In the run-up to the June 7 parliamentary elections in Lebanon, there is speculation that Hezbollah could end up with enough seats to take the lead in forming the next Lebanese cabinet, but that is not the group's intent. Hezbollah sources privately claim they would prefer to remain in the opposition — as long as they retain veto power in the Cabinet and thereby protect their militant wing. To that end, Hezbollah is looking for a political compromise that will include Lebanon's broad political spectrum, but it is holding onto an insurance policy that threatens to plunge the country back into chaos.
Analysis
When the votes are tallied from the June 7 Lebanese parliamentary elections, all eyes will be on the Shiite Islamist party Hezbollah. The Hezbollah-led March 8 coalition has retained a slight lead in opinion polls, leading to speculation that Hezbollah could end up with enough seats to take the lead in forming the next Lebanese cabinet. Should such a scenario occur, there is a good chance that the Western-backed March 14 coalition, as well a number of countries in the West that want to stay on Israel's good side, would boycott the government, thereby plunging Lebanon into a severe — albeit familiar — state of chaos.
Contrary to popular perception, Hezbollah is not intent on controlling the next Lebanese government. The organization's political leaders have already carefully considered the drawbacks to winning a hollow election victory that would end up further complicating their agenda to retain a strong militant arm. Discussions among senior Hezbollah leaders have centered on the fate of Hamas, which swept Palestinian legislative elections in early 2006 and then promptly found itself in nearly complete political and economic isolation. Hezbollah understands that its political evolution must occur gradually so as not to put the group's long-standing militant wing in danger.
In his speech at Cairo University, U.S. President Barack Obama made an indirect reference to Hezbollah's election prospects and widespread fears that an Islamist militant group could become the controlling force in the Lebanese government through legitimate and democratic means. Obama expressed some humility about the U.S. position on democracy, professing that the United States "doesn't presume to know what's best for everyone, just as we would not presume to pick the outcome of a peaceful election." Although Obama was trying to dispel the notion that Washington's promotion of democracy in the region is hypocritically selective, Hezbollah is also well aware that the existence and prowess of its military wing greatly complicates the group's political agenda and is an issue that must be handled with utmost care.
To protect its militant wing, Hezbollah must, at the very least, retain veto power in the Lebanese government. Despite having only 14 seats in parliament, Hezbollah forcefully acquired veto power in the May 2008 Doha accord, which gave Hezbollah and its allies 11 seats in the 30-seat "national unity" government, thereby granting Hezbollah at least one third of the Cabinet.
With a minimum of 11 seats in the Cabinet, Hezbollah can shoot down any legislative moves to disarm the movement, and the group is already deeply suspicious of Lebanese President Michel Suleiman's intentions on this matter. Hezbollah sources privately claim they would prefer to remain in the opposition — as long as they retain veto power in the Cabinet — and are not operating under the assumption that they will be in a position to form the next Lebanese cabinet.
In fact, Hezbollah representatives have been busy in the run-up to the elections dealing behind the scenes with Saad al Hariri's Future Trend party and other members of the Western-backed March 14 coalition to come to some sort of a political compromise that will respect both sides' interests. This type of politics of accommodation is all too common for a country as fractious as Lebanon, where parliament seats are swapped like baseball cards.
Though Hezbollah is looking for a political compromise that will include Lebanon's broad political spectrum, the group also has specific points on its agenda that it intends to fulfill. For example, Hezbollah feels confident enough now in its political movement to raise its profile and try and wrest control of the parliament speaker position from the group's long-standing Shiite rival, Nabih Berri's Amal movement. Hezbollah already has a strategy in play with its contentious Maronite Christian ally Michel Aoun to degrade Berri's position and use Aoun's political support to put Mohammed Raad, the chief of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, in Berri's current position.
Hezbollah also intends to use its political prowess after the elections to push a plan to include the southern suburbs of Beirut — a Shiite-concentrated Hezbollah stronghold — in municipal Beirut. Currently, the southern suburbs are considered part of "greater Beirut." If this structural change is made, Beirut would be politically transformed from a predominantly Sunni city into one that gives Shiites, and therefore Hezbollah, equal representation. And Hezbollah would thus be better equipped for the 2013 parliamentary vote.
In case Hezbollah ends up facing stiff resistance from the March 14 coalition in forming the next government, the group also has a relatively sound insurance policy. This backup plan came to light on May 5, 2008, when the March 14-led government voted to fire a pro-Hezbollah airport security official and to disband the Hezbollah land communications network. Two days later, Hezbollah activists stormed Beirut, threw up burning-tire blockades and effectively paralyzed the city, eventually forcing the government to reverse these two fateful decisions. The standoff has not been forgotten among March 14 members in Beirut, and Hezbollah has every intention of reminding its political rivals of the consequences of trying to clip Hezbollah's wings.
Hezbollah is doing its best to protect itself at home, but as Part III of STRATFOR's Lebanese elections series will soon reveal, the Shiite group's fate will more likely be determined outside the borders of Lebanon.
