Niger's termination of defense cooperation with the United States will likely result in the departure of U.S. troops and pave the way for the deployment of Russian paramilitary personnel in the country, likely resulting in a further deterioration of Niger's security environment in the medium term. On March 16, spokesperson for Niger's military junta Amadou Abdramane announced that Niger was immediately halting bilateral defense cooperation with the United States, adding that the presence of U.S. troops in the country was now illegal. Bilateral defense cooperation notably included a status of forces agreement allowing about 1,000 U.S. civilian and military personnel as well as two military facilities in Niger. One of the facilities is Air Base 201 near Agadez in the center of the country, which is essential to U.S. surveillance and counterterrorism operations in Niger and neighboring Libya. 

• Following Niger's July 2023 coup against democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum, the new military regime swiftly suspended military cooperation with France, with Paris completing the withdrawal of its troops by December of that year. 

Niger's termination of defense cooperation follows the United States' suspension of bilateral defense cooperation in October 2023, and it comes as the junta is pivoting away from the West to consolidate power domestically. While France firmly criticized Niger's July 2023 coup, Washington initially adopted a more cautious approach toward the coup leaders in the hope of retaining its military facilities in the country. But following failed attempts to ensure a rapid transition to civilian leadership, the U.S. Biden administration ultimately labeled Bazoum's ousting as a coup in October 2023, which under U.S. law resulted in the suspension of all non-humanitarian security cooperation, including defense. Together with France's decision to withdraw troops from the country, this strengthened the junta's need to develop ties with new partners such as Russia, in turn further deteriorating relations with Washington. Tensions came to a head during a U.S. trip to Niger on March 12-13, during which U.S. officials reiterated demands for a credible transitional timeline to civilian leadership before the United States would resume defense cooperation and warned Niger to refrain from seeking further cooperation with Russia and Iran. As Niger's military leaders could not concede to Washington's demands without compromising their hold over the country, the junta appears to have taken advantage of the spat to consolidate its power, with the termination of defense cooperation aimed at burnishing its sovereignist and anti-imperialist credentials in the eyes of the Nigerien public. 

• Niger and Iran have strengthened ties in recent months, and leaks from Western intelligence agencies suggest that the two countries may have already signed a preliminary agreement whereby Niger would supply Iran with uranium. However, the logistics of such an agreement remain in question given that Niger only has one major uranium mine in production, which is currently operated by France's state-owned Orano.
• Russia and Niger signed a defense protocol agreement, the context of which remains secret, in December 2023, and the two sides vowed to further bilateral cooperation in the fields of defense, agriculture and energy in January 2024. 

The United States will likely be compelled to withdraw its troops and evacuate its military facilities from Niger, which will degrade Washington's capacity to monitor jihadist activity in the Sahel even if it secures a drone base elsewhere in West Africa in the medium term. Following the junta's statement that U.S. military presence in Niger is now illegal, the Nigerien public largely expects U.S. troops to leave the country. For junta leader Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani, failing to meet these public expectations would be politically challenging given that the military regime has founded its legitimacy on the recovery of Niger's full sovereignty. While a mediation agreement enabling the United States to retain some military presence in the country cannot be discarded, as sections of the Nigerien military still tilt toward Washington, this would raise the prospect of a coup against Tchiani by more anti-Western junta elements. As Tchiani prioritizes consolidating power, it thus appears likely that the United States will be compelled to evacuate its troops and military facilities from Niger over the coming year. However, this process could be delayed, as the Biden administration is likely pursuing mediation efforts in the hope of convincing Tchiani to revoke his termination of defense cooperation. Simultaneously, the Biden administration is also likely to accelerate efforts to set up a drone base elsewhere in West Africa, with Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Benin reportedly the most likely destinations. While a new drone base in one of these locations would help the United States monitor potential jihadist encroachments into coastal West Africa, it would not be as useful in monitoring jihadist activity in the Sahel given its geographical distance from the region. 

The junta's termination of defense cooperation with the United States means the deployment of Russian paramilitary personnel is likely in the medium term, which would likely contribute to an expansion in jihadist activity. Amid a continued degradation of the western Sahel's security environment, Niger's junta will likely emulate military leaders in Mali and Burkina Faso by requesting the deployment of Russian paramilitary personnel to the country in the medium term. This would, at first, likely involve the deployment of Russian military instructors, but could expand over time to include fighters from Russia's Africa Corps — formerly known as the Wagner Group — either serving as Tchiani's security personnel or partaking in joint counterterrorism operations with the Nigerien military. While such a deployment would help the junta consolidate its power, the arrival of Russian paramilitary personnel to Niger would likely contribute to a further deterioration of the country's security environment in the medium term, as Russia's Africa Corps does not enjoy the same military capabilities as the U.S. or French militaries. Furthermore, Russian forces deployed in African countries routinely carry out abuses against civilian populations, which in Niger's context would facilitate recruitment efforts from jihadist groups such as the al Qaeda-linked Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. 

• Following the suspension of defense cooperation with the United States, Tchiani held a highly publicized phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 26, with the two leaders agreeing on the "need" to reinforce bilateral security cooperation. 

Despite the likely deployment of Russian paramilitary personnel in the medium term, Niger will continue to develop relations with other non-Western countries to avoid becoming overly reliant on Moscow, which could reinforce competition between Middle Eastern and North African countries seeking closer ties with Niamey. A deployment of Russian paramilitary personnel to Niger would strengthen Moscow's influence over the junta. However, the junta's own diplomatic and domestic political needs will lead it to sustain efforts to develop ties with third parties, including Iran, amid its break with most Western countries. Gulf Arab states may respond to Tehran’s outreach to the junta by seeking greater engagement with Niger over concerns of expanding Iranian influence in Africa, and this expansion of cooperation between Gulf Arabs and Niger could pave the way for much-needed foreign investments in the Sahelian country. Niger will also sustain efforts to boost ties with Turkey, which has provided Niamey with military support both before and after the July 2023 coup as well as funded development initiatives. Morocco is also set to continue strengthening ties with Niger, as well as Mali and Burkina Faso, notably by advancing plans to help the western Sahelian countries diversify their maritime access through Morocco's ports. While the initiative appears highly unlikely to materialize in the medium term given the lack of infrastructure, the move highlights Rabat's ambition to strengthen its status as a regional leader. This push will likely reinforce competition between Morocco and Algeria over regional leadership, which Niger's junta will seek to exploit to maximize investment commitments from both sides. 

• Niger's junta-appointed Prime Minister Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during an official trip to Tehran in January, during which Raisi praised Niger's "path to independence and freedom." The two leaders thereafter signed agreements to boost health, economic and political cooperation. 
• Turkey delivered six Bayraktar TB-2 drones to Niger in May 2022 and has sustained efforts to train the Nigerien military following the July 2023 coup.