The U.S.-Iran framework deal will decrease the immediate risk of renewed conflict over the next 60 days, but shipping through the Strait of Hormuz will probably resume only gradually, given the persistent risk that talks stall, flare-ups resume or vessels face renewed harassment in and around the strait, while a sustainable nuclear deal will remain elusive. On June 14, the United States and Iran agreed to a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to extend their ceasefire for 60 days, reopen the Strait of Hormuz and continue nuclear negotiations after 107 days of war. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced the framework after mediation by Pakistan and Qatar. U.S. President Donald Trump stated that the United States would lift its naval blockade, while Iran is expected to reopen the strait once the deal is formally signed, on June 19 in Switzerland. While the MoU has not yet been publicly released, it reportedly includes the start of a 60-day period for nuclear negotiations following the deal's signing on June 19. The talks will discuss curbing Iran's nuclear program, the fate of its highly enriched uranium and a compliance monitoring mechanism. In exchange, Iran expects to access billions of dollars of its frozen funds blocked abroad and an end to sanctions that have crippled its economy.

• Israeli officials have signaled that the U.S.-Iran framework does not bind Israel, while Defense Minister Israel Katz said Israel will not withdraw from territory it has seized in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza. Israeli security officials also reportedly said the Israel Defense Forces would not withdraw from its "security zone" in southern Lebanon under the U.S.-Iran framework.
• Global oil prices dropped by over 4% after the MoU was announced. Prices had soared since the outbreak of the war in February and the blockades in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world's oil supply passes.
• Reuters reported that one LNG tanker, the Disha, transited the Strait of Hormuz on June 15, reportedly through the Iran-designated route, after the U.S.-Iran deal announcement. The tanker was carrying LNG linked to India's Petronet and had reportedly been waiting west of the strait after loading in Qatar earlier in the conflict.
• Trump announced that passage through the Strait of Hormuz would be "permanently toll-free," but two semi-official Iranian news agencies with links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps reported on June 15 that, while Tehran will allow free transit for the 60-day window in which further negotiations will take place, it plans to impose fees after that period.

The MoU follows weeks of U.S.-Iran negotiations aimed at extending the ceasefire, reopening the Strait of Hormuz and shifting the conflict toward negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. For weeks, Pakistan and several other regional states, including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, had been mediating between Iran and the United States, and pressuring both sides to halt the military conflict that had spilled over to the Gulf and disrupted the global economy. While in recent days Washington and Tehran reportedly made progress, the talks nearly collapsed after Israel struck alleged Hezbollah targets in Beirut shortly before the MoU's expected signing on June 14, prompting Iranian threats of retaliation and requiring U.S., Qatari and Pakistani mediation to prevent a return to open conflict. The United States reportedly offered further concessions to incentivize Iran to refrain from attacking Israel and inviting retaliation. Both Washington and Tehran have strong incentives to accept the framework for talks and halt military actions: Iran is incentivized to ease the economic pressure from the war and reopen pathways for oil exports, while Trump has been facing mounting pressure to contain global energy shocks, reassure U.S. partners in the Gulf and avoid entering the midterm elections cycle amid a regional war and high fuel prices. 

• For months, Israel has sought to undermine a potential U.S.-Iran deal by escalating its operations in Lebanon and pushing the Trump administration toward a harder military line against Tehran. Beyond Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's domestic political calculations, Israel fears that a U.S.-Iran agreement would come at the expense of its own security priorities, particularly in Lebanon, while postponing the nuclear issue and leaving Iran's missile program and proxy network largely unaddressed. Israeli officials view the current MoU as reinforcing those concerns, since it prioritizes ceasefire extension, Hormuz reopening and nuclear follow-on talks over broader constraints on Iran's regional capabilities.
• Trump reportedly scolded Netanyahu on June 14 after Israel attacked Beirut hours before the expected U.S.-Iran MoU signing, with Axios reporting that Trump said the deal would have already been signed had the strike not occurred. This mirrors a similar episode around June 7-8, when an Israeli attack in Beirut prompted Iran to launch missiles at northern Israel. After Israel retaliated against Iran, Trump urged Netanyahu not to escalate further because Washington was nearing a deal with Tehran. 

The MoU will likely lower the risk of direct U.S.-Iran conflict over the next 60 days, though shipping through the Strait of Hormuz will probably resume only gradually, given the persistent risk of talks stalling and periodic tit-for-tat attacks resuming. The framework is designed to extend the ceasefire, reopen Hormuz and shift both sides into a nuclear negotiating track. The United States and Iran will thus be incentivized to significantly constrain military action to kickstart broader talks on Iran's nuclear program and other outstanding issues, such as the complete unfreezing of Iran's assets and sanctions relief. However, their ceasefire will remain fragile and prone to periodic episodes of escalation, because implementing the MoU will depend on sequencing, including Iran refraining from attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, when the United States lifts the naval blockade and whether Washington refrains from issuing new sanctions or retaliatory attacks before a final agreement is reached. Even if the Strait of Hormuz reopens, shipping through the maritime chokepoint will probably recover only gradually and remain below pre-war levels in the near term, as insurers and shipping companies will likely remain cautious amid lingering risks of vessel harassment, asymmetric attacks or periodic escalation tied to possibly stalled U.S.-Iran talks in the coming weeks. Meanwhile, Israel will remain the main external spoiler that could eventually derail negotiations: Netanyahu, who is facing domestic backlash over his handling of the war in Iran and Lebanon ahead of general elections in October, has already said Israel is not bound by the MoU and has been trying to undermine a U.S.-Iran deal for months. Renewed Israeli escalation in Lebanon could reignite fighting with Hezbollah, trigger Iranian retaliation and derail U.S.-Iran talks, even if Tehran and Washington remain committed to their new framework agreement. Finally, if negotiations stall or either side is seen as reneging on early commitments, the risk of renewed regional escalation would rise again, though both Washington and Tehran will probably seek to contain any violations below the threshold of direct war so long as the 60-day negotiating window remains open.

• During an interview with The New York Times on June 14, Trump argued that, despite Netanyahu's objections, the MoU had saved Israel from nuclear obliteration. He also warned that if Iran fails to reach a final nuclear agreement, the United States could resume military strikes on Tehran or seek a broader regional security role in exchange for a share of Middle East revenues. This will likely keep pressure on Iran during the 60-day negotiating window, but it could also make the process more fragile given that Tehran views U.S. threats as evidence that Washington is not negotiating in good faith.
• Even if Iran formally commits to reopening the Strait of Hormuz, its decentralized "mosaic" military architecture means local IRGC naval units or hard-line commanders opposed to the deal could still conduct attacks or boarding operations against commercial vessels, reinforcing the persistent risks to shipping during the negotiating period.
• Ship operators will likely remain wary of transiting the Strait of Hormuz due to residual risks stemming from vessel harassment, insurance costs, the unclear implementation of the MoU and the possibility that talks stall or tit-for-tat attacks resume. However, the strait's reopening will likely still create a better operating window than during active hostilities for stranded ships that want to go out. This means that some shippers, especially those with delayed cargoes or urgent LNG and oil deliveries, may move quickly to transit Hormuz before the security environment deteriorates again, potentially causing an initial surge in traffic from backlogged vessels.

U.S.-Iran negotiations will continue over the next 60 days, though they are unlikely to produce a final nuclear agreement within that window due to structural divergences. Before offering durable sanctions relief or broader economic concessions, the United States will likely demand that Iran first take verifiable steps toward limiting its uranium enrichment, enhancing international monitoring of its nuclear program, and establishing a way to dispose of its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. Tehran, meanwhile, will likely seek early sanctions relief, access to at least a large portion of frozen funds and guarantees that Washington will not reimpose economic pressure before Iran makes nuclear concessions. Deep mistrust will make this tradeoff difficult during negotiations, as both sides will suspect the other of using the 60-day window to buy time or avoid politically costly decisions. The timeline is also highly compressed: the 2015 Iran nuclear deal took years of diplomacy and months of intensive technical negotiation to finalize, while the current talks are expected to move from a wartime ceasefire framework to a final nuclear accord in only two months. As a result, the negotiating process will likely produce phased steps, extensions or partial understandings rather than a comprehensive final deal, with the risk of renewed hostilities if either side concludes the other is reneging on early commitments.