The first deadly sectarian riot in northern Lebanon occurred May 12, when the country's General Security Directorate used plainclothes security officials to detain a 27-year-old Sunni Islamist, Shadi Mawlawi. The popular and outspoken critic of the Syrian regime was charged with supporting regional al Qaeda forces.
After Mawlawi's arrest, residents from the Bab Tabbaneh neighborhood, which is mostly Sunni and opposes the Syrian regime, and those from the Jabal Mohsen neighborhood, which is mainly Alawite and supports the Syrian regime, exchanged rocket-propelled grenade, mortar and sniper fire. A shaky truce was reached in the wake of the fighting, but continued rallies and sit-ins protesting Mawlawi's arrest suggest that fighting could quickly resume if the young activist is not released soon.
The second flare-up occurred May 20 after Sunni cleric Ahmed Abdul-Wahid and his companion, Sheikh Mohammad Hussein al-Mereb, were killed at an army checkpoint in Kwaikhat, Akkar district. The pair was en route to a rally in the district capital of Halba organized by the Future Movement of former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri. Riots broke out after news of the cleric's death spread, with local sheikhs threatening to create a "Free Lebanese Army" akin to the Syrian rebel army if the soldiers involved in the shooting were not put to justice. Akkar's residents are bracing for ethnic violence over the next three days, which Lebanese Grand Mufti Sheikh Mohammad Rashid Qabbani declared to be days of mourning for Abdul-Wahid's death.
The Syrian Agenda
The common element in Mawlawi's arrest and Abdul-Wahid's shooting is that they both appear to have been instigated by Shiite-dominated agencies of the Lebanese military and security apparatus, in which Syria has long exercised a high degree of influence. Over the past several weeks, Shiite Lebanese authorities, in collusion with the Syrian regime, have arrested scores of Syrian activists operating in Lebanon.
During the recent fighting, security elements involved in the operations — along with their Shiite and Alawite coreligionists in the neighborhoods — appeared prepared for a Sunni backlash. Sunni Lebanese officials already have voiced concern that the developments in northern Lebanon point to a Syrian agenda. The Syrian regime is likely trying to disrupt the vital northern Lebanese supply lines, which have helped sustain the Syrian insurgency.
Tripoli and Akkar district make up critical parts of the supply lines. Tripoli, Lebanon's second-largest city, is an important supply and organizational base for rebel fighters in Syria. In Akkar, fighters will often fire at Syrian army positions along the border to provoke and ambush army patrols, thus distracting the government forces from rebel smugglers.
A reigniting of armed sectarian conflict in northern Lebanon and the threat of civil war would also theoretically enable Syria to distract foreign stakeholders trying to topple the Syrian regime. When threatened, Damascus will often use the threat of sectarian conflict in Lebanon to show countries in the region that it can either defuse or ignite a civil war.
Saudi and U.S. Goals
On the other side of the conflict, the Saudi and U.S. governments (along with regional allies such as Turkey and Qatar) are trying to use the Syrian uprising to bring down the al Assad regime and ultimately reverse Iran's regional ascent. Unwilling to commit the resources of a conventional military intervention in Syria, Iran's regional adversaries have reportedly been funneling weapons and funds to the Syrian rebels in hopes that an upgrade of rebel fighting capabilities will cause the regime to crumble from within. The U.S. and Saudi abilities to control and protect supply routes in northern Lebanon are vital to this effort.
Tripoli is the place to watch in this struggle. Since the end of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Lebanese financial hub of Beirut has marginalized Tripoli, a Phoenician-era port city on the eastern Mediterranean. A collection of Alawites live in the hills overlooking the mostly Sunni city, setting the stage for sectarian clashes as part of an ongoing proxy war between Syria and Saudi Arabia. The city's high poverty rate and large Sunni population have made it a breeding ground for Salafism, the more rigid version of Sunnism. Indeed, there are growing signs that Salafist fighters are dominating the Sunni militant scene in Tripoli with Saudi encouragement.
Influx of Salafists in Tripoli
When riots broke out after Mawlawi's arrest, five armed Salafist groups and a group of Free Syrian Army rebels converged on Tripoli. The Salafists in the area have since been calling on Sunnis in the Lebanese army to defect and join their militias, claiming that the army is overrun by Shia and Christians.
Sunni militiamen aligned with the Future Movement, who typically lead the fight on behalf of Sunnis in Tripoli, were notably absent from the riots of the past weeks. But Stratfor has received indications that the Future Movement, under Saudi direction, is closely coordinating with the Salafist fighters. A significant amount of Saudi funding and weaponry has gone into the group over the past several years in an attempt to counter the heavy Shiite militia presence of Hezbollah and its allies. The Saudi attempt to transform the Future Movement into a professional fighting force capable of challenging Hezbollah achieved negligible results, as shown by their fighting capabilities over the past several years. The Salafist fighters that have moved into Tripoli, however, are much more experienced in fighting and in smuggling arms across rugged terrain.
The United States would prefer not to work through Salafist fighters in its campaign against the Syrian regime, but this is a battleground where Saudi money and experience hold significant weight. And while Saudi Arabia likely understands that it is taking a risk by backing Salafists in its fight in Syria, Saudi royals are also working to prevent the domination of the Syrian rebellion by the Muslim Brotherhood.
It remains to be seen whether the influx of Salafist fighters in Tripoli will translate into marked improvement for Syrian rebel fighting capabilities. With time, Stratfor expects the insurgency in Syria to become more jihadist in nature. Indeed, the Al-Nusra Front, a jihadist group that has claimed responsibility for the majority of large improvised explosive device attacks against Syrian security and intelligence targets, is fast emerging as the premier jihadist group in the Syrian rebellion.
Syria can be expected to use the increased presence of Salafists and jihadists in the rebellion to justify its crackdowns against. Across the border in Lebanon, Syria will rely on its remaining allies to instigate sectarian clashes as a way of impeding Saudi and U.S. efforts to fortify northern Lebanese supply routes.
