Since the Rwandan Patriotic Front assumed control of the country in 1994, after the end of the Rwandan genocide, the government in Kigali has aptly circumvented Kinshasa's authority in eastern DRC. Kinshasa's inability to control the region after the collapse of the Mobutu Sese Seko regime in 1997 has created a void that Rwanda has exploited to serve its interests.
Rwanda is likely to remain opportunistic when dealing with rebels in the DRC, supporting them when Kinshasa or a group threatening Rwandan interests becomes too powerful and withdrawing support when the rebels are no longer needed. There are numerous state and non-state actors operating in the DRC. Rwanda is most concerned with two of these forces: the DRC government in Kinshasa with its DRC military troops, and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a militia of exiled Hutu that fled Rwanda when the current Tutsi regime came to power.
Kinshasa's Problem
It is difficult for Kinshasa to project power into the periphery of the country. The Congo rain forest lies between eastern DRC and the capital and presents a significant geographic barrier that makes it difficult for Kinshasa to establish control over the regions beyond it. The lack of central authority has led to a power vacuum that threatens Rwanda's security but also provides opportunities that Kigali can exploit to its benefit. Rwanda is much smaller than the DRC and could be easily overwhelmed if the DRC developed into a stable economic and military force. As troops desert the DRC armed forces, Kinshasa has been forced to increase its presence in the east. For Kigali, this is unacceptable. Supporting rebel groups in eastern DRC keeps the region insecure, helps prevent unification and protects Rwandan economic interests.
Rwandan Security Concerns
The Rwandan Patriotic Front began as a group of exiles in Uganda, receiving training in the Ugandan military that would be necessary to remove the Hutu leadership in Kigali. Most of the front's leadership remain in power and know from experience that a strong, trained and mobilized militia based a few kilometers from Rwanda can topple a government. Promoting insecurity in eastern DRC will keep Kinshasa too busy to support the FDLR and will keep the FDLR occupied with rival militias. If the situation deteriorates too much, the FDLR can either become too strong and overpower the rest of the groups or become too weak and flee the DRC. Both scenarios could push the FDLR back into Rwanda.
Historically, Rwanda's strategy has been to back one rebel group for a period, then remove support and later aid another when they need to pressure militias or the Congolese army. For example, Kigali initially supported the CNDP when it formed in 2006 led by Laurent Nkunda. But as Nkunda and the CNDP gained strength and became more ambitious, the group split due to infighting, which allowed Rwanda to shift its position on Nkunda and arrest him, while supporting the splinter faction led by Bosco Ntaganda. That faction assimilated into the DRC military in 2009.
The current DRC military defectors are many of the same CNDP rebels who were supported by Rwanda before the peace process. The CNDP leadership has progressed from Nkunda to Ntaganda and now, under M23, Sultani Makenga. All of these leaders are Tutsi and fought alongside the Rwandan Patriotic Front during the Rwandan civil war, making them a natural proxy for the current leadership in Kigali. According to the recent U.N. report, the Rwandan Defense Forces have directly intervened in DRC territory to reinforce M23, and the Rwandan government is actively recruiting Rwandan youth, demobilized ex-combatants and refugees from the DRC to join M23.
Rwanda's Economic Interests
Rwandan interests in eastern DRC are not entirely security-related. North and South Kivu are two of the DRC's most resource-rich provinces and are located on the border, just across Lake Kivu from Rwanda. The area of the DRC that falls under Rwanda's influence has gold, diamonds, cobalt, tin and other precious metals. Rwanda has typically provided rebels with weapons and training in exchange for either the natural resources themselves or for laundering money from DRC mines, which allows Kigali to siphon off some of the revenue from these natural resources. Commanders of the CNDP forced residents in North and South Kivu to mine the mineral cassiterite and then paid below market value, attributing the difference in value to a security fee.
Rwanda's support for M23 will perpetuate insecurity in eastern DRC. It is unknown whether Kigali had a hand in the initial defections from the DRC military, but the fracturing highlights Kinshasa's inability to control both the former rebels enlisted in their service and the region as a whole. Rwanda likely will continue to support M23 in order to protect Rwandan interests in the DRC.
