The Free Syrian Army (FSA), a group of mostly Sunni defectors from the Syrian army, on Nov. 16 claimed it had staged an attack on a Syrian Directorate for Air Force Intelligence facility in the northern town of Harasta, Damascus governorate, roughly 8 kilometers (5 miles) northeast of Damascus. The statement came only a few hours after the attack. Multiple reports have surfaced, each giving a slightly different account of how the alleged incident transpired. The varying reports of the defectors' alleged attack on the intelligence facility provide different possibilities about the culprits and how the operation was carried out. Whichever version is true, the air force intelligence base is the most significant infrastructure that the defectors have targeted, which suggests that the defectors could attempt to attack hardened and more politically meaningful targets in the future. Another version suggests that a chain of communication exists between the FSA and army defectors. Regardless, the level of defection among the Syrian ranks has not yet reached the critical point at which Alawite domination of the security apparatus would be seriously threatened.

Alternative Versions of the Attack

(click here to enlarge image) According to Reuters, a local resident of Harasta heard gunfire and explosions in the area around 2:30 a.m. Various Syrian opposition groups, including the Syrian National Council, the Syrian Revolution General Commission and the Local Coordinating Committee, echoed this report and claimed that the Free Syrian Army had surrounded and attacked the air force intelligence facility using small arms and shoulder-launched rockets. If these reports are accurate, the attack illustrates that the FSA is capable of coordinating and planning attacks on a hardened and politically significant target. It also shows that the FSA is capable of mobilizing one or both of the two FSA battalions purported to be stationed in the Damascus area. The second account came from the FSA, which released the first known statement regarding the attack. The FSA claimed its members were able to breach the facility's security and place explosives throughout. If this version is true, the attack reveals a dramatic improvement in the FSA's capabilities and sophistication. What these versions have in common is that they both describe FSA members as being direct participants in the attack. Moreover, an attack so close to Damascus is important in itself — Damascus and Aleppo are two of the key remaining strongholds of the Syrian regime, and, although small protests regularly occur in Harasta, they are quickly put down because of the potential threat to the capital. The more important detail of this attack is the alleged target. Prior to this assault, none of the claimed attacks by the FSA have focused on such a secure and politically significant target. The Syrian Directorate for Air Force Intelligence is reputed to be the most powerful Syrian intelligence agency. If a directorate facility was indeed the target, the attack represents a notable shift in targeting for Syrian army defectors. The facility possessed significantly higher security than that of previous FSA targets, so the fact that the FSA would attack such a high-profile target may embolden the former soldiers to attack other strategic targets. The selection of the target could also suggest a propagandistic element to the attack, whereby the FSA shows the public it is fighting one of the most feared parts of the Syrian bureaucracy. But there is a third version of events, one that would have very troubling implications for the Syrian regime if true.

The Threat of Coordination

Another version, recounted by a STRATFOR source within the Syrian opposition, states that 20 low-ranking Sunni soldiers in the Syrian army were behind the assault. The source said the soldiers, who were patrolling checkpoints in Harasta Al Qabun and Irbeen and were not affiliated with the FSA, defected together and carried out the attack. The source also indicated that the attacked facility housed political prisoners and that the objective of the assailants was to free those individuals, but the source said they were unsuccessful in that regard. Like the FSA's own version, this account alleges that the attack started from within the perimeter of the facility. That the FSA claimed responsibility in such detail before any other outlet or group mentioned the assault is important because it could suggest the defectors were in contact with the FSA either before or directly after the defectors carried out the attack. This would indicate that the FSA has a communication network in place that allows would-be defectors to contact the FSA and potentially join its ranks. An effective communications network is essential to the ability of the Turkey-based FSA leadership to command and control units inside Syria. If this is the case, the FSA could pose a more serious challenge to the Syrian regime. However, it is also possible, albeit less likely, that the FSA has very good monitoring capabilities around Syria and a propaganda wing prepared to claim any attack. The same source said the defectors involved in the attack communicated with the FSA using satellite phones and with each other by relaying messages between the army camps and checkpoints. This would suggest that the Syrian regime has a weak line of defense at army checkpoints, which would be especially troubling for the regime as it tries to prevent the flow of arms and supplies to activists inside Syria. This dynamic can likely be explained by the fact that mostly Alawite forces are being overstretched in Syria's main urban areas while the regime has had to rely on lower-ranking Sunni army guards to patrol checkpoints. While these accounts of the attack are plausible, it is important to keep the constraints of the Free Syrian Army in perspective. FSA leader Col. Riad al-Asaad claims to command 15,000 soldiers organized into 22 battalions across Syria. However, the Syrian regime claims that only 1,500 soldiers have defected. There is no real way to judge the true size of the FSA or its purported battalions, but it is unlikely that the battalions are the size of traditional Syrian army battalions. Keeping these discrepancies in mind, since early October the FSA has claimed responsibility for multiple attacks every day on Syrian army checkpoints, Syrian armored vehicles and tanks, Syrian forces and Shabiha (plainclothes militia). Because none of the claims could be independently verified, it is possible that such operations never occurred, were exaggerated, or were carried out by Syrian forces that defected and later joined up with the FSA. Additionally, it is possible that defectors with no intention of joining the FSA carried out some of the attacks. It is important to remember that the overwhelming majority of defected soldiers are mid-to-low-ranking Sunnis, while the Alawite, Druze and Christian soldiers remain largely loyal to President Bashar al Assad and the Syrian armed forces. It is important to watch for large-scale defections involving high-ranking and/or Alawite officers, because such defections would likely shake the unity of both the army and the Alawites, which the regime has been able to maintain thus far.