Given that the new Iraqi state was built under his watch, al-Maliki has been able to assume a great deal of power over the years. The country has had two elections since the approval of its new constitution in 2005, both of which produced Shiite majorities that resulted in coalition governments led by al-Maliki. In essence, since its emergence, the new system has not experienced a transfer of power. That fact, along with the already delicate communal balance, renders the Iraqi state fairly fragile.
From al-Maliki's perspective, the first objective cannot be accomplished without the second. As a result, he has tried to undermine opponents in parliament and has assumed powers well beyond constitutional limits, for instance, taking control of the security and energy sectors.
Al-Maliki's attempts to solidify his power have upset his fellow Shia, especially his main political rival, the al-Sadrite movement. However, the Shia have restrained their rivalries to ensure that the Sunnis cannot threaten their newfound power. Freed from the challenges of rival Shiite factions, al-Maliki has focused on keeping the Sunnis weak.
The Sunnis and al-Maliki's Dwindling Support
Initially, al-Maliki worked against the Sunnis by exploiting divisions and by drawing significant Sunni factions into the State of Law coalition. However, the last elections in March 2010 demonstrated the shortcomings of that strategy. In those elections, the State of Law came in second, winning two seats fewer than former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's non-sectarian al-Iraqiya List — in large part because most Sunnis backed Allawi's party. Had he not agreed to merge the State of Law with the Iraqi National Alliance, another Shiite group, al-Maliki would not have secured a second term.
After nine months of negotiations to form his second administration, al-Maliki knew the Sunnis were still powerful, primarily because they had aligned with al-Iraqiya, the non-sectarian nationalist group with considerable nationwide appeal — a challenge for al-Maliki's sectarian agenda. Though he did not fulfill his promises made to al-Iraqiya in exchange for joining his government, al-Maliki largely avoided confrontation until after the departure of U.S. troops at the end of 2011. The day after the U.S. military withdrawal, al-Maliki accused the country's highest-ranking Sunni official, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, of orchestrating several large-scale terrorist attacks in the country and ordered the arrest of many members of al-Hashemi's security detail. Al-Hashemi sought refuge in the autonomous Kurdistan region before going into exile, where he has remained (spending most of his time in Turkey) because the Iraqi judiciary sentenced him to death in absentia.
Due to divisions within al-Iraqiya and al-Hashemi's lack of broad Sunni support, the incident did not elicit a strong reaction from either al-Iraqiya or the Sunni community. However, al-Hashemi's being given sanctuary by the Kurds exacerbated Shiite-Kurdish tensions. (The row between the Shia and Kurds has steadily increased in the months since, with the two sides now battling for security control of the disputed, energy-rich Kirkuk region.) As a result, al-Maliki is simultaneously fighting the Sunnis and the Kurds, making his Iraqi Shiite allies and his Iranian supporters uncomfortable with his rule.
Stuck with al-Maliki
In early 2012, the largest Shiite political movement in parliament, the al-Sadrite movement, threatened to side with the Kurds and Sunnis, who were discussing initiating a vote of no confidence against the prime minister. Of course, the leader of the al-Sadrite movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, is motivated by his desire to eventually replace al-Maliki's faction as the leaders of the Shia. Nevertheless, in the interest of the Shiite community, he did not follow through with his threat. Though al-Maliki is a liability, Iran and the Iraqi Shia realize that replacing him without disturbing the Shiite-dominated political order would be difficult.
Similarly, the Kurds have issues with al-Maliki. Like the Shia, the Kurds have territorial disputes with the Sunnis, but al-Maliki's push for a strong central state encroaches upon their desire for increased autonomy. Still, they do not want to counter al-Maliki badly enough to risk strengthening the Sunnis.
Al-Maliki is aware of the Shia's and Kurds' reservations about challenging him, but he overestimated his advantage when he went after his own finance minister, Rafi al-Issawi. On Dec. 19, al-Maliki began arresting members of al-Issawi's security detail on terrorism charges. Unlike al-Hashemi, al-Issawi hails from a prominent tribe based in Fallujah — the center of the Sunni insurgency from 2003 to 2007 — and so al-Maliki's targeting of him triggered widespread protests from the Sunni community.
Syria's Role and Early Elections
Another factor in the Sunni reaction is the Sunni uprising in neighboring Syria. Iran's regional opponents (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others) have been hoping that once Syrian President Bashar al Assad loses control of Damascus, the Sunnis' increased clout would spill over into Iraq, rolling back Iranian influence there. In fact, there is already evidence that there is some level of cross-border coordination between Sunnis in the two countries — due in large part to al-Maliki's controversial policies.
The protests in Iraq are the most significant Sunni uprising in five years and have knocked al-Maliki off balance. In response, the prime minister offered to release 700 female Sunni detainees who have been incarcerated for years. Seeing the government reeling has emboldened the Sunnis, who are now calling for early elections — an option that is also being considered by the Shia as a way out of the crisis, especially considering that elections are due in a little more than a year. However, elections are unlikely to defuse the crisis because the opponents of the Shia and Iran want to erase Iranian influence in Iraq. In general, Iraqi elections tend to aggravate the country's deep ethnic and sectarian divisions because they produce highly fractured legislatures and, given the sectarian war brewing in Syria, the next election will probably have an even more polarized outcome.
Sunnis boycotted the first election in 2005 and were divided during the 2010 vote. They are likely to be more unified the next time, which means that cobbling together a coalition government will be even more difficult. Moreover, the Kurds would want to use this sectarian division to demand greater concessions on issues related to their autonomous status.
The Sunnis will be unlikely to accept their current share of political power, increasing the risk of violence. There is a strange alignment of interests between Syrian Sunni forces, transnational jihadists and Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, all of whom have their reasons for wanting to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq. Simply put, the risk of sectarian violence in Iraq is at its highest since the end of the Sunni insurgency around late 2007.
Iran Seeks a Political Solution
Iran is well aware of the stakes. While Tehran tries to maintain influence in post-al Assad Syria, it wants to make sure it does not lose ground in Iraq. The Iranians need to protect the Shiite-dominated order, which is currently more threatened by the problems created by al-Maliki than by the Sunni protests.
Al-Maliki's power grab has not just galvanized the Sunnis, it has also upended Iran's traditional strategy for managing Iraq, which consists of supporting rival Shiite forces. Al-Maliki's moves to institutionalize an independent power base has made it difficult for Iran to control him. When the Iraqi government's tensions with the Kurds and the Sunnis were under control, this was not a problem. But with the events in Syria, and with regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Turkey working to loosen Iran's grip in Iraq, Iran can no longer ignore al-Maliki's unilateralism. At the same time, al-Maliki is not easily replaceable.
Ideally, Iran wants to find a replacement for al-Maliki who can create a new power-sharing mechanism in the country that satisfies the Sunnis without empowering them. In theory, one of al-Maliki's associates in his party, Hizb al-Dawah — such as his subordinate, Ali al-Adeeb — could replace al-Maliki in the same way that he replaced his predecessor, former interim Prime Minister and veteran Hizb al-Dawah leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari. But unlike al-Jaafari, who governed for barely a year, al-Maliki has deeply entrenched himself in the republic.
Replacing al-Maliki would also require a new power-sharing agreement among the Shia that could lead to infighting and weaken the community's position in the country. Therefore, Iran has no choice but to get the various Shiite factions to rally behind al-Maliki. For now at least, Iran is concerned with resolving the Iraqi crisis politically and preventing the situation from descending into violence.
A political resolution would require a coherent and unified Shiite political bloc as well as concessions to the Sunnis that do not undermine the Shia's dominance. While not impossible, both of these tasks will be difficult for Iran to achieve. Major concessions, such as changing the terrorism laws and giving Sunnis more say in policymaking, would weaken the Shia, while limited concessions risk emboldening the minority community.
Although it cannot be discounted, the chances that Iran can manage the situation politically are slim. This means that Iraq could experience a fresh bout of sectarian conflict. Regardless of how the situation unfolds, Iran's position in Iraq is likely to weaken.
