The Iran war will push Gulf states toward greater defense and security coordination and diversification, but they will remain structurally reliant on the United States, resulting in deeper cooperation without full strategic autonomy. Since the start of the war in Iran, Saudi Arabia has deepened its defense cooperation with Pakistan. Islamabad has reportedly deployed fighter jets, support aircraft and additional military personnel under the 2025 mutual defense pact between the two countries, with assets positioned at King Abdulaziz Air Base in the Eastern Province to strengthen air defense readiness and signal deterrence against Iran. These moves, alongside Pakistan's growing diplomatic role in regional mediation between Iran and the United States, highlight a visible expansion of Saudi-Pakistani military coordination during ongoing regional tensions. More broadly, a recent Wall Street Journal report indicated that Gulf states were increasingly exploring alternative security partnerships beyond the United States, reflecting concerns over exposure to air defense munition shortages during the ongoing conflict and a reinforced desire to diversify both defense ties and strategic dependence. Both increased Saudi Arabia-Pakistan cooperation and reports of diversifying efforts highlight the impact that the war is having on Gulf countries' security calculations.

• Against the backdrop of deeper cooperation with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia announced on April 15 that it would provide $3 billion in financial support to Pakistan to help it address a multibillion-dollar financing gap ahead of a debt repayment to the United Arab Emirates, reinforcing the broader strategic relationship underpinning their recent defense cooperation.

U.S. security guarantees, advanced defense systems and existing security agreements proved insufficient to fully shield Gulf states from Iranian retaliation, despite the strong overall performance of Western air and missile defenses. Iran and its allies' attacks on the Gulf in the early stages of the conflict have exposed the limitations of U.S. security guarantees for Gulf states, with the existing arrangements failing to fully prevent strikes on critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, U.S. and Western air defense systems — which Gulf countries heavily rely on — successfully intercepted a significant share of incoming projectiles. However, sustained Iranian attack volumes, combined with finite interceptor inventories and uneven coverage, allowed Iranian missiles and drones to penetrate defenses and damage significant military sites, energy facilities and other infrastructure like airports. This has exposed a structural vulnerability in the Gulf states' current defense and security strategy, namely their dependence on external security support without sufficient stockpiles, redundancy or fully integrated layered defense architectures to withstand prolonged or high-intensity conflict. At the same time, the conflict has triggered a broader strategic reassessment in Gulf capitals. While U.S. military presence and capabilities provided meaningful protection, they also failed to fully deter or absorb Iran's retaliation, raising questions about the reliability and sustainability of the U.S. security umbrella in scenarios where Gulf states are exposed to escalation. There is growing concern in the Gulf that reliance on the United States is not only insufficient to prevent attacks, but also increases exposure, as hosting U.S. assets and aligning with Washington makes Gulf states primary targets for Iranian retaliation.

• Gulf states claimed that their air and missile defense systems — largely U.S.-supplied — have achieved high interception rates of 80-90% against Iranian missiles and drones. Some countries, like the United Arab Emirates, have reported rates above 90%. However, sustained high-volume attacks mean that even a 10-20% penetration rate has been sufficient to damage critical energy and infrastructure targets, underscoring that while defenses are tactically effective, they remain strategically permeable under prolonged high-intensity conflicts.
• U.S.-supplied air and missile defense systems are highly effective in short, intense conflicts. However, they are less optimized for prolonged high-volume campaigns, where sustained salvos can gradually strain interceptor stockpiles and increase the chances of successful targeting of incoming projectiles.
• Despite the high interception rates, Iran and its allies successfully struck a wide range of critical infrastructure across the Gulf, including oil fields, refineries, liquefied natural gas facilities, export terminals (such as Fujairah), ports, air bases, airports, power plants, water desalination facilities and even data centers, launching over 4,000 missiles and drones during the conflict. This resulted in significant damage to energy systems and economic infrastructure, with total regional repair costs estimated at up to $58 billion.

Iran's widespread attacks on the Gulf states will drive them toward closer security coordination, but lingering divergences in threat perception will limit their coordination. If a settlement to the Iran war is reached, Gulf states will likely move toward closer regional security coordination, renewing their efforts to strengthen a more integrated regional security architecture focused on air and missile defense, early warning and maritime protection against common threats like Iran and its allies. This push will likely aim to reduce immediate vulnerabilities exposed by the recent conflict while incrementally increasing operational autonomy. However, progress toward a cohesive regional defense framework will likely remain constrained by persistent divergences within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) regarding threat perceptions and strategic priorities. Saudi Arabia will likely support stronger regional defense coordination while also preserving de-escalation channels with Iran. However, the United Arab Emirates is likely to place relatively greater emphasis on deterrence against Iran and expand security ties with Israel. This will complicate Gulf security coordination, given divergent views over how much emphasis to place on deterrence versus de-escalation vis-a-vis Iran and the fact that most Gulf countries see Israel — alongside the United States — as an instigator of the conflict. Other actors, such as Qatar and Oman, will likely continue prioritizing mediation and diplomatic engagement, further complicating the development of a unified Gulf security posture despite shared concerns over regional instability. At the same time, efforts to scale up capabilities will face practical constraints, particularly around procurement and supply bottlenecks. Expanding air and missile defense systems, radars and interceptor stockpiles at scale will depend heavily on U.S. and Western supply chains in the short term, which are already under pressure from ongoing conflicts and domestic prioritization of stockpile replenishment. This could lead to delays in delivery timelines, limited availability of high-end systems and increased competition for munitions, slowing the pace at which Gulf states can translate coordination into meaningful operational capability.

• While Gulf states are likely to deepen security coordination, the GCC is unlikely to evolve into a cohesive "Arab NATO" with collective defense clauses due to persistent political and strategic divergences. Instead, cooperation will remain selective and pragmatic, potentially complemented by a gradual expansion of the Abraham Accords as states pursue parallel normalization and security ties with Israel to counter shared threats from Iran.
• The conflict may also increase Gulf incentives to invest not only in defensive systems, but in cheaper and more scalable offensive capabilities such as drones, loitering munitions and precision missiles, both to strengthen deterrence and avoid overreliance on costly interceptor-heavy defense models in future high-volume conflicts.
• Saudi Arabia has maintained active diplomatic engagement with Iran despite being directly targeted during the conflict, with multiple recent phone calls between Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan and his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi focused on de-escalation, regional stability and support for negotiations. This engagement underscores Riyadh's pragmatic approach of balancing deterrence with diplomacy and signals that it is unlikely to adopt a fully hawkish posture toward Tehran.

In the short term, Gulf states will continue to rely heavily on the United States for security, as no alternative can match U.S. capabilities, integration and speed of response. Gulf states have in recent years increased their efforts to diversify their security and defense partnerships. This dynamic is likely to accelerate against the backdrop of the Iran war by increasing the number of partners and weapons systems providers. However, they are still likely to deepen cooperation with Washington across missile defense, intelligence sharing and maritime security in the Persian Gulf, especially in the short term. This will be largely driven by the proven effectiveness of U.S.-supplied systems and forward-deployed assets, which played a central role in intercepting threats and protecting critical infrastructure and shipping lanes during the conflict. Meanwhile, existing security frameworks — including basing agreements, joint exercises and integrated command structures — further reinforce that the United States is the only partner capable of delivering immediate, large-scale defense support. Even if the conflict exposed vulnerabilities tied to limited interceptor stockpiles, regulatory constraints on procurement and reliance on a single supplier, institutional dependence on U.S. systems will compel Gulf states to remain structurally reliant on the United States in the near term, which will continue to make them a target for Iran if hostilities resume in the coming months.

• Defense industry agreements with companies like Lockheed Martin aim to raise output of Patriot PAC-3 interceptors from roughly 600 to up to 2,000 annually over several years. THAAD production is being expanded to around 400 per year from under 100, underscoring that even accelerated production occurs over multiyear timelines rather than immediate scaling.
• Global demand is outpacing supply. U.S. production must simultaneously support domestic replenishment, Israel, Ukraine and other allies, with reports indicating Gulf states are facing delays and competition for access to interceptors, reinforcing supply constraints despite increased output.

In the longer term, GCC states are likely to reduce their dependence on the United States in procurement and some mid-tier air defenses and offensive capabilities but will still remain reliant on Washington for high-end, integrated defense, limiting their overall strategic autonomy in security and defense. Gulf states are diversifying not because they want to completely replace the United States outright, but because the recent wars in the Middle East and U.S. behavior and involvement in conflicts alongside Israel showed the Gulf that relying too heavily on Washington leaves them exposed, constrained and vulnerable to supply shocks during high-intensity conflicts. This means that over the coming years, GCC states are likely to move toward a more layered and diversified security model that reduces reliance on the United States for procurement of offensive capabilities, mid-tier air defense systems and stockpiling of munitions, but does not eliminate dependence on Washington for high-end defense. In practice, this will likely involve broader sourcing from European and Asian suppliers, expanded domestic defense production, greater emphasis on munitions reserves and efforts to build more national capacity in drone, counterdrone and lower- to mid-tier air defense systems. This would materially improve Gulf states' bargaining power over time, particularly by reducing exposure to U.S. export restrictions, replenishment delays and single-supplier bottlenecks. However, this diversification is unlikely to fully displace the U.S. role in defense and security. Most Gulf missile defense architecture remains tied to U.S. systems, training, intelligence support and command integration. As a result, the longer-term trajectory is less one of full security and defense autonomy than of partial decoupling at the lower and middle ends of the defense spectrum. Continued reliance on the United States is likely to persist for high-intensity conflict and integrated regional defense. All of this means the Gulf is likely pushing to become more flexible and somewhat less exposed to U.S. policy swings and regional behaviors that put it in the crosshairs, but not strategically and completely independent.

• Across the GCC, states are actively pursuing defense diversification beyond the United States, with Saudi Arabia leading through its 2025 mutual defense pact with Pakistan, expanded drone and fighter cooperation with Turkey, including Bayraktar systems and discussions on the KAAN fighter jet program, and a recent 2026 defense agreement with Ukraine focused on counterdrone capabilities and training. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has continued to diversify through the procurement of Chinese Wing Loong drones and expanding ties with Turkey and other suppliers. Qatar and Kuwait have sought to procure U.S. systems as well as European and Turkish platforms. Collectively, these moves reflect a region-wide shift toward multipartner sourcing, faster procurement and reduced reliance on a single security provider, even as structural dependence on U.S. systems remains.
• Gulf states are best positioned to diversify toward partners like France and South Korea, which offer advanced systems with fewer end-use restrictions and faster procurement timelines while remaining close or similar to U.S. and/or NATO standards. For example, the United Arab Emirates operates French air defense, fighter jets and radar systems alongside U.S. platforms and has procured South Korean KM-SAM (Cheongung) systems. Saudi Arabia has also moved to acquire Korean missile defense capabilities.