Israel's airstrikes in Yemen are unlikely to deter future Houthi strikes, but increased regional coordination could mitigate their risk. Regardless, future successful Houthi strikes, especially as part of an Iranian-led strike against Israel, could steadily pull Israel into a more sustained campaign in Yemen. On July 20, Israeli jets bombed the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah in Yemen, destroying fuel tanks and killing at least six people. The Israeli air force said it carried out the strike using multiple fighter jets — including F-15s, F-16s and F-35s — with reconnaissance aircraft and refueling planes, making it one of the farthest Israeli air force operations in modern history at a range of almost 1,100 miles (about 1,770 kilometers) from Israel. The air force said it deliberately targeted a dual-use port, aiming for military facilities, to send an economic and military message to the Houthis in retaliation for a July 19 drone attack on Tel Aviv that killed one civilian. The Israeli air force also said it was bracing for Houthi retaliation, which the group vowed to carry out in response to the Hodeidah strikes.

• The Israeli air force's preliminary investigation into the July 19 Houthi attack revealed that the drone had crossed over Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt before arriving off the coast of Israel, where radar operators did not properly elevate the threat because they were monitoring another threat incoming from Iraq. 
• Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023, the Houthis have launched over 220 drones and missiles toward Israel, according to the Israel Defense Forces. However, the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel have intercepted most of those attacks, and the others have been otherwise unable to reach their objectives. Israel has long threatened to strike Yemen once the Houthis acquired long-range missiles capable of reaching Israeli targets. 

While the Houthis will try to attack Israel again, they may face regional air defense coordination from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, enhanced Israeli air defense focus on Yemen, and technical limitations. On July 21, the Houthis launched another missile toward Israel as part of their response to the July 20 attack, and the Israel Defense Forces shot it down south of the city of Eilat on the Red Sea. Continued Houthi aggression is likely, in part because of Houthi political incentives. The Houthis' political ideology calls for conflict with Israel, and successful Israeli strikes on Houthi-held territory enable the group to portray itself as a victim of Israeli aggression and fuel recruitment, despite the immediate economic impacts of strikes on the Houthis' limited fuel reserves and infrastructure. However, Houthi attacks will face improved tracking performance by the Israeli air force and likely coordination between Israel's regional partners — including Egypt, the United States and Saudi Arabia — to track and intercept Houthi strikes, which could mitigate the risks of another successful strike.

• It remains unclear how the drone that struck Tel Aviv was able to cross Egypt without being intercepted by the Egyptian military, as Egypt has a vested interest in defending its air space from all foreign aircraft, including Houthi missiles and drones. This failure makes it likely that Cairo will take a more active stance to intercept projectiles that might utilize that route again. 
• Saudi Arabia, while distancing itself from the strikes on Hodeidah, also said it would not tolerate airspace violations, a remark designed to show Riyadh's interest in preventing itself from becoming a vector for Houthi attacks on Israel. Saudi Arabia has also shot down Houthi missiles that have crossed into its airspace. 
• The Israel Defense Forces claimed the July 19 attack was successful in part because radar operators failed to prioritize the target amid a separate threat from Iraq. The military said it would deploy more operators to categorize threats correctly. 

Israel's retaliation for the July 19 attack will likely satisfy domestic objectives in the near term as the air force looks to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran as more immediate threats. Israel's government did not suggest an open-ended campaign against the Houthis, instead suggesting it was a single retaliatory mission. This is in part because a longer campaign would tie up aircraft and pilots needed for possible missions against other long-distance targets like Iran, and in part because of the comparatively mild threat the Houthis pose to Israel due to that same distance. Meanwhile, Israel is prioritizing possible escalation against Hezbollah in Lebanon and in recent assessments has suggested that such a campaign could not only require substantial air force resources but result in the loss of Israeli aircraft given Hezbollah's anti-aircraft capabilities. As a result, Israel is not incentivized to earmark resources for a campaign against the Houthis that might not result in a shift in Houthi behavior.

• U.S. and British forces have been striking the Houthis since January 2024 to try to stop the group's attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, but these strikes, while damaging Houthi military infrastructure, have not ended the Houthis' technical capability and political will to continue this campaign. Meanwhile, the Saudi air force conducted a long air campaign against the Houthis from 2015 onward, which also failed to end Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia.
• Israel remains poised to potentially escalate against Hezbollah in Lebanon as the militant group conducts rocket and missile strikes on targets throughout northern Israel. This escalation could involve ground incursions, which would require the current pace of Israeli air force sorties to increase substantially.  
• Israel has already embarked on an aerial campaign against Iranian assets in Syria, bombing weapons depots and shipments and assassinating Iranian commanders and advisers.

However, should the Houthis successfully strike Israel again, a regional cycle of tit-for-tat attacks could emerge. In the longer term, there will be a heightened risk of Houthi attacks similar to the July 19 strike as part of the group's recently announced escalation against Israel. Given that the Israeli air force has targeted the Houthis' fuel depots, the Houthis could try to attack Israeli oil and gas fields and facilities, among other civilian infrastructure. Additionally, other Iranian proxies could increase coordination with the Houthis on missile and drone attacks designed to overwhelm Israeli defenses and increase the likelihood of a successful attack. Another successful attack by the Houthis or their allies will likely create a cycle of tit-for-tat attacks, widening the conflict in Gaza to a more regional one, especially if other pro-Iranian groups are involved. Despite this potential coordination, geographic limitations will make it difficult for Houthi-Israeli tit-for-tat attacks to reach the intensity of the Israeli campaign in Syria or conflict with Hezbollah. As a result, even in the face of another successful Houthi strike, Israel would likely limit a campaign in Yemen to keep key assets free, particularly since the footprint of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Yemen is smaller than in Iraq, Syria or Lebanon.

• For the past few weeks, the Houthis have closely coordinated with Iraq's pro-Iranian Kataib Hezbollah militia, announcing several joint attacks against Israel. Though these attacks have been ineffective, future Houthi coordination with other groups could result in a successful attack against Israel.
• The Houthis are one of the most autonomous pro-Iranian armed actors in the region. The group receives its main supplies from Tehran but largely makes its own political decisions and calculations. Iran reportedly has fewer advisors and less infrastructure in Yemen as a result.