Editor's note: This is part three of a three-part series on the capabilities and impediments of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemen-based al Qaeda franchise. Part one discussed AQAP's growth since its formation and its links to the al Qaeda core. Part two discussed challenges that the U.S., Yemeni and Saudi governments face in eliminating the militant group.

Domestic Constraints for AQAP

AQAP faces challenges of its own. The offensive against AQAP limits its ability to operate out in the open or plan and coordinate attacks, and it could lead to the death of key leaders, though it is unclear how long the Yemeni government will be able to continue the current intensity of its campaign. A more complicated problem for the group is dealing with Yemen's vast network of tribes. 

Tribes are the main social unit in Yemen and often serve as their own governing bodies in the areas they occupy. Maintaining working relationships with tribal leaders is vital for AQAP and its Ansar al-Sharia division to operate, implement religious-based law, maintain training bases and recruit young tribesmen to become militants. However, the relationship between tribes and AQAP is very nuanced and is determined mostly on a case-by-case basis depending on the tribes' willingness. AQAP tries to encourage positive relationships with tribes through a combination of strategically marrying into powerful tribal families, providing cash incentives to the tribes and offering services that the government has failed to provide. These include protection from other hostile tribes and even services such as water, sewage and electricity, which the group already claims to be providing in several of the cities it has recently taken over.

Despite AQAP's efforts to form working relationships with tribes, there are some tribes that the militants oppose for ideological and religious reasons, rendering any such relationship unlikely. AQAP vehemently opposes the al-Houthi tribes in the north and the Ismaili tribes in Saudi Arabia along the Yemeni border that practice different forms of Shiism, as opposed to the radical version of Sunnism that AQAP practices. AQAP has even opposed Sunni tribes if they do not follow a sufficiently conservative view of Sharia or are unwilling to implement it.

Even if a tribe is in ideological agreement with AQAP, most tribesmen will work for anyone who pays them, meaning their allegiance can be shifted with enough financial incentives from the Yemeni government or its allies. Saudi Arabia has made extensive use of this tactic to keep tribes in line. Buying tribes off can deny AQAP the kind of indigenous support that allows the organization to operate in Yemen. Therefore, while some tribal connections may assist AQAP, tribes can also be used to attack AQAP or limit the group's ability to operate openly, implement Sharia and recruit new members.

Transnational Constraints for AQAP

In addition to these domestic challenges, AQAP is faced with tactical limitations on the group's transnational capabilities. Despite AQAP's efforts to inspire Muslims in the West to carry out attacks, very few rise to the call, and those who do often are detected during the planning and preparation phases of the attack cycle. Additionally, their ability to properly construct explosive devices and use weapons is often amateurish, especially since most who attempt attacks in the United States never received any formal training in Yemen. 

The group also has difficulties using Yemen as a launching pad for transnational attacks. In addition to the challenge of transporting the explosive device or an individual in possession of the device to a Western target without being detected or drawing the suspicion of intelligence and security officials, it is difficult to find militants with the ability and savvy to travel internationally. Although there are still holes in travel security, even old tactics with new innovations are very difficult to implement successfully. Devices failing to function as planned have also proved problematic, such as the 2009 Christmas Day underwear bomb attempt or the attempted assassination of Saudi counterterrorism chief Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. More recently, leaks to intelligence officials have thwarted transnational attacks such as the printer bomb plot, which was exposed by an ex-jihadist, and the recently thwarted improvised explosive device attack on a U.S. aircraft that was exposed by an agent working for U.S. intelligence.

A separate constraint that could cripple AQAP's transnational capabilities is its organizational leadership structure. Much of AQAP's core leadership has close ties to the al Qaeda core and vital terrorist tradecraft skills and abilities that are difficult to impart to other members. For example, if AQAP's lead bombmaker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, were killed, it could leave a massive void in AQAP's ability to make and deploy the innovative explosives that have been able to pass through security measures undetected, even if they have not always functioned as planned. Although al-Asiri claims to be teaching his skills to several students, it takes a certain degree of creativity and intuition to design the types of explosive devices that he has devised. Similarly, AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahayshi and senior military commander Qasim al-Raymi have close ties with the al Qaeda core, greatly bolstering their credibility and ability to unite and inspire AQAP and other militants. The group's dependence on a few key leaders is a critical operational vulnerability should those individuals be captured or killed.

AQAP remains the most capable and active al Qaeda franchise and has seized the opportunity presented by the Yemeni government's weakness over the past year. While the efforts by the United States, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have stunted AQAP advances, those countries face constraints that will limit their ability to suppress the militant group. Over the longer term, AQAP will likely continue to be a domestic and transnational threat for as long as the Yemeni government and security apparatus remain divided and distracted and thus unable to devote the time and resources needed to root out the group.