High-profile jihadist attacks in Mali portend a further fragmentation of state authority, and while jihadists are unlikely to forcibly seize power in the coming months, their escalating kinetic and economic pressure increases the risk of a military coup and will incentivize the junta to develop new security partnerships with the United States and Turkey. On April 25, al Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM, launched coordinated attacks across northern, central and southern Mali, including in and around the capital Bamako. Attacks in Bamako and its vicinity targeted Modibo Keita International Airport and the garrison town of Kati, which acts as the Malian military's nerve center. In Kati, jihadist militants raided the residence of junta leader Assimi Goita, forcing him to be exfiltrated, killed Defense Minister Sadio Camara in a truck explosion attack, and injured intelligence chief Mobido Kone, who allegedly later succumbed to his wounds (though this remains unconfirmed). Simultaneously, JNIM stormed the cities of Mopti and Sevare in central Mali, the latter of which hosts an important airbase for the Malian military and Russia's paramilitary Africa Corps. In northern Mali, JNIM launched a coordinated offensive with the Tuareg separatist Liberation Front of Azawad, or FLA, on the cities of Kidal and Gao, forcing Malian security forces to withdraw into their military compounds. While the FLA and JNIM appear to have exited Gao, the militants seized Kidal, following which Africa Corps paramilitaries and Malian security forces then reportedly struck an agreement enabling them to safely exit their compound and withdraw from the area. While Mali's ruling junta appears to have stabilized its hold on Sevare and around Bamako, more clashes were reported in Kati and central Mali on April 26, and the junta imposed a 72-hour night curfew in Bamako. Meanwhile, JNIM claimed control of the town of Tessit, located in northern Mali near the border with Niger, on April 27 after Malian security forces reportedly surrendered and Russian paramilitaries withdrew from the town.

• In an April 24 statement, JNIM claimed to have seized Mopti, and reports from France 24 journalist Wassim Nasr indicate that the militants prayed in the city's grand mosque. However, the jihadists now seem to have withdrawn from the city after seizing weapons and ammunition from security forces. 
• In its statement announcing its seizure of Kidal, the FLA called for a "convergence" of all actors seeking to remove the junta in Bamako, effectively acknowledging its military partnership with JNIM. 
• Kidal holds symbolic importance for both Mali and Russia, as its capture in late 2023 by a joint Russo-Malian force was one of the main achievements of Russian paramilitaries and Mali's ruling junta in reasserting state control over northern Mali. 

The April 25 attacks come as JNIM has steadily expanded its territorial presence in Mali and eroded the junta's authority over the country, which has prompted Bamako to seek new security partnerships beyond Russia, including with the United States. Mali has faced jihadist activity within its territory for around two decades, which led France — the country's former colonial overlord — to militarily intervene in 2013. While this intervention helped prevent a collapse of the state, jihadist attacks continued across northern and central Mali, where the militants capitalized on the perceived marginalization of the Tuareg and Fulani ethnic communities to build support. Discontent with persisting jihadist attacks ultimately prompted Goita, Camara and their allies to seize power through a series of coups in 2020 and 2021. Once in office, the junta downgraded relations with France — ultimately prompting Paris to withdraw its troops in 2022. Meanwhile, it struck a security partnership with Russia, which initially deployed 1,000 to 1,500 personnel from its paramilitary Wagner Group, a cooperation format that has since been rearranged but continues to this day through the Africa Corps. Despite the junta's alliance with Moscow, JNIM has markedly grown its reach since the departure of French forces, including by launching deadly attacks on Bamako in September 2024. Notably, the jihadist group has increased its influence in many rural areas of southern Mali, where it often acts as the de facto authority. JNIM leveraged this influence to launch a fuel blockade of Bamako and government-held areas in September 2025, which caused widespread fuel shortages in the capital. The severity of the crisis ultimately prompted the junta to strike a time-bound truce with JNIM to ease the blockade in exchange for the release of prisoners, a move it seemingly repeated in March. In the face of these deepening challenges, Malian authorities have sought to build new security partnerships, including with Turkey, the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Arab Emirates. 

• JNIM has downplayed its ties to al Qaeda to broaden its appeal among other opposition groups in Mali, which has enabled it to strengthen cooperation with the secular FLA. 
• Following JNIM's imposition of the fuel blockade on government-held areas in 2025, the junta began organizing larger fuel convoys to the capital, with trucks reportedly escorted by security forces and helicopters. Together with the junta's negotiations with JNIM over time-bound truces, this has helped ease the severity of fuel shortages in Bamako. However, widespread shortages persist, leading to more frequent and longer power outages.
• Since President Donald Trump returned to power in January 2025, the United States has been working to reset relations with Mali. In mid-2025, Washington resumed intelligence sharing with Malian security forces on high-value targets. On March 9, Reuters also reported that the two countries were close to inking an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance agreement. Turkey has also emerged as an important drone supplier to the Malian military, and has provided training support to Malian security forces. 

Although JNIM remains unlikely to forcibly seize power in the next few months, Goita will likely prioritize security operations around Bamako in the near term to avert a potential coup attempt, which will limit the junta's ability to retake Kidal and prompt Mali to sustain security cooperation with Russia in the immediate future. Despite the unprecedented scale of the JNIM/FLA attacks, the Malian military retains a decisive edge over the militants with regard to conventional military capabilities. This will likely prompt JNIM to continue favoring hit-and-run attacks across central and southern Mali in the short term and suggests that the jihadist group is unlikely to forcibly seize power in the next few months, especially as JNIM has not explicitly made taking over state institutions a formal goal. Nonetheless, the April 25 attacks delivered a serious blow to the junta's domestic legitimacy, and Goita will want to swiftly regain the initiative to squash a potential coup attempt against him, particularly amid recurrent reports of intra-junta tensions. To that end, Malian security forces will likely focus on securing Bamako and its vicinity to avert new attacks that could target the country's military leadership. The junta likely also intends to reassert control over Kidal, given the northern town's symbolic importance, but its prioritization of counter-insurgency operations around the capital and focus on retaining control of Gao and Timbuktu in the north will limit its ability to swiftly recapture Kidal. These difficulties mean that Goita will remain at a heightened risk of being forced out in the immediate future. Meanwhile, the junta's efforts to regain the initiative suggest it will likely sustain its security partnership with Russia in the near term. While the April 25 attacks showcase the severe limitations of Moscow's security assistance, a rapid drawdown in the Africa Corps's presence from Mali would leave large gaps in the country's security architecture and undermine the junta's ability to counter JNIM and its allies. Russia, for its part, will likely keep supporting the junta for now to avert further erosion of its credentials as a reliable ally and to preserve the strategic gains from its deployment to the Western Sahel. However, Russian paramilitaries may reposition to major urban hubs, giving space for the FLA and JNIM to grow their presence in northern Mali. Moscow also remains unlikely to significantly expand its security assistance, as it seeks to limit the scope of its military footprint in the country.

• On April 27, reports emerged on social media of escalating tensions between Mali's presidential guard and special forces. 

JNIM will likely eventually re-tighten the enforcement of its fuel blockade on Bamako, while the fallout from the April 25 attacks will likely prompt the junta to accelerate efforts to expand security cooperation with the United States, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, coastal West African countries. JNIM is set to sustain its attacks against Malian security forces and the country's economic infrastructure to further pressure the junta. This will likely see the group re-tighten the enforcement of its fuel blockade on Bamako later on in 2026. Although the Malian military is now better prepared to counter fuel interdiction efforts, which will make it harder for JNIM to replicate its past success, the group would still likely worsen fuel scarcity in the capital. JNIM may thereafter ease the blockade in exchange for tactical concessions, such as additional prisoner releases or reduced security force presence in certain localities. However, the jihadist group will likely eventually attempt a more protracted fuel interdiction campaign, with the aim of triggering destabilizing unrest that could collapse the junta and/or force Goita into peace talks. Given these risks and the limitations to Russia's security assistance, Mali will likely accelerate its efforts to build new defense partnerships. The junta will likely strengthen cooperation with the United States, which could see Washington expand intelligence sharing and begin intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance flights in Mali to support the country's counterterrorism efforts. Mali will also likely deepen defense cooperation with Turkey, which could help the junta expand its drone fleet and secure more deployments of Turkish military instructors and/or contractors. Additionally, the April 25 attacks will further incentivize Mali and member states of the Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, to increase cooperation, given the threat JNIM poses to West Africa's stability. However, political misalignment between the Malian junta and ECOWAS countries will likely limit the extent of such cooperation.

• The junta's withdrawal from ECOWAS, made effective in 2025, and the formation of the Confederation of Sahel States remain central pillars of its legitimacy, and a full-blown reversal would risk deepening intra-junta divisions and confusion among many junta supporters. Instead, Mali appears likely to more discreetly expand cooperation with Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Senegal — its western and southern neighbors — on intelligence sharing and border security.

The mounting costs imposed by JNIM raise the prospect of the junta entering more comprehensive negotiations with the jihadist group, and also increase the risk of government collapse in the next two years. Despite the junta's clear edge in conventional military capabilities, Mali's current trajectory is one of state fragmentation, in which central authority is increasingly limited to — and periodically contested in — large urban areas. JNIM's persisting kinetic pressure, coupled with weakening morale among Malian junta leaders following the death of Camara, suggests that Goita may consider more comprehensive negotiations with the jihadist group to de-escalate its insurgency. However, such a move would prove highly controversial among Mali's top brass, as it would undermine the junta's domestic legitimacy, which centers on fighting jihadist groups. Reaching a deal with JNIM would likely also require significant political concessions, including making sharia law a central tenet of Mali's currently secular legal system and agreeing to some form of power-sharing arrangement that entrenches jihadist groups' influence in rural areas. Many Malian military leaders will thus likely instead favor maintaining the current patchwork of ad hoc and local agreements with JNIM. But the junta's current strategic dead-end and lack of a clear path to reverse JNIM's momentum will nonetheless make comprehensive peace talks more likely in the coming years, even if the overall likelihood of such talks remains low in the coming months. Disagreements on counterterrorism strategy, such as whether to negotiate with JNIM or which foreign partnerships to prioritize, will likely exacerbate factionalism within the junta. Meanwhile, JNIM's continued pressure on Mali's economy and security forces will further strain Goita's legitimacy, raising the risk of unrest in urban areas, especially if fuel and/or food shortages worsen. Even if Goita is able to remain in office amid the fallout from the April 25 attacks, which remains uncertain, these trends point to a significant risk of a government collapse in the next 24 months, due to a military coup and/or a popular uprising. Although JNIM would be unlikely to seize power immediately due to its lingering capacity constraints, Mali's new leaders may be more receptive to launching peace talks with the jihadists, especially if civilian opposition movements — such as that of Mahmoud Dicko, an influential imam — are integrated into the new government. 

• The junta may seek to enter talks with the FLA instead of JNIM, in an attempt to drive a wedge between the Tuareg separatists and the jihadist group. However, this would prove politically challenging, as the FLA would likely demand that Bamako re-engage in the 2015 Algiers Accords, which the junta terminated in early 2024. 
• Recent estimates indicate that JNIM has only around 6,000 fighters, significantly fewer than the Malian military. The junta also retains the upper hand in terms of combat vehicles and air power, even though it cannot match France's air patrols prior to 2022. 
• Mahmoud Dicko was previously the High Islamic Council of Mali and played a leading role in mobilizing the 2020 protests against Mali's civilian government, which ultimately paved the way for the military to seize power. However, Dicko has since fallen out with the junta. In December 2025, he joined the exiled opposition coalition, the Coalition of Forces for the Republic. He has also called for protests against the junta and negotiations with "armed groups," likely implicitly referring to JNIM.