Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies will likely prioritize cooperation with Russia on oil production policy amid U.S. sanctions on Russian oil and pressure on Riyadh to compensate for lost supply, even if it risks angering the United States. Eight OPEC+ members, which have been voluntarily cutting oil production, agreed at their Nov. 2 virtual meeting to increase oil production by 137,000 barrels per day, but to pause production increases for the first three months of 2026. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak was reportedly the main proponent of the three-month pause in production hikes, as the meeting came less than two weeks after the United States sanctioned Russia's two largest oil exporters, Rosneft and Lukoil, on Oct. 22. Saudi Arabia, OPEC's de facto leader, reportedly agreed to the pause because oil demand typically slows in the first quarter of the year. The pause also gives Saudi Arabia and its OPEC+ allies more time to assess the impact of U.S. sanctions on Russian oil production and exports. So far, the U.S. sanctions and OPEC's announced pause in production hikes have not significantly impacted global oil prices, with European light sweet crude benchmark Brent still largely trading in the $60-$65 per barrel range where it has been for several months. Against this backdrop, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is scheduled to meet with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington on Nov. 18. Trump has frequently urged Saudi Arabia to boost oil production to lower global prices, and will likely continue to press this demand during the meeting. 

• Largely at the behest of Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council allies, OPEC+ has been boosting oil output for most of 2025, in an aim to unwind production cuts at a time when its members believe the market can absorb greater supply. From April to September, OPEC+ rapidly unwound 2.2 million barrels per day in voluntary production cuts. The newly approved December increase follows increases of the same level in October and November, bringing the total to about 2.9 million barrels per day when taking into account a higher production baseline level for the United Arab Emirates that also went into effect this year. OPEC+ still has 1.25 million barrels per day in voluntary production cuts and 2 million barrels per day in mandatory production cuts in place. 
• The U.S. sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil — which collectively export about 3 million barrels per day of oil (about 3% of the world's oil supply) — include a 30-day wind-down period for companies to suspend their activities with the two oil companies, which expires on Nov. 21. The sanctions have caused significant operating challenges in the first two weeks since their announcement. Chinese, Indian and Turkish refiners — especially large state-owned ones — have all suspended or reduced their Russian oil purchases, at least temporarily. Lukoil was also forced to quickly divest from its international assets, reaching a deal to sell them to commodities trader Gunvor.

Ahead of an expected oil glut in 2026, Saudi Arabia is prioritizing OPEC+ cohesion and cooperation with Russia over increasing oil production and opportunistically gaining market share. Before the United States sanctioned Lukoil and Rosneft, the global oil market was broadly projected to be significantly oversupplied in 2026. In the International Energy Agency's October Oil Market Report, which was released a week before the sanctions were announced, the agency projected as much as a 4 million barrel per day surplus in 2026 due to OPEC+ unwinding its production cuts and high oil production growth in the Americas, particularly from Argentina, Brazil, Guyana and the United States. This opened the door for the United States to impose meaningful sanctions on Russia with only a limited impact on oil prices, which has so far proven to be the case. The projected oil glut in 2026 and attendant low prices have so far motivated Saudi Arabia to refrain from increasing its own oil exports to compensate for the loss of sanctioned Russian supplies, as Riyadh is seeking to use the dip in supply to prop up global prices, or at least keep them from falling further. Saudi Arabia is motivated to maintain this strategy since its government needs oil prices to exceed $90 per barrel to balance its budget. Additionally, by not claiming Russia's lost market share, Saudi Arabia is maintaining its long-term cooperation goals with Russia and preserving OPEC+ unity. This is particularly important since the United States will likely ease its sanctions in the next year if Russia makes modest concessions regarding a ceasefire in Ukraine, as Trump will be eager to point to low oil prices ahead of the U.S. midterm elections. If sanctions relief were to occur after Saudi Arabia broke its production alliance with Russia, there would be no Russia-OPEC mechanism in place to manage oil market conditions as Russian oil exports increase — risking another price and market share war between the two large oil producers, which would send prices well below their current level. 

• Real oil prices are currently at their lowest levels since Russia and Saudi Arabia first began coordinating their oil production policies in 2016 after a two-year price war for market share, not counting 2020, when demand cratered due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Saudi Arabia's reluctance to claim Russia's lost market share by increasing production risks alienating the United States, but this strategy will likely keep Brent's price floor around $60 per barrel, with higher upside if U.S. sanctions are effective. Riyadh's hesitation to immediately backfill lost Russian oil supply could lead Trump to threaten retaliatory action against Saudi Arabia, such as high tariffs, limits on the export of AI chips and/or a reduction in defense ties. This likelihood would further rise if Saudi Arabia rebuffs future explicit U.S. pressure to increase oil production, especially if oil prices rise due to U.S. sanctions. However, Trump's focus on other issues in the Middle East — namely, gaining Saudi support for any peacekeeping force deployed to Gaza and coaxing Saudi Arabia to sign an Abraham Accords agreement with Israel — could limit Trump's ability to punish Saudi Arabia for not selling out Russia and boosting oil production. Regardless, with Saudi Arabia now in a position to let the market adjust to reduced Russian oil exports, Riyadh can more easily manage an oil price floor near the current level, giving the country financial breathing room despite the growing oil glut; in the current environment, Brent prices are unlikely to sink below $60 per barrel and could rise higher if U.S. sanctions are effective and thoroughly enforced. This strategy would also maintain the Saudi Arabia-Russia oil alliance, enabling OPEC+ to manage any reintroduction of Russian oil back to the market once U.S. sanctions are relaxed, such as by phasing exports in or pausing other production increases. Such coordination would avoid a more chaotic return in which Russia seeks to push out Gulf and Saudi oil from Turkish, Chinese and Indian refineries.

• Russia's post-sanctions oil production could range from 500,000 barrels per day to 2 million barrels per day, depending on the sanctions' effectiveness and the United States' willingness to enforce them.