Iraq's new Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi is likely to struggle to form a government in the time allotted by the constitution. Even if he succeeds, any government would likely be a weak compromise Cabinet that would extend political paralysis and avoid Iraq's most contentious issues. On April 27, Iraq's ruling Shiite Coordination Framework (SCF) selected al-Zaidi, a businessman, as its nominee for prime minister, after incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al-Maliki agreed on his candidacy during a meeting in Baghdad. Sudani said al-Zaidi's name was put forward to break the political deadlock after repeated failures to reach consensus on earlier candidates. Al-Zaidi's nomination came after at least seven unsuccessful SCF meetings to agree on a candidate, with multiple sessions delayed or postponed before the bloc finally settled on him. His selection came one day after the constitutional deadline, 16 days after the election of President Nizar Amedi, meaning he must now present a Cabinet to parliament within 30 days. When he does, the Iraqi parliament will have to approve the new prime minister and government.

• Al-Zaidi is a businessman with a background in finance and media, serving as director of Al-Janoob Islamic Bank, CEO of Dijlah TV and chairman of Al-Shaab University, while also holding roles tied to state-linked commercial activity. His nomination is likely to draw scrutiny given that Al-Janoob Islamic Bank has been under U.S. sanctions since 2024 over allegations of money laundering, fraud and illicit use of U.S. dollars.
• The current deadlock stems from the November 2025 general election, which produced a fragmented parliament without a clear governing majority. Sudani's coalition won 46 of 329 seats, al-Maliki's State of Law 29, Sunni-led Taqaddum 27 and the Kurdish-led KDP 26, after which the Shiite Coordination Framework (which includes Sudani and al-Maliki's parties and others) consolidated itself into the largest bloc with about 162 seats — enough to dominate the nomination process, but not enough to form a government without Kurdish and Sunni support, making prolonged coalition bargaining structurally inevitable from the outset.

Al-Zaidi's nomination comes after months of internal Shiite coalition deadlock, U.S. pressure and spillover from the Iran war into Iraqi politics. The SCF had struggled for months to settle on a nominee, after choosing former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as a candidate months ago. Coalition infighting, growing domestic pressure and the fallout from the Iran war ultimately blocked al-Maliki's path to the premiership and created the conditions for al-Maliki and al-Sudani to converge on al-Zaidi as a compromise candidate. Within the SCF, al-Maliki remained too divisive to unify the bloc, while the broader regional context made his return even more difficult. That shift took place amid mounting U.S. pressure on Baghdad to rein in Iran-backed militias, especially after some of these militias carried out repeated drone and rocket attacks on U.S. and Gulf targets during the wider Iran war, prompting Washington to halt a roughly $500 million cash shipment to Iraq and suspend some security cooperation with Baghdad. At the same time, the United States had clearly signaled opposition to an al-Maliki comeback, with President Donald Trump reportedly having threatened to cut off aid to Iraq if al-Maliki were appointed, making a less polarizing and more transactional figure more attractive to the SCF. In that sense, al-Zaidi was selected less because he represented the strongest political option and more because he served the SCF's immediate strategic needs under growing domestic pressure over the deadlock. However, he is less overtly polarizing than a figure such as al-Maliki, which makes him a more manageable choice for factions seeking to preserve Shiite control of the premiership without further intensifying internal divisions. 

• The SCF also appears to have favored al-Zaidi in part because of his economic and business profile, including his background in finance, investment and commercial management, which allowed the bloc to present him as a technocratic and lower-profile figure despite his lack of prior political office.
• The ongoing U.S.-Iran ceasefire likely also helped create political space for Iraqi factions to move forward on the premiership because the temporary de-escalation reduced immediate regional pressure on Iraq to forcefully rein in militias and encouraged the SCF to capitalize on the moment, even though the truce itself remains fragile and prone to collapse.

Al-Zaidi will struggle to form a government within the 30-day constitutional window, with his failure extending Iraq's political stalemate in the search for another compromise candidate. Several obstacles will likely complicate al-Zaidi's ability to form a government by the deadline. First, although he was chosen in part because of his relatively low profile, he remains tied to a bank that is under U.S. sanctions for alleged money laundering and Iran-related smuggling, making it unlikely that Washington — which is increasing pressure on Baghdad to disarm militias and curb Iranian influence — will view him as an acceptable candidate unless he aligns with demands the SCF itself will staunchly reject. Second, al-Zaidi's nomination emerged from weeks of intra-Shiite bargaining and a compromise between al-Maliki and al-Sudani, rather than from the consolidation of a strong governing coalition behind a politically authoritative figure. This raises the likelihood that disagreements within the SCF will re-emerge quickly around Cabinet portfolios and the broader objectives of any next government. Third, al-Zaidi has no prior political experience, which means he is unlikely to be able to independently manage coalition-building and will instead have to rely heavily on senior SCF leaders to negotiate with Kurdish and Sunni actors needed to secure enough votes to form a Cabinet. If al-Zaidi fails, a renewed stalemate within the SCF camp is likely, followed by another search for a compromise candidate. In such a case, al-Sudani could re-emerge as a viable candidate given his former governing experience and demonstrated ability to work across factions and appease both the United States and Iran.

• The SCF controls roughly 162 of Iraq's 329 parliamentary seats, leaving al-Zaidi short of the majority needed to form a Cabinet and forcing him to secure Kurdish and Sunni backing. Government formation is therefore highly vulnerable to bargaining over ministerial portfolios and possible Kurdish demands on the budget and oil.
• The SCF may also have chosen al-Zaidi assuming that he would fail to form a Cabinet within the constitutional window, thereby buying the bloc more time to renegotiate around a more viable nominee during or after the 30-day period. This dynamic would likely benefit al-Sudani, who is hoping that a failed al-Zaidi bid could eventually return him to the forefront as the most experienced and workable fallback candidate.

Even if al-Zaidi were to form a government, it would likely be weak and unlikely to address core issues like disarming Iran-backed militias. While difficult, al-Zaidi could still form a government if the SCF concludes that avoiding a prolonged deadlock is worth making major concessions to Kurdish and Sunni factions, even without meaningful U.S. backing and under continued U.S. pressure. In practice, this would likely require a heavily negotiated, quota-based Cabinet in which the SCF retains control of the premiership, Kurdish parties secure concessions on budget transfers and oil-related issues and Sunni factions obtain portfolio and patronage guarantees. For the SCF, a weak but manageable government may be preferable to an extended vacuum that further paralyzes state institutions and deepens Iraq's economic and financial crisis. If al-Zaidi forms a government under those terms, it will likely be administratively functional but politically fragile, with limited capacity to address the core issues driving tension with Washington. It would be unlikely to move decisively against Iran-backed militias or materially rebalance Iraq's regional posture, particularly if the SCF continues to shape al-Zaidi's decision-making and Iran-aligned actors retain significant influence within the governing coalition. A government formed on that basis would likely increase the risk of expanded U.S. sanctions, tighter restrictions on dollar inflows and reduced assistance to Iraqi security forces, all of which would worsen Iraq's financial strain and could increase the risk of escalation, including possible military action. Domestically, such a government would remain highly vulnerable to paralysis, as each major bloc would expect returns for its support, making disputes over ministries, spending and security portfolios recurrent. In that environment, the risk of protests, militia infighting and tit-for-tat attacks involving U.S. or Israeli strikes on militias and retaliatory attacks would rise further, especially if hostilities between the United States and Iran resume.

• The next Iraqi government will have to manage the combined political, security and economic fallout from the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, which has already spilled into Iraq through militia-linked attacks, retaliatory strikes and growing U.S. pressure on Baghdad over armed groups and financial channels. At the same time, disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has directly hit Iraq's oil-dependent economy. Reuters reported this month that Iraq had to cut production by about 80% as storage filled up when Hormuz closures prevented exports. Iraqi officials have since rushed to reopen alternative routes such as the Rabia crossing with Syria to sustain fuel exports and trade.