Georgia's political scene has become increasingly dynamic ahead of the elections due to the emergence of Bidzina Ivanishvili, a charismatic tycoon who has become the most popular opposition figure in the country's recent history. Ivanishvili has united many elements of Georgia's historically fractured opposition, and semimonthly rallies staged by his Georgian Dream movement have consistently attracted thousands of supporters.
Saakashvili has held power since Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution, including during the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, but he is ineligible to run for a third term in the country's 2013 presidential election. The president recently appointed as premier former Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili, a close ally and powerful figure, fueling speculation that Merabishvili could be Saakashvili's hand-picked successor for a run in 2013.
The Kremlin has a keen interest in Georgian political developments, given its adversarial relationship with its southern neighbor. However, which specific leader rises to power in Tbilisi is unlikely to matter much to Moscow. Merabishvili would be expected to continue the majority of Saakashvili's anti-Russian policies, but Ivanishvili would also be hesitant to dramatically reorient Georgian policy toward the Kremlin — despite claims to the contrary by Saakashvili's camp. Indeed, no overtly pro-Russian leader could currently survive politically in Georgia. Rather, both Merabishvili and Ivanishvili (or any other Georgian leader who emerges) would likely maintain Tbilisi's broader pro-western, NATO-oriented strategy.
Russian Influence
Moscow's influence in Georgia stems from the Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and from the Kremlin's hold over the North Caucasus republics positioned along Georgia's northern border. In August 2008, Russia launched its invasion of Georgia through the Roki Tunnel in North Ossetia. Tensions also flared in the late 1990s and early 2000s, after Moscow accused Tbilisi of providing Chechen militants havens in eastern Georgia, and again in August after militants allegedly staged raids into Georgia from Dagestan. The North Caucasus will likely continue to be a source of tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi, particularly as Russia prepares to host the 2014 Winter Olympics in the Black Sea city of Sochi, just north of the Abkhazian border.
Russian military and political maneuvers in the Georgian breakaway republics are not new. But the timing and intensity of the most recent moves — the military exercises involving some 400 troops and hardware including T-90A tanks and BTR-80 armored personnel carriers — are intended to signal to Georgia that Moscow will still command attention, regardless of who wins the upcoming elections. In turn, the diplomatic activity in Georgia is Tbilisi's way of showing Russia that the West is maintaining an active interest in the Caucasus state. Such contentions will remain fundamental features of the Russia-Georgia relationship throughout Tbilisi's political transition.
