Editor's Note: This is the third installment in a five-part series on Russia's military modernization. This installment examines Moscow's modernization and reorganization efforts to date. Click to read Part 1, Part 2, Part 4 and Part 5.
With its focus refined, the Russian military has publicly announced several modernization programs since 2008. Most of these reforms have not started yet, and it is doubtful that Russia has the funds or the will to implement every modernization effort announced. Nevertheless, some major reforms — most of which have centered on command and control structures — have occurred that have changed the military structure in accordance with the country's military doctrine. This suggests that Russia is designing a conventional force that will project power only within its immediate sphere of influence to defend the homeland, while relying heavily on its nuclear arsenal to discourage superior militaries and coalitions from encroaching upon its regional turf.
The old Soviet military had three main branches: the ground forces, the air force and the navy. These forces were split among six districts, and each branch (in conjunction with its General Staff) was responsible for the operational planning for its own forces. In an effort to streamline the command and control structure, the military has created four districts — which would have been known as joint strategic commands during wartime — to replace the original six.
The joint strategic commands have been tasked with operational control and planning of almost all military and security elements within their area of responsibility, regardless of which branch or government institution they belong to (there are three combat branches that do not fall under this structure). This has, in effect, created four smaller militaries that operate independently from one another and have the ability to execute combined armed military campaigns within their immediate districts. This restructuring can be viewed as a prudent command organization in accordance with Russia's first three doctrinal threats, regional power projection and defense.
The Russian military made another major change when it switched from a divisional structure to a brigade structure — transforming brigades into stand-alone, self-sufficient units of focus — and reduced the number of brigades in order to man them to near-full capacity. In theory, this makes an army faster and more flexible by cutting out layers of command bureaucracy and allowing for proportional responses to varying threats. By 2009, the Russian military had designated 85 brigades, but some estimates put the number of operational brigades around 64 due to manning and equipment issues. There was also a concerted push to reduce the overall number of military personnel from at least 1.2 million to around 1 million, and to change the proportions of officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted members, as well as contract soldiers and conscripts. This comprehensive reduction plan has been successful and has, to a point, gone too far, but attempts to adjust the proportions of various groups have had only limited success.
The Russian military has three combat branches that do not fall under the joint strategic command structure and instead report directly to the president and the Defense Ministry. The first branch is comprised of the Russian Aerospace Defense Forces, which replaced the Russian Space Forces and are charged with air and missile defense and the operation of military satellites. The second branch, made up of the Strategic Missile Troops, controls Russia's land-based nuclear weapons. The third branch is comprised of the 35,000-strong Airborne Troops, which are considered the heart of the army and are able to deploy rapidly throughout the country or within the region. By separating these branches from the joint command structure, the president and the Defense Ministry are able to maintain direct control over key structures of the military that would primarily be used to combat an existential threat or as the main deterrent against acts of aggression by foreign militaries.
The Defense Ministry has also undergone some subtle changes in order to cement civilian leadership over the military. The General Staff can now directly report only to the defense minister, as opposed to reporting to the president. There has also been a concerted effort to place civilians in deputy ministerial positions and to increase the number of civilians in the Defense Ministry, which traditionally had been dominated by military personnel. Lastly, the General Staff has been downsized and its current role has been limited compared to what it was during the Soviet era. These measures have helped shift the power balance toward civilian oversight and, in some cases, have helped spur the reform process.
