Fiji sits about 3,000 kilometers (1,800 miles) east of Australia at the edge of the Melanesian island chain. Its central location in the South Pacific on the trade route between the Americas and Oceania and its abundance in timber, mineral and fishing resources make Fiji an economic and communications hub for the smaller Pacific nations. Fiji is also an important player in the regional political dynamic. Together with other Melanesian nations, including Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, Fiji in 1983 formed the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), which has increasingly demonstrated its ability to act as a counterweight to the Australia- and New Zealand-dominated Pacific Islands Forum.

The Melanesian Islands

Australia's relations with most of the MSG countries have been strained since the 2000s due to Canberra's perceived heavy-handed stance toward them, but since Fiji's suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum in 2009, the MSG has grown more assertive in challenging Canberra. It has criticized Australia's attempts to isolate Fiji and accused Canberra of deliberately trying to fragment regional groups as a way to maximize its power over the individual countries. The Melanesian Islands and most of the other South Pacific islands are under Australia's sphere of influence to varying degrees, some reluctantly so, and the Fiji dispute has given these countries an issue through which they can voice their displeasure with Australia and attempt to undermine its credibility.

Canberra's Strategic Reassessment

In addition to fomenting divisions within the regional bloc, the sanctions Australia imposed on Fiji have failed to achieve their intended purpose of isolating the regime and bringing about the resumption of civilian rule. In fact, they have encouraged the Fijian government to look elsewhere for patrons, especially to China, which has undertaken its own Pacific islands engagement strategy. Beijing has responded to this opening by sending extensive investment and foreign aid into the country, as well as loans with few conditions attached. Bilateral trade increased from $45.3 million in 2005 to $172 million in 2011, and China also outpaced Australia as Fiji's major aid donor and enhanced bilateral military and political ties between Beijing and Suva.

With this investment, China proved itself a reliable alternative for Fiji. At the same time, Beijing has been trying to buy influence in regional forums such as the MSG, including funding the MSG Secretariat building in Vanuatu and other projects, as well as strengthening its ties with other Melanesian nations. These efforts strike against one of Canberra's core strategic imperatives: keeping the island nations to its north and east from becoming bases of influence for outside competitors.

A large continent with a relatively small population located primarily along its eastern coast, Australia sits in a neighborhood of much larger nations, and its status as a non-ethnically Asian nation leaves it feeling vulnerable to larger regional population centers. The island chain running from the Indian Ocean through Indonesia and the Melanesian states into the Pacific serves as a defensive barrier for Australia. It does not need to occupy or control these states, but Canberra has an imperative to ensure that no other significant regional power is able to exploit these states to break Australia's defensive chain.

Fiji's economic and geographic position is not particularly important to Australia. However, because of its role as a centerpiece of Melanesia and its ability to serve as a unifying force for the Melanesian chain, Australia's isolation of Fiji has undermined Canberra's relations with Papua New Guinea (much more important economically and strategically), the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and even parts of New Caledonia. The Fiji issue has not only opened a wider regional rift but also given China an opportunity to step in and exploit the islands, something inimical to Australia's strategic imperatives. 

Fiji's Importance to Washington

Washington initially imposed its own sanctions on the military junta and voiced support for Australia's refusal to deal with the regime. However, the United States appears to have shifted its position since 2010 as it has accelerated its re-engagement strategy in East Asia. The United States moved to independently normalize relations with Fiji and engage the military government, leaving Australia and New Zealand isolated in their stance.

Because of Washington's growing focus on the Pacific and increasing military presence in the region, including establishing a new permanent base in the northern Australian city of Darwin, it is important for Canberra to demonstrate the ability to contain regional instability and maintain its influence on small island countries, whose cooperation is necessary for U.S. re-engagement. This has resulted in pressure on Canberra to conform to U.S. policy on Fiji. Australia also faces commercial pressure, since a number of Australian businesses operating in Fiji have been damaged by the sanctions and have pressed Canberra to take another approach.

Australia's sanctions policy has put it in a dilemma. Canberra does not want to appear to be backing off its call for a return to democratic governance, but its insistence may be coming at the expense of more important strategic interests. Congratulating Fiji on its purported moves to restore democracy may be a first step toward eventually dropping the issue so it can begin trying to mitigate China's gains in Fiji.

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