Tutsi rebel forces under Gen. Laurent Nkunda suspended participation Feb. 22 in a cease-fire agreement with the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Though Nkunda himself has said that his forces have not abandoned the cease-fire, the deal's failure to address the interests of Rwanda, which is believed to be backing Nkunda’s forces, effectively doomed it. Nkunda’s forces, known as the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), and other rebel groups agreed to the cease-fire with the DRC government Jan. 23. Signed in the North Kivu provincial capital, Goma, the cease-fire aimed to end conflict in the country’s mineral-rich North Kivu province. While the agreement addresses amnesty and disarmament programs, it does not address Rwanda’s interests in the eastern DRC. Rwanda is believed to be backing Nkunda’s forces, which have been operating in North Kivu since the end of the 1998-2003 DRC civil war. A former senior officer in the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which took power in Rwanda after overthrowing the Hutu regime of then-President Juvenal Habyarimana in 1994, Nkunda ostensibly operates in the eastern DRC to protect ethnic Tutsis from the Hutu militia that fled Rwanda. More critically, Nkunda’s forces act as proxy for Rwanda — one of Africa’s poorest countries — to control North Kivu's rich natural resource deposits in order to compensate for the otherwise meager Rwandan economy. While the DRC government of President Joseph Kabila is loath to legitimize Rwanda’s land grab in eastern DRC, it has had little ability to do anything about the Rwandan actions. After his election in late 2006, Kabila spent much of 2007 consolidating his control in the country’s capital, Kinshasa. Having exiled his leading political rival, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Kabila began to turn attention to the country’s restive, mineral-rich East. DRC armed forces deployed to the East in December 2007 have been outmanned and outgunned, however, by Nkunda’s battle-hardened forces. The rebels led by Nkunda remain the most capable fighting force in the North and South Kivu regions of eastern DRC, though lesser rivals — including Mai Mai tribal militia, Hutu fighters who fled Rwanda and units of the DRC armed forces — control local mines and trade routes. As the strongest force in the region, Nkunda’s therefore implicates the DRC and regional supply chain mechanisms related to the mining and exporting of DRC minerals. Further tightening the Rwandan grip, the import of necessary mining equipment, foodstuffs and other supplies depends on road infrastructure through Rwanda. Transporting goods across the DRC to ports along the Atlantic coast is simply not feasible because of wholly inadequate road and rail infrastructure. Though the DRC government is reviewing mining contracts signed during the country’s civil war with an eye to restructuring the deals in the new government’s favor, the inability of the DRC government to eject Nkunda’s forces essentially requires mining interests in North and South Kivu to reckon with Rwanda, not Kinshasa. And with economic interests underpinning competition for control of North and South Kivu, the failure to incorporate Rwandan interests — and the subsequent suspension by Nkunda’s forces of its participation in a monthlong cease-fire — probably spells a resumption of conflict in the eastern DRC.