The CSTO is a military alliance that emerged from a military pact between many members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an organization created from countries that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Initially, it was mostly a talking shop, with the majority of its efforts directed toward consolidating the movement of Russian military industry and hardware from its fellow former Soviet states.
Moscow planned to have the CSTO become something more meaningful along the lines of NATO, albeit on a smaller scale. This prompted Uzbekistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan to withdraw from the group in 1999. The countries' chief complaint was that Russia was trying to use the military alliance to expand its influence in the former Soviet Union.
Uzbekistan and the CSTO
After the states most opposed to such an expansion had quit the pact, Russia transformed the CIS military pact into the CSTO in 2002, with Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan — the former Soviet states most loyal to Russia — as members. Uzbekistan initially refused to join the new group to keep its independence from Moscow's influence.
Events in 2005 began to change Uzbekistan's stance. The first event was Tashkent's bloody clampdown on an uprising in the Andijan region. (Uzbeks put the death toll at 180 while Westerners put the death toll at more than 1,500.) The West responded with a series of military, economic and diplomatic sanctions against Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan responded to the West by booting the United States from Karshi-Khanabad Air Base, a major logistical hub in Uzbekistan for NATO operations in Afghanistan.
At the same time, Uzbekistan nervously watched as social unrest in the region began to spread. The Tulip Revolution in neighboring Kyrgyzstan toppled the government in Bishkek in 2005. Meanwhile, Russia was increasing its security presence in the region through intensified military relations with the Central Asian states under the CSTO.
Uzbekistan ultimately decided to join the CSTO in 2006 not because it wanted an alliance with Russia and its military organization but so that Tashkent could guarantee the group did not try to pressure Uzbekistan. Technically, any CSTO member can veto group decisions, leading Tashkent to believe it could prevent the group from taking steps against Uzbek interests. Over the years, Uzbekistan did not participate in the majority of the CSTO meetings, exercises or forums (some of which it boycotted). Uzbekistan first tried to prevent the bloc from acting on critical issues in 2009.
Tashkent tried to veto Russia's plans for a military base in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, near the Uzbek border. But Russia ignored Uzbekistan's veto and signed the agreement under the aegis of the CSTO, though the base was to be Russian-run. (Progress on the base has since stalled.) Uzbekistan next tried to veto a CSTO agreement creating a rapid-reaction force for the "protection of the bloc." Tashkent argued that the units should not deploy in countries that objected or during conflict among member states. Again, Moscow ignored Uzbekistan's veto and signed the deal, along with the rest of the membership of the CSTO.
These failures reportedly led Uzbekistan to consider quitting the CSTO, but Tashkent apparently decided that at least continued membership would allow it to know what was going on inside the group. Much of the rest of the group expressed displeasure at Uzbekistan's decision to stay. Belarus has been the most vocal in its opinion that Uzbekistan should leave the bloc if it does not plan to be an active member.
Uzbekistan's decision to suspend its membership rather than to quit gives it leeway to change its mind — assuming the CSTO would allow it to return. However, Uzbekistan feels it must explore other options to guarantee its security given the array of threats in the region, options that CSTO membership might impede.
Regional Threats to Uzbekistan
Part of this enhanced threat comes from Russia's increased presence in the region. Russia has boosted its security forces over the past few years in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan — the two countries that border Uzbekistan's heartland, the Fergana Valley. In addition, there is evidence of Russian support for Kyrgyzstan's 2010 revolution. Meanwhile, Russia is solidifying its economic reach in neighboring Kazakhstan via the Common Economic Space, a group Kyrgyzstan also wants to join. And Russia's plans for a Eurasian Union of many of the former Soviet states by 2015 threatens Uzbek autonomy.
Uzbekistan also worries about its neighbors. Uzbekistan is locked in spats with them over energy, refugees and border demarcation. This is particularly true of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Should conflict break out in the region similar to the ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 2010, Uzbekistan cannot be sure the CSTO would not deploy its rapid-reaction force — perhaps even to the borders of Uzbekistan. Tashkent also fears its far larger neighbor and regional competitor, Kazakhstan. In May, it hindered Kazakhstan's participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization military exercises in Tajikistan, which Uzbekistan itself boycotted. Uzbekistan was not comfortable having the Kazakh military cross Uzbekistan to get to Tajikistan, forcing Kazakhstan to detour. More generally, Uzbekistan fears increased instability simmering across the region.
Uzbekistan obtains almost all of its imported military equipment from Russia. Russia caps what Uzbekistan can receive and could even cut this off at will, which would prompt Uzbekistan to seek alternative suppliers. In mid-May, it emerged that the United States has been engaged in negotiations for the handover of U.S. military equipment in Afghanistan to certain Central Asian states as part of the Excess Defense Articles program. The program was launched to induce Central Asian countries to agree to the transit of goods into Afghanistan along the Northern Distribution Network.
Washington is in talks with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for the transfer of tank transporters, prime movers, tank trucks, special-purpose graders, bulldozers, water trucks and armored vehicles. Most of the items are auxiliary equipment, except for the armored vehicles, which CSTO rules would prohibit Uzbekistan from acquiring. (According to Stratfor sources, talks on the transfer of armored vehicles are only happening with Uzbekistan.)
Uzbekistan is also considering expanding its military relationship with China. In the past few months, there has been an uptick in Sino-Uzbek defense meetings, including when China's People's Liberation Army chief of the General Staff, Chen Bingde, met with Uzbek Defense Minister Kabul Berdiev on May 31. Thus far, these talks are just that. But Uzbekistan could be trying to develop them into something more.
In order to deepen relations with either China or the United States, Uzbekistan must first disentangle itself from the CSTO — particularly if Uzbekistan wants to receive heavy military equipment from outside the bloc. How Russia will respond to Uzbekistan's suspension remains to be seen. As Makarov said, Moscow can now consolidate the organization even further without the threat of an Uzbek veto (albeit a veto Moscow could simply ignore).
While Moscow has been open to Tashkent's remaining independent, it does not welcome its building relationships with outsiders. Moscow may therefore feel the need to be assertive in its response to Uzbekistan's shift. Russia still wields power over Uzbekistan in many trade matters and through its presence in neighboring states. Russia is a major market for Uzbek exports and provides the majority of processed energy and food to Uzbekistan. Russia also has a security presence surrounding the most sensitive parts of Uzbekistan, such as the Fergana Valley. Russia's strong relationship with the other Central Asian states — particularly those already engaged in disputes with Tashkent — gives it yet more leverage over Uzbekistan.
All of this could play into the already souring relationship between the United States and Russia. Russia is pressuring the United States to back off from its relationships with many former Soviet states and clients. At present, Syria is the main venue in this struggle. But should Moscow feel increasingly threatened by Washington's focus on Central Asia, it could take action there as well. And this could threaten the Northern Distribution Network and thereby U.S. access to and from Afghanistan.
