The Cabinet post announcements come amid power transfer negotiations between Ivanishvili and Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili. Ivanishvili likely will become the next prime minister once the issue of his citizenship is resolved (he holds both Georgian and French citizenship, and dual citizenship was made illegal for political candidates during the campaign season). Ivanishvili and Saakashvili will present the proposed Cabinet to parliament for confirmation when the legislature reconvenes Oct. 20. Saakashvili will conclude his presidency in October 2013, and after that a new constitution will take effect and transfer many of the presidency's powers to the parliament and the prime minister.
Until then, there are numerous important factors to watch as Georgia makes its political transition. As Stratfor has mentioned, Georgia will maintain its broader strategic orientation toward the West and particularly toward NATO. This was one of Ivanishvili's campaign promises and it has the support of the majority of Georgia's population, making any other move politically unpalatable. However, beyond the question of Georgia's strategic orientation, the country's new political landscape leaves some room for significant changes in other areas.
One of those areas is Tbilisi's relationship with Moscow. Though Ivanishvili has stayed firm on the NATO issue, he also said he would like to build a stronger working relationship with Russia, adding that Saakashvili's aggressive policy toward Moscow was counterproductive. Several areas in Georgian-Russian relations could be improved, at least on the surface. There has been no official dialogue between Russia and Georgia since the 2008 war, with Moscow only holding consultations with Georgian opposition figures like Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Nogaideli. Ivanishvili's victory raises the possibility of official visits or meetings.
While meetings in and of themselves do not change anything, they could lead to improvements in areas like trade and visa facilitation, something both countries have an interest in right now. Georgia's continued NATO and EU orientation will of course irk Russia, but Moscow could have an interest in cooperating to try to at least soften Georgia's stance on such issues in the medium to long term.
Another area with room for significant change is relations with the former Soviet Union in general. In this context, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko said Oct. 5 that he would do everything in his power to return Georgia to the Commonwealth of Independent States. While the group has become more of a talk shop than an effective organization (Moscow prefers the Customs Union or Collective Security Treaty Organization for more active integration efforts), a Georgian return to the Commonwealth of Independent States would be a very symbolic move. It is unclear whether Georgia would be interested in doing this (especially with Saakashvili still in office), but it presents an interesting opportunity for Tbilisi, particularly if coupled with some of the bilateral steps toward cooperation with Russia mentioned above.
Finally, there is the question of the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgian Dream has said it would like to restart dialogue with these breakaway territories, and the leaders of these territories have said they are interested in improving relations with Georgia.
Despite these statements, changes in relations are not likely, at least in the short term. Tensions between the government in Georgia and the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had existed long before Saakashvili came into power. These breakaway territories are Soviet-era holdovers that will continue troubling Georgia's post-Soviet sovereignty (much like Nagorno-Karabakh for Azerbaijan and Transdniestria for Moldova). Russia will retain its military presence and financial support in these regions, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia will remain oriented toward Moscow. This is a truly strategic issue that is not likely to change with the installation of a new government in Tbilisi.