Editor's Note: In the coming year, RANE will analyze the geopolitics of natural resources and raw materials. This series will be published periodically throughout the remainder of 2026; you can find all parts here.

If Flavio Bolsonaro wins Brazil's October 2026 presidential race, his right-wing administration would dismantle much of the country's environmental framework, accelerate deregulatory measures on land use and environmental protection, likely reverse deforestation gains, limit Brazil's access to climate finance, and increase supply chain compliance risks. Several polls show that Flavio Bolsonaro, the son of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, is technically tied with, or numerically ahead of, the incumbent President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in the October election. If Bolsonaro wins the election, his right-wing populist administration would occasionally pursue controversial economic and social policies and demonstrate authoritarian tendencies, though it is unlikely to be as far-right as his father's. A Flavio Bolsonaro administration would likely subordinate the environment ministry to agribusiness and mining interests. Regulatory bodies would be actively defunded beyond the country's structural fiscal constraints, with the federal government making political appointments and directly interfering in sensitive oversight or permitting processes to benefit allied businesspeople or private sector interests more broadly. Meanwhile, with the support of the agribusiness caucus in Congress, the Bolsonaro administration would likely approve broad deregulation and reverse existing restrictions on land demarcation and Indigenous and local communities' rights in favor of extractive activities. Despite short-term improvements in the business operating environment, these matters would highly likely be judicialized, as independent prosecutors would file lawsuits and the judiciary would occasionally rule in favor of environmental preservation and local communities' rights, fueling legal uncertainty, causing project delays and resulting in financial losses in the long-term on the back of retroactive compensations. Against that backdrop, Western countries would again halt their contributions to the Amazon Fund, while the Tropical Forests Forever Facility would not become operational as the government would refuse to deliver on environmental commitments to secure climate funding. Deforestation would significantly increase, particularly in the Amazon, amid agricultural and mining expansion. Even if the domestic business environment broadly becomes more permissive, these developments could result in harmful commercial consequences for certain Brazilian exporters — especially for those of soy, beef, timber and coffee operating under the European Union Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), which would likely face fines or market access restrictions. A Bolsonaro victory would also likely require multinational companies with Brazilian agricultural supply chains to reassess their sourcing strategies and sustainability commitments, given increased compliance and reputational risks.

• Several polls show Bolsonaro technically tied with, or numerically ahead of, Lula in the 2026 presidential race, though the election remains highly competitive between the two. Regardless, the emergence of a competitive moderate or centrist alternative remains highly unlikely.
• During Jair Bolsonaro's presidency (2019-2022), Amazon deforestation reached a 15-year high in 2021, with 13,235 square kilometers (5,110 square miles) cleared.
• The EUDR will enter into force for large companies in December 2026 and will require them to conduct due diligence proving that commodities were not produced on deforested land; it covers soy, beef, palm oil, wood, cocoa, coffee and rubber. Non-compliance can result in fines of at least 4% of annual EU turnover. In 2024, Brazil exported approximately $14 billion worth of EUDR-covered commodities to the European Union.

A right-wing government would largely abandon environmental and climate commitments, likely accelerating extractive investments and project timelines, including in environmentally sensitive areas, while increasing firms' legal and reputational exposure, particularly those subject to ESG disclosure requirements in Western markets. A Bolsonaro administration would push a broad deregulatory and pro-business agenda in extractive sectors. Such a platform would largely eliminate the existing institutional friction that has slowed permitting processes under Lula, as the government would direct and eventually interfere in oversight bodies to facilitate extractive activities rather than allow them to act as autonomous regulators. Petrobras would retain an important role in Brazil's energy sector, but a Bolsonaro government would seek to divest non-core assets, such as refineries, renewable energy plants and fertilizer assets, to increase the company's focus on oil production, which has a higher margin and enables larger dividends for shareholders. The administration would also open up the sector to increased private sector participation by reducing the state-owned company's mandatory stake in new blocks and creating more favorable fiscal terms to attract international oil companies, especially from the United States and other Western countries. On critical minerals, a Bolsonaro government would accelerate licensing, disregard environmental protection and overrule local communities that resist new projects. A right-wing government would also likely push for the approval of Bill 191/2020 to open protected lands for mining, which would likely unlock controversial mining projects in the Amazon, including the Morro dos Seis Lagos niobium deposit. The government would fast-track project timelines and prioritize commodity exports, while sidelining efforts to increase value-added processing by prioritizing short-term economic gains over a long-term strategic repositioning that would only bear fruit after Bolsonaro's four-year term. Indigenous consultation requirements, which corporate entities and pro-business legislations have contested under Lula, would be further weakened by regulatory changes that reduce traditional communities' legal standing to challenge extractive projects in or near their territories. Brazil would also likely withdraw from international commitments to favor businesses over local communities. For mining companies, the permitting environment would improve significantly in the short term, but the removal of consultation safeguards would increase the risk of project-level social conflict, community opposition and litigation, domestically and abroad, particularly for companies whose shareholders or lenders apply free, prior and informed consent standards as investment conditions. Overall, despite some risks, these policies would likely increase Brazil's attractiveness for extractive industry investment, not particularly focused on ESG standards, by partially offsetting structural bottlenecks and constraints, such as insufficient transport infrastructure, low labor productivity and overall high operating costs for businesses. 

• A 2017 mining code reform grants the federal government broad discretion over licensing timelines and influence over environmental conditionality. This would give a Bolsonaro administration substantial room to accelerate approvals without requiring legislative changes, while Congress's mostly pro-business stance would facilitate coordination in favor of extractive sectors' interests.
• Indigenous territories cover about 13% of Brazil's total land area, with the vast majority (98%) located in the Amazon region. These territories overlap with several portions of the country's critical minerals prospecting zones, which means consultation requirements are a key factor in determining project timelines and assessing legal risks.
• The Morro dos Seis Lagos niobium deposit is the world's largest, with an estimated 2.8 billion tonnes of ore. But it sits at the core of three overlapping protected zones — a biological reserve, a national forest and an Indigenous territory near the Venezuelan border — which has halted its development in recent years.
• Brazil is a signatory to the International Labor Organization Convention 169, which requires that governments and companies secure "free, prior and informed consent" from local communities before undertaking development projects in their area. The Lula administration has strictly enforced this rule, in opposition to the "silent approval" attempts of Jair Bolsonaro's previous administration. Many European export credit agencies and multilateral development banks have adopted similar informed consent requirements as conditions for financing.
• A Bolsonaro government would likely withdraw from or significantly dilute Brazil's commitments under the Paris Agreement and related multilateral climate frameworks. This would reduce the country's access to concessional green finance from European institutions and multilateral development banks that have made climate governance a condition of lending.

A Bolsonaro government would pursue strong geopolitical alignment with the United States, reducing Brazil's diplomatic flexibility but improving commercial conditions for U.S.-aligned investors while increasing political risk for companies with existing Chinese partnerships or financing arrangements. A Flavio Bolsonaro presidency would significantly curb the strategic ambiguity that has defined Brazil's geopolitical positioning under Lula, replacing equidistance between China and the United States with a more explicit alignment toward the White House, largely mirroring the foreign policy of his father's government. Ideological affinity with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump would translate into concrete policy shifts, including formal participation in U.S.-led supply chain initiatives, tighter restrictions on Chinese state-owned companies in sensitive sectors and a more receptive posture toward U.S. demands that have so far been accommodated on a case-by-case basis under Lula. On critical minerals, a Bolsonaro government would likely seek to expand the Serra Verde template into a broader framework, either by conditioning access to U.S. development financing on the exclusion of Chinese supply chain participation across multiple projects or by resorting to mergers and acquisitions to expand U.S. presence across Brazil's critical materials space. Closer ideological alignment between Brasilia and Washington would create clearer and more predictable commercial conditions for U.S.-aligned investors and companies operating within Washington's supply chain architecture, reducing uncertainty. A Bolsonaro presidency would also significantly improve the operating environment in Brazil for mining companies and financiers already integrated into U.S. supply chain structures. However, greater alignment with the United States — along with the Bolsonaro administration's increased scrutiny over Chinese interests in Brazil — would likely prompt trade retaliation from Beijing, potentially affecting agricultural exporters and investments in manufacturing and energy. China would likely adopt a measured approach initially, launching trade investigations, reducing import volumes or favoring competing suppliers in Australia and Argentina. However, if tensions with Brasilia deepen, Beijing could escalate its response to include export controls or investment restrictions. Furthermore, prioritizing U.S. relations over Chinese market access could negatively affect Brazil's trade balance, as exporters might struggle to find alternative markets for goods currently sold to China. Such Chinese retaliation would likely prompt the Bolsonaro administration to reverse some of its anti-China measures, driven by intense pressure from private sector stakeholders to mitigate potential economic losses.

• China purchased approximately $140 billion worth of Brazilian goods in 2024, including iron ore, soybeans, crude oil and beef, giving Beijing significant retaliatory leverage. 
• The Trump administration's Shield of the Americas initiative and Project Vault program to create a critical minerals stockpile both include provisions designed to reward governments that align with U.S. supply chain preferences, creating financial incentives that Bolsonaro's administration would likely seek to formalize early in its term.