The thaw in Turkish-Armenian ties will expand Turkey's regional influence while enabling Armenia to somewhat reduce its reliance on Russia, though progress on both fronts will be constrained by Russian coercion. On May 25, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced in a social media post that the Akhalkalaki-Kars railway between Georgia and Turkey is open for Armenian imports and exports. The announcement came after Turkey lifted some customs restrictions on Armenia on May 13, a step toward facilitating direct bilateral trade — the latest in a series of slow-moving steps to thaw ties between Turkey and Armenia. On May 4, the two also signed a memorandum of understanding to restore the ruined medieval Ani Bridge, which sits between the two countries, as a symbolic gesture of cooperation. The agreement was announced after a meeting between Pashinyan and Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz on the sidelines of the 8th European Political Community Summit, where the two officials discussed additional areas for potential bilateral cooperation, including transportation, energy and customs cooperation.

• Direct trade between Turkey and Armenia had been halted since 1993, when Turkey severed economic ties in solidarity with Azerbaijan, its longtime ally, during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994). 
• In January 2023, after months of initial talks between Turkish and Armenian envoys to improve relations, Turkey lifted its ban on air cargo to Armenia, which facilitated direct flights for goods between the two countries. Even so, additional progress stalled as Turkey conditioned further major steps on improving Armenia-Azerbaijan ties. 
• Less than a week after Turkey lifted some of the customs restrictions on Armenia, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Turkey, Rashad Mammadov, said that the reopening of the Turkey-Armenia border, as well as the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, is contingent on Armenia implementing constitutional changes after June 7 general elections, which Pashinyan's government has been slowwalking because they are highly controversial. Azerbaijan has influence over Turkish-Armenian normalization efforts due to its robust ties with Turkey and significant investments there.

In recent years, Turkey and Armenia have sought to normalize long-strained ties after Azerbaijan fully secured control of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory and as Armenia has sought greater autonomy from Russian influence. Turkey's historical denial of the 1915 Armenian genocide under the Ottoman Empire has long plagued Turkish-Armenian ties, which further deteriorated during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994) due to Turkey's close alliance with Azerbaijan. Although Turkey recognized Armenia's independence in 1991, the two countries never established formal diplomatic relations. For years, Turkey conditioned normalization with Armenia on a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijani territories. However, the landscape shifted after Azerbaijan's victory in the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and its subsequent 2023 offensive to fully seize the territory. Although Azerbaijan's complete takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh initially exacerbated tensions with Armenia, the effective end of the long-running dispute also opened a path for rapprochement between the two countries, while simultaneously addressing some of Turkey's primary conditions for normalization with Armenia. Azerbaijan has demanded that Armenia implement controversial constitutional reforms to remove Armenia's territorial claims over Nagorno-Karabakh, but U.S.-backed diplomacy has helped keep a lid on bilateral tensions. Furthermore, Pashinyan's government in Armenia has increasingly sought alternative foreign partnerships to pivot away from Russian influence and exert greater policy autonomy, especially after Russia, Armenia's ostensible military ally, failed to provide significant military support during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts in 2020 and 2023. As such, despite complex historical ties, Armenia has sought to improve relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, not only to boost relations with neighboring countries but also to improve political, military and economic ties with the West more broadly.

• In a May 22 poll conducted by the International Republican Institute, 58% of Armenian respondents said Turkey was one of the greatest political threats to Armenia — second only to Azerbaijan, which 73% of respondents identified as a threat. Even so, these results still indicate a warming of public perception toward Turkey and Azerbaijan, since in a previous March 2023 poll, 89% of respondents said Turkey was a main threat and 93% said that Azerbaijan was. 
• Armenia's geography makes it relatively isolated and reliant on overland trade routes through other countries. Poor relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan have historically limited these routes, though both countries have recently eased some trade restrictions.
• Armenia has deepened ties with the United States and the European Union (especially France) in recent years, leading to the establishment of a strategic partnership agreement with Washington and the inaugural EU-Armenia summit in May 2026.
• In August 2025, the United States brokered an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan as part of broader efforts to support rapprochement between the two countries. The deal includes a provision granting the United States exclusive 99-year rights to develop a transit route connecting Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic exclave, through a 20-mile (32-kilometer) stretch of Armenian territory. 

Turkey-Armenia rapprochement could enable the former to expand its regional influence, while helping the latter reduce its reliance on Russia, though Russian coercion and other constraints will limit progress on both fronts. Stronger economic and political ties with Armenia would strengthen Turkey's position as a regional middle power by facilitating connectivity between Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East. This shift would also help weaken the relative influence of other regional powers, namely Iran — particularly if the proposed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity comes to fruition, which would directly link Turkey to Azerbaijan while bypassing Iran. At the same time, direct overland trade routes between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey would increase Armenia's access to Western markets and enable it to somewhat diversify commercial ties away from Russia toward European countries, even if Armenia's hoped-for accession to the European Union remains elusive for the foreseeable future. However, Russia's relationships with both Turkey and Armenia will put an upper limit on rapprochement. Turkey is reliant on Russian gas exports, and also maintains trade and economic ties with Russia, which will deter it from taking assertive steps to undermine Russian influence in Armenia. Russia is thus set to maintain its firm grip on Armenia through long-standing economic and energy ties, including purchasing roughly 25% of Armenia's exports. This also means that if Armenia pivots too closely toward Turkey and/or the European Union, Russia will likely weaponize its economic power by imposing temporary export bans or rescinding tax exemptions on gas and petroleum exports.

• In March 2025, Armenian lawmakers passed the EU Integration Act, providing formal support for the country's bid to join the European Union. However, Armenia's EU accession efforts still face major hurdles, including concerns about authoritarianism, its membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, and insufficient legal and anti-corruption standards aligned with EU standards.
• On May 26, the pro-Russian media outlet Kommersant reported that Moscow sent a letter to Yerevan threatening to end tax-free gas, petroleum and uncut diamond exports if Armenia pursued EU accession, potentially requiring Armenia to pay compensation. Armenia's foreign minister denied receiving the letter. Then, on May 29, the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union threatened to suspend Armenia due to its EU aspirations, and on May 30, Russia recalled its ambassador from Yerevan.
• Turkey and Armenia's historically tense relationship will likely fuel domestic opposition to normalization in both countries. But both the Pashinyan administration and Turkey's ruling coalition are still expected to move forward with these efforts, suppressing major organized attempts to derail progress.

If the Turkish-Armenian border reopens following Armenian constitutional reforms, it would boost investment in Armenia, particularly in the construction, energy and tech sectors, as well as in eastern Turkey to facilitate tourism and transit, though Armenia's weak legal framework and corruption would likely pose obstacles for some European companies. The reopening of the border will depend on whether Armenia implements contentious constitutional reforms following the June 7 general elections. These reforms currently face domestic opposition and would likely receive far less support from a new prime minister representing an opposition bloc, should Pashinyan's party fail to secure an adequate parliamentary majority. However, if Pashinyan's party secures the two-thirds majority needed to push the reforms through parliament and wins a subsequent referendum, the reopening of the border would likely boost investment in both Armenia and Turkey's eastern region, which remains less developed than the country's urbanized west. Armenia would likely benefit from increased investment and cross-border commercial activity due to decreased trade barriers, streamlined supply chains and expanded access to European markets. This shift could spark interest from European and Turkish companies in Armenia's technology, energy and construction industries. While Armenia's small market size, corruption challenges and weak legal frameworks may deter some European investors, these issues are less likely to impede Turkish investment. Given its proximity and regional energy ambitions, Turkey would likely pursue opportunities in Armenia's energy and construction sectors, especially as Armenia works to expand its renewable energy sector. Furthermore, a reopened border would boost domestic investment in eastern Turkey to support tourism and the infrastructure needed to transport goods to foreign markets.

• Turkey and Armenia share a 220-kilovolt cross-border power line, but it has been used sparingly due to poor bilateral ties. However, with improved relations and additional grid connection expansion, Turkey and Armenia could increase energy cooperation. 
• In January, Armenia's deputy minister of economy stated that a reopened border could lead to a gradual 20% increase in investment flows into the country, though she did not provide a projected timeline or other details.