Syria and Iran have prepared the ground for a strong performance by Hezbollah in Lebanon's June 7 parliamentary elections. Still, Syria regards Hezbollah as a tool in gaining a more prominent role in the region and Hezbollah is watching and waiting for a time when it finds itself cornered by an opportunistic Syrian regime. And while Iran's relationship with Hezbollah has never been tighter, the Iranians have a lot on their plate right now. The battle for Beirut is far from over.
Analysis
The electoral battle that will take place in Lebanon June 7 will not be limited to the country's warring political factions. Lebanon's fractured political landscape makes the country an ideal proxy battleground for regional players, evidenced by the country's reputation as a den of spies and the rampant vote-buying that defines Lebanese democracy.
The United States, Israel, France, Saudi Arabia and Egypt (among others) are all united in their desire to prevent Hezbollah from sweeping the elections. These countries have worked through their various intelligence arms to beef up the fractured March 14 opposition led by Saad al-Hariri, but they are also preparing for the worst. Meanwhile, Syria and Iran are laying the groundwork for Hezbollah and its allies to give a strong performance in the elections, though the interests of Hezbollah's patrons are bound to clash down the road.
The French may have put Lebanon on the map, but in the eyes of Damascus, the territory encompassed by Lebanon is for all intents and purposes a natural extension of Syrian territory. Incapable of giving up Syria's primary economic outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, the Syrian political elite will continue to subscribe to the historical notion of a Greater Syria and can always be expected to play a preponderant role in Lebanon.
The Feb. 14, 2005, assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri that drove Syrian troops out of Lebanon after 30 years of occupation was a setback for the Syrian regime, but only a temporary one. Syria's robust intelligence network in the country remains intact, and after a few years of political intimidation, bribing and diplomatic maneuvering, the groundwork is laid for Syria to reclaim its kingmaker status in Lebanon and reconstitute itself politically in the upcoming elections.
But while the Syrians are on the rise once again in Lebanon, they are not entirely satisfied with their position in the region. Syrian President Bashar al Assad thought he would be able to skillfully maneuver his way into a peace deal with Israel that would guarantee official recognition of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon and break U.S. isolationist policy toward Syria, thereby giving Damascus room to play a more prominent role in the region. Not surprisingly, the Syrians and the Americans were never able to see eye to eye. Washington expected Syria to sever ties with Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and its other militant proxies, while Syria thought it could get away with its traditional mercantilist negotiating strategy of offering much and delivering little in the end.
Al Assad was told by his foreign policy advisers (Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem, Syrian Ambassador to the United States Imad Moustapha and political and media affairs consultant Bouthaina Shaaban) that the Obama administration would show more flexibility in dealing with Syria and apply pressure on Israel to resume bilateral talks with Syria under the auspices of Turkey. Those hopes were quickly dashed, however, when the U.S. administration announced in early May that it would renew sanctions on Syria. Al Assad has already reprimanded his foreign policy advisers, some of whom could be caught in upcoming government reshuffles.
The Syrian-Israeli negotiating track has not been completely derailed, however. The United States will be relying more on Turkey to breathe life back into the talks when the time is right. Still, Syria's relationship with the West will continue to be strained, as Damascus has no intention of sacrificing its relationship with Hezbollah. Relations between Syria and Hezbollah have been on the rocks, particularly since the 2008 assassination of Hezbollah senior commander Imad Mughniyah . Nonetheless, Syria wants to maintain this relationship and convince the Americans, the Israelis, the French, the Saudis and others that only Syria is capable of containing Hezbollah, which Damascus claims can be accomplished only if Syria is given the room to rebuild its influence in Lebanon.
Syria has long been preparing for the upcoming elections to ensure victory for its allies. According to STRATFOR sources, Syrian intelligence officers in the Rif Dimashq Governorate in rural Syria intimidate Syrian citizens who hold dual citizenship in Lebanon (at least 10,000 Syrian-Lebanese dual citizens are eligible to vote). STRATFOR sources say intelligence officers have threatened to cut off water and electricity and imprison and torture villagers if they vote "for the enemies of Syria" in the March 14 coalition. Villagers also have been informed that Syria's intelligence apparatus has the ability to know exactly how they vote. Lebanese villagers in the west Bekaa Valley bordering Syria have also reportedly been ordered to travel to Damascus to receive their orders on which Syrian allies — Abdul Rahim Mourad (Sunni), Eli Firzli (Greek Orthodox) and Faysal Daoud (Druze) — to vote for. The Syrian National Social Party is the primary political vehicle that Syrian intelligence agents use to implement the Syrian election strategy for Lebanon.
Syria may be aiding Hezbollah's election campaign, but the Syrian regime still regards the Shiite militant group as a tool in its negotiations with the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and France. Hezbollah will take the Syrian aid, but it is also watching and waiting for a time when it finds itself cornered by an opportunistic Syrian regime.
Meanwhile, Iran's relationship with Hezbollah has never been tighter, but the Iranians have a lot on their plate right now. In addition to staking their claim in the Lebanese elections, the Iranians are trying to diplomatically maneuver around the Americans, the Israelis and the Europeans; maintain their nuclear program; prepare their Shiite allies for elections in Iraq; and get through their own presidential elections on June 12.
Tehran is counting on its most powerful and sophisticated militant proxy in Lebanon to help discourage military action by the Israelis and Americans. At the same time, the Iranians are extremely wary of Syria's long-term intentions for Hezbollah, a concern ever since Mughniyah was assassinated on Syrian soil and Syria decided to go public with its now-stagnant peace negotiations with Israel. Iran and Hezbollah are also eyeing Israel carefully. The United States is not interested in approving any military action against Iran for the time being, and Israel does not have the luxury of carrying out an attack on its own. Washington could, however, acquiesce to an Israeli plan to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon to dilute Iran’s militant insurance policy. Both Iran and Hezbollah are preparing for such a scenario.
The Iranians have many reasons to protect a militant asset like Hezbollah and have spent a great deal of time lately tightening their leash on the group, beginning with restructuring Hezbollah's leadership. Hezbollah sources claim that significant changes in the group's top tier can be expected after the June 7 elections.
Iran wants Hezbollah to broaden its aims and serve as a link between the Islamic Republic and Arabs. When Hezbollah's limited network in Egypt was exposed in early April, the Egyptian government seized the opportunity to besmirch Hezbollah's reputation by grossly exaggerating the group's activities in Egypt (the Hezbollah network there is primarily designed to provide logistical support to Hamas in Gaza). The Egyptians have known about this network for a while but decided to time its exposure ahead of the Lebanese elections, causing Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah's popularity to decline among the region's Sunni Arabs, who have respected him as a resistance leader against Israel.
Though Nasrallah is a charismatic leader and continues to carry significant symbolic weight among Shiites, Iran has increasingly viewed him as a liability. As STRATFOR reported in December 2007, Iran decided to exclude Nasrallah from Hezbollah's decision-making process and has bolstered the positions of more hard-line Hezbollah members, including Hezbollah deputy chief Sheikh Naim Qasim and security chief Wafiq Safa.
As part of Iran's bid to reach out more to Sunni Arabs and attempt to bridge the sectarian divide, the Iranian regime is seriously considering whether Nasrallah should be replaced as the official head of Hezbollah. Qasim has already served as the de facto leader of the organization, and has expressed his willingness to take Nasrallah's place, though it remains unclear if and when such a shift would take place.
The Iranians also have tightened their control over Hezbollah's military operations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps directly runs Hezbollah operations from the Iranian embassy compound in Bir Hassan, Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs. This allows Iran to ensure that any Hezbollah action against Israel is done in strict accordance with an Iranian agenda.
Iran naturally wants Hezbollah to gain a symbolic victory in the upcoming Lebanese elections and had pledged to spend millions on Hezbollah's election campaign. But with oil prices sinking and Iran's economy in dire straits, the Iranians had to go on a bit of a spending diet. Instead, Qatar, which enjoys being the political maverick of the Persian Gulf and has extensive intelligence links in Lebanon, has picked up the slack for Iran and deposited funds in Lebanon's central bank for Hezbollah and its allies.
In spite of American, French and Saudi efforts to bolster the March 14 coalition, Syria and Iran have done their work to provide Hezbollah with a significant political victory on June 7. This next round in the ongoing Iran-West standoff may go to Tehran, but the diplomatic plates are still shifting in the region as Syria seeks out a more prominent role and recognition by the West. The battle over Beirut is far from over.
