Tensions between Iraq and Kuwait can be traced back through history. Iraq has repeatedly made claims that Kuwait is an Iraqi territory, even during the days of the Ottoman Empire when Turkish representatives in Basra claimed Kuwait as part of the Ottoman province. Additional claims were made in the 1930s and 1960s. Then in August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and occupied the country until U.S.-led forces pushed it out in early 1991.  

It has taken more than 20 years and another war in Iraq for Kuwait to begin to re-emerge. Kuwait has experienced economic growth across the board, with 13 consecutive years of budget surpluses and the development of several major projects, including a free trade zone and The Avenues Mall. Still, Kuwait City is hindered by an internal power struggle. Meanwhile, Iraq is also re-emerging, albeit slowly and in fits and starts. The two countries' return to form will soon give way to a mutual reassertion of their decades-old rivalry.  

Ports of Contention  

Though they have had their disagreements, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are historical allies. They share a border and a history: The earliest Kuwaitis migrated from the Najd in central Saudi Arabia; Kuwait's ruling al-Sabah family is related to Saudi Arabia's al-Sauds; and Kuwait provided sanctuary for the founder of modern-day Saudi Arabia, Abdulaziz ibn Saud, when he was ousted from Riyadh and served as a launching point for his reconquest of the Najd five years later. They also share common enemies, Iran and Iraq.

Iran, on the other hand, has seized a historic opportunity to transform Iraq, its former foe, into a buffer on its western flank. In the 1980s, Iraq and Iran fought a bloody, eight-year war. But Tehran exploited the political and security vacuum created by the ouster of Saddam Hussein to put Iraq under its control. Shia account for 65 percent of Iraq's 31 million citizens and now constitute the majority in the government. Iraq has thus become a vehicle for Iranian actions and will be even more so now that Iran has lost control of Syria.

Both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would prefer to see an Iran contained to the Iranian plateau. But with 30-35 percent of its population having Persian and Arab Shiite descent, Kuwait will always be careful in its relations with Baghdad and Tehran. Indeed, Kuwaiti authorities have arrested locals suspected of spying for Iran. Kuwait does not trust Iran, and Iran's influence in Iraq only adds to Kuwait's sense of vulnerability, giving the Kuwaitis another reason to align with Saudi Arabia. 

The Saudis, however, can afford to alienate Baghdad and work through Kuwait to pressure Iraq and through Iraq to pressure Iran. Saudi Arabia's greater concern is the Shiite power, Iran. An off-balance Iraq limits Iran's reach, and with its setbacks in the war in Syria, Tehran will be even more concerned about its position in Baghdad. 

Iran has recently tried to shore up that position by enhancing military cooperation with Iraq. (Iran's defense minister, Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, visited Baghdad in early October, the first visit by an Iranian defense minister since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.) Iraq's Shiite leadership is fractured but will most likely remain under Iran's influence in the immediate future. But over the next few years, questions about Iran's strength may widen the natural divisions in Iraqi politics. Pressure points such as the Khor Abdullah channel — and more generally, Iraq and Kuwait's competition — in the northwestern Persian Gulf will rise in importance. Kuwait and Iraq will be more important not only for their own conflict but also because they will serve as proxies for the larger regional sectarian divide.