The al-Sabah family's internal divisions are at the root of the current political crisis. The family's two main factions — the al-Jaber branch and the al-Salem branch — have historically alternated control of the post of emir, the country's highest office. The crown prince has typically represented the branch not in power and his eventual ascension ensures the balance between the two branches.
Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah, a member of the al-Jaber branch, held the emirship from 1977 until his death in 2006. He was succeeded by a member of the al-Salem branch, Sheikh Saad Abdullah al-Salem al-Sabah. However, Sheikh Saad held the post for only nine days, abdicating due to health concerns and pressure from the ruling family. The current emir, a member of al-Jaber branch, replaced him. After ascending to the throne, Sheikh Sabah broke with tradition and named two other al-Jaber members — his half brother Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah and nephew Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Ahmed al-Sabah — to be crown prince and prime minister, respectively, and thus the second and third in line for the throne.
Sheikh Sabah's maneuvering meant the al-Salem branch would be denied its turn at the post. The move was an unprecedented attempt to shut the al-Salem branch out of power for the foreseeable future and has opened a breach between the branches of the ruling family.
This division has manifested itself in the country's other political institutions, especially the parliament. Though the emir holds ultimate political authority and is responsible for naming ministerial officials to their posts, the popularly elected 50-member parliament can block or propose legislation and can summon ministers for questioning — a process known in Kuwait as grilling. Sheikhs and factions within the ruling family use alliances with various lawmakers or political blocs to advance their interests. This was evident when opposition lawmakers and the al-Salem branch of the ruling family used parliament to target one of the emir's controversial appointments, Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad.
During Sheikh Nasser's tenure as prime minister, which ran from 2006 through November 2011, parliament called in numerous members of the Cabinet for grilling, a common tactic that often leads officials to resign. The prime minister himself eventually resigned after parliament undertook an investigation that charged him with bribing lawmakers. After appointing then-Defense Minister Sheikh Jaber al-Mubarak al-Hamad al-Sabah to replace Sheikh Nasser, the emir dissolved parliament in February for the fourth time since 2006 and called snap elections. Far from quelling the conflict, the election appears to have further empowered opposition forces in parliament.
Kuwait's Opposition
The Kuwaiti opposition largely represents Islamists and tribal elements of society and is drawn almost exclusively from the country's Sunni majority. The government derives its support from Kuwait's Shiite minority and the elite merchant class.
The opposition won 34 of 50 seats in February elections, dealing a defeat to the government, its allies and Kuwait's more secular merchant families. The victory can be credited in part to an electoral redistricting in 2006 that reduced the total number of districts from 25 to five. Tribal areas make up the entirety of two districts, giving the tribal bloc 20 guaranteed seats and strengthening their role in the opposition.
The electoral victory further emboldened opposition lawmakers and their supporters within the ruling family. Opposition lawmakers have since filed or threatened to file several motions to question the new prime minister and his Cabinet. Finance Minister Mustafa al-Shimali and Social Affairs and Labor Minister Ahmed al-Rujaib have resigned since April, one following a grilling and the other rather than facing one. Another motion was filed in early June against Interior Minister Sheikh Ahmed al-Hamoud al-Sabah, but the suspension has put that process on hold. Rumors have also been circulating that the entire Cabinet may resign.
Senior members of the ruling family have also been forced out. Central bank chief Sheikh Salem Abdulaziz al-Sabah resigned in February after 25 years at the post, following the same corruption scandal that led the prime minister to resign. That scandal also brought about the resignation of Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammad al-Sabah, the only member of the al-Salem branch serving in a senior post in government and also one previously tipped as a potential future emir.
Opposition lawmakers are no longer simply asking for greater influence over the government. They now want the government to resign and for a new 15-member Cabinet that includes nine opposition members to take office. Historically, the emir has held the exclusive right to appoint the prime minister — and by extension the entire Cabinet. But calls have mounted for the parliament to be allowed to choose the prime minister as well as for the legalization of political parties, which under current law are not allowed.
Consequences of the Conflict
The strengthening opposition movement poses two serious problems for the al-Sabah regime. First, accommodation along the lines demanded by the opposition would result in a real loss of power to parliament on the composition of the government. This could set a precedent that would resonate across the region and would be opposed by all the other Gulf Cooperation Council states, which already view Kuwait's fractious parliamentary politics as a dangerous model they do not want to emerge in their own countries.
More important, the movement could endanger the al-Sabahs' long-term claim as Kuwait's ruling family. The al-Sabahs are not absolute monarchs in the mold of Saudi Arabia's al-Saud family. According to the historical narrative, Kuwait was founded by a group of families who had fled the Nejd region in Saudi Arabia in the early 1700s. Once in Kuwait, they agreed to establish a government and chose one family — the al-Sabahs — from among themselves. The al-Sabahs were to administer Kuwait while the other merchant families focused on business.
This system of first among equals essentially meant that the merchants viewed the al-Sabah family as peers. By extension, the al-Sabahs' claim to serve as ruling family was a matter of consensus among the early families of Kuwait. That consensus still holds, but the demographics of the country have changed considerably in the last few decades. Tribal Kuwaitis now account for the majority of the population and the older merchant families, while retaining aristocratic prestige and great wealth, have shrunk in size and political influence. As a result, the royal family's power base is weaker than it used to be, and managing political challenges both at home and abroad has become more difficult.
Easing the pressure on the government appears to be the impetus for the one-month suspension of parliament. The government will likely use this time to push through decrees to implement projects and programs that have been stalled for years by parliamentary opposition. Kuwait's economy and the development of its energy infrastructure have languished for nearly a decade, despite the fact that the treasury has amassed more than $200 billion over 13 consecutive years of budget surpluses. Stalled development projects include among others a plan to tap northern oil fields, the construction of a metro system and an airport expansion, and a plan to build a new $14.5 billion oil refinery. The government has also lost valuable international deals, including an $11 billion joint venture with Dow Chemical Co. The collapse of that deal, triggered by parliamentary opposition during the height of the 2008 financial crisis, cost Kuwait $2.16 billion in damages for backing out of the plan.
The suspension of parliament falls within the constitutional rights of the emir, and the timing may keep parliament out of session for several months. Parliament cannot resume its activities until July 18, but Ramadan is expected to begin on or near July 20 and since many opposition members are Islamists, lawmakers will likely agree to take an early summer break, which typically extends to mid- to late October. This would effectively give the government a four-month reprieve from hostile parliamentary hearings. However, this tactical move will do nothing to address the underlying sources of the political conflict in Kuwait, which can be expected to resume when parliament reconvenes.
