The sharp fall in the value of the currency prompted Fernandez to call an emergency Cabinet meeting the evening of March 20. Confidence in the peso fell as a result of a March 18 tax bump on Internet transactions involving purchases of foreign products, from 15 percent to 20 percent. The parallel market, which hovered around 7.5 pesos to the dollar in January, reached 8.75 pesos to the dollar on March 20. The official exchange rate is around 5.1 pesos to the dollar, a 70 percent difference. Argentines' limited faith in the value of the peso is not a new phenomenon, but the diverging official and unofficial rates are putting new pressure on Argentina's currency regime.

The government is likely considering a devaluation of the currency. On a crawling peg, the Argentine peso has been slowly devaluing against the dollar since July 2008 — and since January 2010, the currency has gradually devalued by 24 percent. A sharper devaluation could enable the Argentine Central Bank to better control demands on the institution's foreign exchange reserves.

But devaluation would also worsen the country's already high inflation, which could rise above 30 percent in 2013. Efforts to control inflation have included widespread price controls that may now be extended until legislative elections in late 2013. Argentina's inflation is driven foremost by monetary expansion that grows on average by about 34 percent annually. Increasing the money supply helps to fund policies that keep a range of consumables relatively cheap, including transportation, utilities and food. Devaluation, however, would raise the cost of imported goods and could worsen the overall inflation problem.

The ultimate goal of the government is to secure control over foreign exchange resources within the country while maintaining policies that cater to consumers. With only limited access to foreign capital markets, the trick for Argentina is to keep a tight grip on the country's balance of payments. This is the reason for the host of capital and trade controls that have been enacted over the past two years.

But these policies have significant negative effects. Inflation drives up costs to Argentine producers and the slow crawl of the pegged currency means that the effective profit margin for exporters shrinks every year. This is especially important in the agriculture sector. Agricultural products constitute more than half of Argentina's total exports — of which soybeans are half, by value — and agriculture export taxes account for 5 percent of government revenue.

As a result of narrowing profit margins, high government export taxes and strict controls on the quantity of wheat and corn that can be exported, the agriculture sector is gearing up for a political fight with the Argentine government. Having become highly organized during the 2008 confrontation with the government over soybean export taxes, the farmers are looking once again to effect change.

The threat of holding back soy exports has been aired, and protests that resemble those seen during the 2008 crisis could begin as early as April. If the government does not significantly change its policies, these protests will likely be even more organized and galvanized in 2014.

While Argentina's agriculture sector benefits abundantly from the fertility of the Pampas region, it has not always been the most important source of income. At the beginning of the 21st century, Argentina was a significant exporter of hydrocarbons. But the price controls and regulatory environment of Fernandez and her now deceased husband and predecessor Nestor Kirchner led to a decline in exploration and production alongside a rise in consumption.

The country is now a net importer, and energy imports represent the single biggest threat to the country's balance of payments. It was this danger that prompted the nationalization of energy company Repsol YPF in 2012, and the government is counting on a resulting increase in oil and natural gas production from YPF now that it is under new management. But the challenge is that in the process of nationalizing YPF, the Argentine government proved itself an unreliable business partner. Moreover, drawing real investment into the sector is proving difficult. Without a significant increase in energy production, Argentina's options will dwindle. In all likelihood, the prospects of a political and economic crisis are growing.