Militants belonging to both the Islamic State West African Province and Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad killed at least 40 people on Jan. 14 from the Dumba community in Borno state, in northeastern Nigeria, Reuters reported Jan. 15. Those killed were primarily farmers and fishermen local to the area, which is near Lake Chad; many others remain missing. The state governor emphasized the importance of citizens adhering to government-designated safe zones for farming and other economic activities. The attack is notable for involving apparent collaboration between JAS and its breakaway faction ISWAP, which split in 2016. The two sides have since fought each other over territorial control and local influence, a conflict that only escalated following the 2021 death of JAS's then-leader, Abubakar Shekau. Violence has surged since the end of 2024, in large part driven by ISWAP's increased targeting of security forces with explosives-laden drones. The conflict remains concentrated in northeastern Borno, but extends to border areas with Cameroon, Chad and Niger, particularly in the Lake Chad region. The groups' rivalry stems from their differing ambitions and tactics, with JAS aiming to establish strict Islamic rule in northeastern Nigeria, while ISWAP focuses on expanding its influence across West Africa to build a geographically broader Islamic caliphate aligned with the Islamic State.

Resource scarcity could have motivated coordination between ISWAP and JAS to target vulnerable communities, but this probably will be short-lived, portending further clashes between the groups and with security forces that involve the use of more advanced tactics like drones. Given the two sides' differing ambitions and yearslong rivalry, it appears more likely that specific/local factions within ISWAP and JAS collaborated during the recent attack rather than the broader groups, perhaps as both faced resource scarcity. Barring further incidents involving reported collaboration between the groups, their long-standing rivalry suggests such coordination will be a one-off or will otherwise remain limited and/or short-lived. This means the groups will likely return to fighting each other in the coming months, increasing violence not just among the militants and leaving civilians in the crossfire. ISWAP's use of advanced tactics, such as drones, showcases its growing military capabilities that will worsen regional instability. The group's use of these tactics in simultaneous attacks in December 2024 on military posts in Borno and Yobe states, for example, demonstrated a new level of strategic sophistication. This will allow ISWAP to extend its operational range and evade conventional counterterrorism measures, as delivery drones are often small, fast and capable of operating at low altitudes, making them difficult to detect and intercept with traditional radar systems, which themselves are limited in Nigeria. ISWAP may even use its drones to attack power grids, water supply systems or communication hubs, causing more widespread disruptions. The Nigerian military's limited defense budget will further hinder its ability to acquire advanced drone detection and counter-drone technologies to address these threats. Ongoing attacks in Borno underscore significant gaps in security coverage, especially in remote or volatile areas, facilitated by limited regional cooperation due to Chad and Niger's internal challenges. Against this backdrop, extremist groups like ISWAP and JAS will exploit the security vacuum, intensifying violence and further destabilizing the region.