The Uzbek parliament ratified March 28 the country's re-entrance into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) after a nearly 10-year absence. Taskhent is attempting to balance the region's major powers so that it has some modicum of room to maneuver. CSTO is a Russian-dominated security organization intended to replace the Warsaw Pact as Moscow's security bulwark. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, however, there are few Russian bases on the territory of any of the member states, and the organization is largely limited to sporadic military exercises used to make political points. In essence, CSTO is little more than a Russian claim to influence in the former Soviet Union. Uzbekistan once styled itself Central Asia's regional hegemon. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse and the rapid Russian retreat from the region, Uzbekistan found itself in a very favorable position. It sported the region's most powerful military, largest economy, largest population and — unique in Central Asia — substantial populations of its ethnic compatriots in all of the other four Central Asian states. Tashkent rapidly developed a reputation as the neighborhood bully, interfering with water flows to Kazakhstan, conflicts in Tajikistan and intelligence matters in Kyrgyzstan. In 1999, seeing its relative power on the rise, Uzbekistan haughtily left the CSTO. After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the American desire for staging grounds to prosecute the Afghan war gave Uzbekistan a golden opportunity. Literally within hours of the attack, Washington sealed an agreement that would allow NATO forces to use Uzbek bases. Suddenly, all Uzbek policies received de facto American approval, and Russian and Chinese influence seemed far away indeed. That heady mix of influence and security did not last. As U.S.-assisted color revolutions began peppering the former Soviet Union, one eventually popped up in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, curdling the blood of Uzbek President Islam Karimov's near-totalitarian regime. It was quickly followed by an uprising in the city of Andijan in Uzbekistan's Ferghana region. (click image to enlarge) Suddenly, Tashkent's view of the world turned inside out. If the Americans were willing to stand aside while protesters directly challenged governmental authority — or worse, perhaps even tacitly cheer on the protesters — then the U.S. military presence was a poison pill. Although Uzbekistan once had impressive advantages, it ultimately faces even stronger geographic weaknesses. Half of the country's population lies in the Ferghana region, a territory separated from the capital by mountains and Stalin's cartographic creativity — Stalin redrew the region's borders in order to ensure that should any of the Soviet republics attain independence, they would be dysfunctional. The country is also doubly landlocked, so it is utterly dependent upon its neighbors for both exports and imports. With this change of worldview, Tashkent's primary concern became the maintenance of control, and that meant cozying up to states that did not care about things such as democracy or brutal crackdowns. Suddenly, all things Russian and Chinese were en vogue; the United States was ejected from the Uzbek bases; and Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and applied to rejoin the CSTO. But that produced a different crop of problems. Uzbekistan's primary export is natural gas. However, Soviet infrastructure requires that it only be sold to Russia, which gives Moscow constant access to Uzbekistan's political and economic system. Tashkent attempts to balance this by turning to the Chinese; but Chinese manufacturers can outmanufacture local producers — creating precisely the same vulnerabilities vis-a-vis China that Tashkent hopes to avoid having vis-a-vis Russia. So Uzbek policy is still turning. A state boasting Uzbekistan's mix of advantages and disadvantages is one that cannot hold to a consistent policy. It must engage a variety of outside players to resist the proclivities of all. It wants U.S. security guarantees, but not the political complications that come with it. It wants Russia as a balance to the United States, but not the energy domination that comes with it. It wants China as a balance to Russia, but not the economic domination that comes with it. It wants to be a regional hegemon, but ultimately needs an outside backer to achieve that — which forces it to gyrate wildly among China, Russia and the United States. And so, even as Tashkent is rejoining CSTO, it simultaneously might be engaged in negotiations to allow the United States back onto its bases. Uzbek policy came full circle. And as long as the country exists, it will continue to turn on events utterly beyond its control.