Since July 28, 34 alleged militants have been killed by unmanned aerial vehicles (known colloquially as drones), including three in Yemen's southern Lahj province on Aug. 10, ending a brief hiatus of drone attacks. Drone strikes have occurred in Yemen since 2002 but did not begin to take place with much frequency until 2012, when 42 such strikes were reported. Since the beginning of 2013, there have been 21 reported strikes targeting militants, many of them taking place in recent weeks.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's aforementioned threats against Yemeni energy facilities and U.S. and Western interests likely prompted the uptick in drone strikes.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is the jihadist franchise that has come the closest to carrying out a successful transnational attack, even if every attempt has either failed due to operational errors or been thwarted by security measures. Although the group has not had a great record of success in the past, its threats are taken seriously because it possesses strong tradecraft skills and resources, including its lead bombmaker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, and funding from kidnapping campaigns and foreign donors.
The alert was raised when al Qaeda core chief Ayman al-Zawahiri reportedly gave his approval during an encrypted online conversation with Nasir al-Wahayshi, the leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for a plot planned by Yemen's al Qaeda node. The attack was set to occur during Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end of Ramadan, though no such attack took place then.
The alleged plot brings into question the Yemeni group's relationship with the al Qaeda core. The Yemen branch has demonstrated the closest ties to al-Zawahiri's al Qaeda compared to the other regional al Qaeda nodes. Many of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's leaders and former leaders had close ties to Osama bin Laden and other transnational fighters. However, it is not typical for the group to coordinate its attacks with the al Qaeda core. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula opts to conduct its business as an independent franchise rather than a subordinate organization.
Besides the threat to Western interests that prompted the closure of U.S. embassies (all of which have reopened except in Yemen), a second threat was revealed by Yemeni officials and involved an alleged plan by the Yemeni al Qaeda node to seize control of oil facilities in Mukalla. Later, the Yemeni government issued an official statement denying any such plot existed. Despite the conflicting reports, an attack targeting energy infrastructure did in fact take place, though not on the scale suggested by Yemeni officials. Al Qaeda militants shot and killed five Yemeni soldiers at the Radhum checkpoint outside oil and natural gas projects in Shabwa province. Attacks on energy infrastructure are common in Yemen and are conducted not only by al Qaeda but also local tribesmen hoping to elicit concessions, usually money, from the central government.
The type of attack the Yemeni officials warned of involved the seizure of entire oil facilities, something that has not yet been seen in Yemen. While such an attack is conceivable, especially in the wake of the January attack at the Ain Amenas refinery in Algeria, vast amounts of resources would be required to ensure a complete takeover of such a facility. In addition, unlike Algeria, Yemeni fields involved in the production of hydrocarbons are confined to only a few areas, enabling Sanaa to concentrate its forces to protect critical infrastructure there. The pipelines that connect the fields to export terminals on the country's coast are an easier target, however, and have consequently been attacked much more frequently.
It is unlikely that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would be willing to dedicate the necessary resources to such an attack, since this would probably mean the group would have to forgo its goal of launching transnational attacks against the West and its allies and establishing an Islamic emirate in Yemen. Such an allocation of resources for one operation would be worthwhile only if the targeted complex contained numerous foreign hostages who could ensure hefty ransoms, which could then be used to fund future attacks. However, because the threat has already been publicized, the element of tactical surprise has been lost and many foreigners have already left these facilities, further reducing the likelihood of this type of attack. In addition, most of the major international energy companies operating in Yemen have been replaced by Yemeni or other non-Western companies in recent years, offering relatively few potential physical energy targets associated with the West, though it should be noted that international companies do still retain financial interests in the fields and would be adversely affected by such attacks.
Instead, the Yemeni al Qaeda node will focus its efforts on attempting to assassinate military and intelligence officials and launch attacks against pipelines in the country. It will simultaneously dedicate resources to transnational attacks amid heightened scrutiny from U.S., Yemeni and Saudi intelligence gathering and security campaigns.
