Editor's Note: This is the second installment of a five-part series on Russia's military modernization. This installment examines Moscow's national security strategy. Click to read Part 1, Part 3, Part 4 and Part 5.

The Kremlin has focused more on the need for a strong and modern military in recent years. Russia's previous military strategies since the fall of the Soviet Union were not really focused on strengthening the military; they emphasized trying to keep the country afloat.

Russia's military doctrine is one of the best ways to gauge Russia's intentions for military development. Over the decades, that doctrine has shifted according to the perceived threats and types of war that Moscow believes it will face. For example, the military doctrine and strategy under Josef Stalin following World War II was to create large land forces able to once again face a protracted, large-scale, yearslong land war. This military doctrine shifted under Nikita Krushchev because the Soviet Union's development of nuclear weapons made nuclear war more likely as Russia settled into the Cold War with the United States. Under Leonid Brezhnev, a more balanced military doctrine was put in place with broad concepts of war to account for various land and nuclear war scenarios. The aggressive military doctrines of these Soviet leaders started to falter in the 1980s as Moscow massively re-evaluated its military doctrine, shifting to a more defensive state as the Russians realized that they were starting to overextend their military potential (particularly financially).

Locator Map - Russia

Early Post-Soviet Doctrines

The military doctrines that followed the fall of the Soviet Union were an attempt to figure out how to sustain any large military and military industrial complex — let alone an effective one — during a time when Russia was feeling the looming threat of NATO near its doorstep and being wracked by domestic separatist threats such as Chechnya. The military and its industrial complex in the 1990s was chaotic, top-heavy and lacked any political will from the Kremlin to fix its problems (mainly because of Boris Yeltsin's concerns that the military could overthrow him one day).

The Kremlin's focus on the Russian military and its doctrine started to take serious shape in 2000 under Vladimir Putin. His main focus was to reorganize the Russian military, purge the glut and shift to a tighter and smaller military. The 2000 Russian doctrine was meant to be a period of transition for the military and industrial complex. It set up the Russian military to be defensive in character during this period. By 2006, Russia had started to come up with a coherent plan for its future — one based on internal consolidation and a future push out into its traditional sphere of influence. This new mindset of a stronger Russia was reflected in its next military doctrine (which took two years to develop).

A New Assertiveness

It is the newest military doctrine (drawn up by then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and formalized in 2009 into the National Security Strategy to 2020) that is Russia's first aggressive and proactive military doctrine since the 1970s. It has a clear strategy and definable set of threats. Of course the latest security strategy was drawn up when Russia was feeling militarily stout after two decades of feeling vulnerable and weak. Russia had just successfully wrapped up a five-day war with its neighbor Georgia — a NATO partner — and was looking to explain to the world what its strategy from that point on would be. Russia's security policy hinges on five principles that Medvedev laid out:

1. "Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law."
2. "Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict."
3. "Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States and other countries, as much as is possible."
4. "Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us."
5. "Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors. These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy."

Within these points, Russia is saying that it wants to redefine the regional and global system. Russia does not accept the United States' hegemony over the global system. Thus, while Russia wants a productive relationship with the United States and Europe, this depends partly on the behavior of Washington and the Europeans.

Russia is focused on its regional position in two ways. First, it is willing to protect the interests of Russians no matter where they are. This means that Moscow could intervene on behalf of Russian citizens and communities in countries such as the Baltic states or Georgia. Next, Russia has deemed the former Soviet sphere as Russia's special interest, meaning that foreign activities in this region that undermine Moscow's position there are considered a threat. Overall, this doctrine does not mean that Moscow is recreating the Soviet Union or Russian empire, but that Russia is the center of gravity in the region. The country's regional power (plus its substantial nuclear assets) allow it to be part of a global system and counter U.S. hegemony.

Based on the Medvedev Doctrine and the National Security Strategy to 2020, Russia has four categories of threats:

1. Terrorism and militancy, which mainly involve Moscow's focus on the Russian Caucasus (Chechnya and Dagestan), as well as domestic militant capability to strike outside of the Caucasus (such as the attacks on the Moscow subways, trains, schools and airport).
2. Bilateral regional conflicts, in which Russia would go against another state in the region (such as the Russo-Georgian War in 2008).
3. Regional conflicts in which Russia would intervene (such as if war broke out in the Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan)
4. Global threats to Russia and its sphere of influence (such as NATO, or other powers that could result in a nuclear option for Russia).

But to be able to fulfill such an ambitious strategy, Russia needs a reorganized, robust and modern military. This means two major focuses: reforming the military structure and replacing the majority of the military equipment.