests

Since early 2011, Egypt has seen a multitude of protests over a multitude of issues. In October 2011, rank-and-file police officers joined the protests, staging widespread, if brief, demonstrations over better working conditions and higher wages. They threatened to strike repeatedly throughout 2012 over similar grievances, but they refrained from doing so until February 2013, when hundreds of police officers protested what they saw as their use as a political tool. During the protests, the Interior Ministry headquarters were shut down in seven provincial capitals.

Since the initial demonstrations, members of the Central Security Forces have joined low-ranking policemen in sit-ins in Cairo and in cities in the Sinai, Nile, Nile Delta and Canal regions. In addition to calling for better work conditions, security officials also demanded weapons for rank-and-file officers, justice for police officers killed in clashes during recent protests, better benefits and the resignation of Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim. In some cases, police officers have been promised higher wages, and the Interior Ministry has agreed to purchase 9mm pistols. But these efforts have not ended the strikes.

Currently, hundreds of security forces and police officers are staging sit-ins in northern Sinai, the Suez Canal, Mansoura, Alexandria and Port Said. So far, the sit-ins have not led to major or long-lasting disturbances; most have only caused temporary closures of administrative and government buildings. However, continued strikes could have serious security and political implications.

Their refusal to work contributes to a rise in instability and lawlessness, especially in places where rioting and protests are prevalent. In some areas, striking police officers returned to work March 11 on the condition they would not try to quell protests. Without police and security forces regulating angry crowds of protesters, some of the rioters may inflict more physical damage to state infrastructure and threaten government employees, who the protesters resent.

In some places, the military has been called to act in the police's stead. On March 8, the police strikes compelled the military to assume control of security in Port Said, where strikes and riots actually killed people in 2013. The military's primary role previously had been securing key government installations and buildings in the city. Although some protesters have been advocating military security in Port Said, many remain skeptical of the transition. It is unclear how the military will handle the unwelcome responsibilities of being used directly as government enforcers.

Military Reliance

The ongoing police strikes present a significant challenge to the military-Muslim Brotherhood alliance. The military's previous social management system is under increased pressure. Cairo's growing economic problems leave little room for addressing the material demands of the security forces, and acquiescing to the security forces' demands could establish a precedent that could be used by other frustrated government and private institutions.

The current strikes also present a new obstacle to Egypt's ruling authority. Although the political demands of the Interior Ministry agencies ostensibly target the Muslim Brotherhood's political leadership, they demand a response from the military both through its role as defender of the nation and as the only entity capable of containing the rise of the Brotherhood or replacing the striking security forces in the streets. Both are equally negative propositions for a military looking to avoid the responsibilities of direct state management.

Moreover, the political system can do little to stabilize the security situation without relying directly on the military. Following a March 11 announcement from the Egyptian prosecutor general's office urging citizens to conduct civilian arrests, local opposition and Salafist political groups vowed to organize themselves to replace the striking police in their neighborhoods. The announcement was met with swift condemnation from the military, which said that it would not tolerate the formation of "private militias."

The situation underscores the fact that there are no quick fixes to Cairo's current problems. Cairo's economic problems are not easily solved, and without economic reform, domestic unrest will continue, eventually necessitating military involvement in the absence of domestic security forces. The Egyptian military will try to avoid direct conflict with protesters as best it can so that it can maintain its prestige and its unpredictable ability to use force — its two levers for quelling dissent.