Amphibious Warships: The Real East Asian Arms Race U.S.: Naval Dominance and the Importance of Oceans U.S., South Korea: Exercise Delays and Lingering Perceptions Special Series: The Chinese Navy U.S. President Barack Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard formally announced Nov. 16 that the United States will expand its military activity and cooperation with Australia as early as 2012. Washington and Canberra have a long history of military cooperation as well as longstanding, closely aligned geopolitical interests. This most recent agreement marks a significant step in a broader and more substantial expansion of cooperation between the two countries and within the wider region. The agreement lays the groundwork for U.S. Marines to make regular use of Australian training grounds (including independent training), with at least occasional rotation of a 2,500-strong Marine Air-Ground Task Force slated to begin in 2016. Meanwhile, air bases such as Royal Australian Air Force Base Tindal could host American combat and support aircraft, including aerial refueling tankers and strategic bombers. Ports such as Royal Australian Navy Base HMAS Coonawarra in Darwin, already a regular port of call for American warships, and HMAS Stirling (Fleet Base West) south of Perth could see the forward basing of American aircraft carriers, surface combatants, amphibious ships, auxiliaries and submarines as well as a considerable expansion of logistical, repair and rearmament capacities. The agreement with Australia is but one, albeit central, element of the reorientation, rebalancing and rationalization of the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, a process that has been under way for more than a decade. The Pentagon has already undertaken a massive effort to expand the military capacity of the island of Guam. Military construction is also under way in South Korea and Japan. In the Philippines, the sustained presence of U.S. special operations forces and advisers has far outlasted its original justification of confronting Muslim separatist group Abu Sayyaf. Singapore, already a regular port of call for American warships, is under discussion as the potential homeport for the first foreign forward deployment of one or two of the U.S. Navy's newest Littoral Combat Ships. (click here to enlarge image) Looming budget cuts have also come into play. The Pentagon is looking to do more with the same or less resources. This forward basing allows warships and crews to spend more time on station and less time in transit, which allows the same military presence to be sustained with fewer vessels. It also leads to less wear on and fuel use by ships moving to and from bases in North America. Alternative deployment and basing paradigms (including the possibility of rotating crews between a warship or submarine in the theater, already standard on ballistic and cruise missile submarines and Littoral Combat Ships) are being examined with increased interest. The U.S. military in particular and Washington in general has found most of its resources consumed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, with the Iraq withdrawal almost complete (though the problem of Iran's growing power in the region remains unaddressed) and the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan slated to accelerate in the coming years, the United States has slowly been able to turn its attention to other key areas of the globe. In doing so, Washington has encountered an increasingly assertive and aggressive China, particularly in the South China Sea. China has used the window of opportunity created by Washington's preoccupation in Iraq and Afghanistan to expand its reach and influence and strengthen its own military posture in the Asia-Pacific region. From a geopolitical standpoint, there is an inherent tension given increasingly overlapping national interests — both between Washington and Beijing — and among other regional players. This friction has left many in the region — from South Korea to Vietnam and Australia — nervous about the long-term implications of China’s increasingly assertive rise and the increasingly aggressive exercise of military power (as well as Beijing's use of paramilitary maritime entities). In other words, as China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy has expanded, there has been mounting interest in joint training with and even hosting of American military forces around the region. Much of the current American posture reflects Cold War-era considerations more than current military dynamics and concerns in the region. As a result, the United States is moving to rationalize its current basing architecture by attempting to move from a legacy posture to one that deals with the emergence of modern Asian powers. These moves do not signal any shift in Washington's larger geopolitical, strategic or military intentions. Still, the distance and dispersal that Australia offers is not lost on the Pentagon planners eyeing China's anti-access and area denial strategy. For Australia, further tightening of an already strong relationship between Canberra and Washington makes a great deal of sense. Given its geographic and demographic realities, Australia has always relied on the support of an outside power to ensure its broad, regional defense and its outside economic engagement. The Australian Defence Force has long been an important and capable ally of the U.S. military, and the relationship allows Australia greater access to intelligence and training as well as more sophisticated defense hardware than Canberra could provide for itself. The United States brings considerable capabilities and reinforcements to bear when Australia chooses to intervene in its neighborhood. Tension between China and the United States is unavoidable in the region. Any rebalancing at all — excepting a U.S. military pullback from the region — will continue to unsettle Beijing. Meanwhile, every country in Southeast Asia will view the arrangement between Australia and the United States from its own position. Indonesia, for example, will be nervous about being caught between China and additional American forces in Australia — and the subsequent Chinese attention that situation may attract. Despite Obama's denials at the signing ceremony, the tension between China and the United States is a reality. Beijing will continue to refine its own military posture and disposition in response to changes by Washington in the region, while others will naturally worry if either side becomes too dominant. While many in the region might benefit from competition between China and the United States in the long term, countries are currently concerned about near-term stability as that competition evolves.