The latest exchanges of fire between Israel and Iran will not immediately collapse the ceasefire, but likely future similar exchanges could significantly strain the ceasefire, if not unravel it. On June 8, Iran's armed forces announced that they had ended military operations against Israel, while warning that they would strike Israel again if it continued to attack Lebanon. The statement came hours after U.S. President Donald Trump called on Iran and Israel to de-escalate following Israeli airstrikes against targets in Iran, including military assets like air defenses, missile launch sites and bases and a major petrochemical plant. Iran responded by firing volleys of missiles toward military bases in central and southern Israel. The exchanges of fire marked the first time Israel and Iran had targeted each other since the April 8 ceasefire between Iran, its allies and the United States and Israel. This tit-for-tat cycle began after Israel struck Beirut on June 7 during renewed fighting with the Iran-backed Lebanese militant and political group Hezbollah. The attack prompted Tehran to retaliate by launching ballistic missiles toward Israel the same day. Israel then followed through on its promise to counterattack against Iran, despite Trump urging Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to retaliate.

• Before Israel retaliated, Trump was attempting to de-escalate the exchange, telling Fox News and Axios that he was urging both Iran and Netanyahu to stand down. On Fox News, Trump said, "What I would suggest to Iran: 'You've shot your missiles, that's enough. Get back to the table and make a deal.'" He later told the Financial Times that he would set the limits of Israel's response, saying, "I call all the shots… [Netanyahu] doesn't call the shots."
• On June 1, in a reportedly tense phone call, Trump also intervened to stop Netanyahu from launching large-scale attacks in Beirut after Iran threatened to suspend talks with Washington over Israel's Lebanon campaign and to retaliate if Israel followed through with its threats.
• After Iran's initial salvo of missiles toward Israel, Trump said Israel had not coordinated its June 7 Beirut strike with Washington and that he was "not happy" about it, underscoring growing U.S.-Israel friction over Lebanon. 
• The Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen also fired two ballistic missiles toward Tel Aviv. In addition to their ballistic missile attack, the Houthis also announced they would resume attacks against Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea, another important maritime trade route.

The latest exchange highlights competing efforts by Iran and Israel to define the scope and conditions of the broader regional ceasefire. The exchange reflects a broader contest over rules of engagement: Israel is trying to preserve freedom of action against Hezbollah despite U.S. efforts to maintain the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire and U.S.-Iran diplomatic tracks, while Iran is signaling that Lebanon is part of the broader regional ceasefire and that Tehran is now strategically positioned and willing to respond to such violations. Iran had been warning for weeks that Israeli attacks on Hezbollah (particularly in Beirut) would constitute a violation of the broader regional ceasefire with the United States that would cause Tehran to halt negotiations with the United States and launch attacks against Israel. Meanwhile, the United States has been trying to delink Lebanon from the broader regional ceasefire by pushing for negotiations between Israel and Lebanon regardless of Hezbollah's position and Washington's negotiations with Tehran. By firing missiles at Israel in response to Lebanon, Iran is trying to link the two fronts by re-emphasizing that any deal with the United States is contingent on a full halt of hostilities in Lebanon.

• The exchanges are unfolding while negotiations between the United States and Iran over a memorandum of understanding to end the war remain deadlocked, despite Trump's comments that a deal is close. Iran and the United States have been exchanging fire in recent weeks in the Persian Gulf. Iran's actions also appear designed to pressure Washington by signaling that Tehran is still willing to escalate and potentially return to conflict, despite U.S. claims that the war is over. 
• Netanyahu's decision to retaliate despite Trump's request for restraint underscores that he may be prioritizing domestic political goals over Washington's diplomatic timeline. Trump had previously succeeded in restraining Netanyahu from planned Beirut strikes, but Israel's subsequent strikes on Iran indicate that Netanyahu's willingness to comply is selective. Israel and the United States have behaved differently since the April 8 ceasefire. Israel has attempted to undermine the deal and urged a return to war, but the Trump administration at present prefers to deal with Iran diplomatically.

While neither Iran nor the United States currently wants a wider conflict, continued Israeli operations in Lebanon risk setting off a cycle of escalation that could unravel both the ceasefire and U.S.-Iran talks. Similar future exchanges of fire between Iran and Israel are likely to occur, given the diverging red lines between both sides. Israel is unlikely to completely halt its attacks against Lebanon, given its strategic security priorities vis-a-vis Hezbollah, which would compel Iran to follow through on its threats. Even so, future similar exchanges would likely remain limited, meaning the Iranian ceasefire with the United States is unlikely to immediately collapse. The fact that the United States has not participated in Israel's attacks and that Trump has urged Netanyahu to refrain from further retaliation underscores that Trump remains focused on managing Iran diplomatically rather than re-entering a wider conflict. Additionally, while Iran is signaling its willingness to escalate over ceasefire violations, it still wants to negotiate a deal with Washington, potentially involving unfreezing some of its frozen assets, which would help its battered economy. However, the recent exchanges demonstrate how quickly Israeli escalation in Lebanon can spill into the Iran-Israel track and threaten U.S.-Iran negotiations. The main risk is that each side's attempt to pursue its own strategic goals narrows the space for de-escalation and undermines negotiations. If Iran responds again with missiles or proxy attacks, Israel will face domestic political pressure to retaliate, especially as Netanyahu seeks to project strength ahead of election season. Such escalation would also strain the U.S.-Iran track because Tehran has increasingly tied regional calm to a full halt in Israeli operations in Lebanon. If Israel continues to strike Lebanon while Washington is unable or unwilling to restrain Netanyahu, Iran would then harden its negotiating position, pause talks or use proxy attacks to raise the cost of continued Israeli operations. If the ceasefire unravels, a return to full-scale hostilities between all sides would lead to Iran and its allies launching widespread attacks against U.S. and Israeli assets in the region, including the Gulf.

• Iran increasingly sees itself as negotiating from a position of relative strength after withstanding the U.S.-Israeli attacks, making it less likely to tolerate what it views as Israeli efforts to violate the ceasefire. Tehran's mistrust of U.S. and Israeli intentions remains high, especially given its view that diplomacy has repeatedly coincided with Israeli military pressure in Lebanon and elsewhere. As a result, Iran is willing to signal that it can return to escalation if Washington does not move on the memorandum of understanding or restrain Israel. If Iran escalates too far by launching more widespread attacks against Israel or other targets in the region, Trump could come under pressure to greenlight stronger Israeli action or resume U.S. military operations, especially if U.S. assets, Gulf partners or maritime traffic are threatened. 
• There is also a small but still plausible scenario in which Trump becomes increasingly dissatisfied with Israeli escalation and applies stronger pressure on Netanyahu in order to de-escalate, particularly if Washington sees a realistic opening for a broader deal with Iran and wants to disengage from the fighting. This dynamic would undermine the Netanyahu government and its relations with the United States and compel it to regionally de-escalate.