Al-Maliki's State of Law coalition holds the Iraqi premiership for two reasons. First, the coalition has the support of Iran and a coalition of Iraqi Shiite partners. Second, al-Maliki reached a power-sharing agreement with Sunnis and Kurds in November 2010 that ended an eight-month political stalemate and set the conditions for al-Maliki's second term as prime minister.
However, al-Maliki has breached the agreement with the Sunnis and Kurds. Since the U.S. military withdrawal in December 2011, he has accumulated more power. Al-Maliki now has oversight of the oil ministry through his appointment of Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Hussein al-Shahristani. Al-Maliki also has control of the military and intelligence services because he is the acting interior minister, defense minister, national security minister and chief of the military.
To further solidify his control, al-Maliki began eliminating potential rivals. In December 2011, al-Maliki reportedly banned Sunni Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq from Cabinet meetings and issued an arrest warrant for Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi; both men are members of the Sunni-backed al-Iraqiya List. He also arrested Faraj al-Haidari, a Kurd who serves as the head of Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission and who oversaw the March 2010 parliamentary elections in which al-Maliki's party garnered a disputed second place.
Al-Sadr Speaks Out
So far, al-Maliki has not targeted his Shiite coalition allies, but those allies are not waiting for him to strike first. Instead, al-Sadr — one of Iraq's most prominent Shiite leaders — is capitalizing on the growing opposition to al-Maliki's ambitions. When he spoke out against al-Haidari's arrest, al-Sadr became the first high-profile Shiite to criticize al-Maliki's treatment of non-Shias. Al-Sadr's remarks also signaled growing concern from Tehran — which supports both al-Sadr and al-Maliki — about the possibility of Shiite dominance in Iraq weakening.
In response, al-Maliki visited Iran on April 22 to (apparently unsuccessfully) allay Iranian fears that he was intent on consolidating power at the risk of undermining the Iraqi power structure that Iran had created. Al-Sadr then visited Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdish Region, meeting with Barzani in Arbil on April 26. This meeting was not a unique event, but al-Sadr has been using the growing opposition to al-Maliki to put the prime minister in a position where he cannot undermine Shiite authority. That position will also advance al-Sadr's objective to replace al-Maliki and his allies.
Al-Maliki is betting that his Shiite allies will not break rank, yet the Shiite bloc is divided. The Shia want Baghdad to remain in Shiite hands, but no faction wants another faction to hold too much power. Meanwhile, the Arab Sunnis resent the autonomy granted to the ethnically Indo-Iranian Kurds, and the two groups are involved in a dispute over ownership of the oil-rich region of Kirkuk. The groups are not natural allies, yet neither one could challenge al-Maliki on its own.
Al-Maliki's Next Moves
With the addition of al-Sadr to the coalition of forces against al-Maliki, the prime minister is on notice that he will need to either rein himself in or face a united front of opposition and a vote of no confidence. Though the no-confidence vote is unlikely, it is possible, especially given the increase in rhetoric on the issue coming from all sides. Iran likely will intervene further before such a vote is held in order to prevent further weakening of the Shia's hold over the current system and lessen the risks to the entire political system put in place with Iran's participation.
Al-Maliki's gradual accumulation of power has created a dilemma for Iran and Iraq's Shia in terms of their collective imperative to maintain a Shiite hegemony in Iraq. Tehran and its Iraqi Shiite allies need to contain al-Maliki but cannot weaken him too much for fear of undermining the Shiite dominance over the Iraqi political system. Al-Maliki's primary concern will be placating his own Shiite base, but he might grant some superficial concessions to the Sunnis and Kurds while using their natural divisions to weaken their position.
But Al-Maliki has been planning his power consolidation for some time and is not likely to be intimidated by procedural threats. If any concessions are made, they most likely would be to al-Maliki's Shiite competitors in Iraq. There are enough divisions between the Sunnis and Kurds to exploit in order to weaken their tenuous alliance. Co-opting the other Shia would reduce the opposition to al-Maliki and do away with any Sunni-Kurd alliance expectation of support. Al-Sadr has long challenged al-Maliki in hopes of strengthening his own power base and influence in Baghdad. It is a reasonable expectation that some key political positions held by al-Maliki or his appointees will be made available to al-Sadr's followers or other Shiite factions in Iraq. Furthermore, granting concessions to other Shiite groups would assuage Iran's fears that the Shiite base — and thus control over Iraq — is fracturing further.
Al-Sadr's continuing vocal opposition is evidence that Al-Maliki's visit to Iran, meant to reduce domestic pressure on him, ultimately failed. Although Iran does not want to see Shiite control over Iraq disintegrate, it sees al-Maliki's growing vulnerabilities as a way to increase his dependence on Tehran for support, and it sees intra-Shiite competition in Iraq as a means of containing al-Maliki.
