(Stratfor)

By agreeing with Russia to enact a cease-fire in northwestern Syria starting at 12 a.m. March 6, Turkey appears willing to sacrifice significant territory held by the rebel forces it supports to ensure that violence stops as soon as possible. In doing so, Turkey is setting up Russia and Syria for their next offensive in Idlib province with no real solution in sight for refugees in the area. The deal is designed to allow the de-escalation process between Turkey on the one side and Russia, Syria and Iran on the other to begin in earnest and to reduce tensions between Turkey and Russia in Idlib.

The initial details of the cease-fire announced March 5 by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin indicate that Turkey will accept a reduced sphere of influence in Syria, as the current front lines will become the new demarcation zones between the two sides and a demilitarized "security corridor" will cut through a significant portion of the rebel-held territory along the M4 highway. Joint patrols by Turkish and Russian troops are to guarantee the M4 highway corridor's de-escalation, which is set to be 6 kilometers (3.7 miles) deep to the highway's north and south.

From a military perspective, the security corridor along the M4 highway drastically affects the ability of rebel forces supported by Turkey to defend the city of Idlib and areas to the south of it. The rebel-held city of Jisr al-Shughour even falls entirely within the corridor. Rebel forces will no longer be able to build out defensive positions in-depth, something that has helped them to slow and even push back against the most recent Syrian government offensive. If and when fighting were to resume in Idlib, government forces will be able to rapidly advance into this demilitarized security zone, as well as areas to the south of it that will become untenable because of this agreement. As such, the cease-fire has allowed Turkey to protect a portion of rebel-controlled Idlib temporarily, but at a cost to its future sustainability.

Even as its military benefits are questionable, the deal is a diplomatic success for Turkey, albeit a limited one.

Even as its military benefits are questionable, the deal is a diplomatic success for Turkey, albeit a limited one. Turkey increasingly was finding itself having to take greater and greater military risks to deter Syrian advances, including a drone campaign against Syrian government forces. With this cease-fire, Turkey can begin to return its relationship with Russia to a more stable level, and Turkey's working ties with Russia in Syria's northeast, as well as over other defense matters, appear to be uninterrupted, at the moment at least.

As for Turkey's future relationship with Europe, there may be little change in Ankara's current refugee strategy. Turkey is under domestic pressure to ease its refugee share, and with no military reversals in Idlib, some Idlib refugees will continue to push into Turkey for fear that this cease-fire delays rather than prevents future advances by Damascus. Turkey is likely to continue to use Syrian refugees as leverage against Europe to gain new support in the face of this ongoing challenge.

Finally, Turkey's relationship with the United States appears unaltered, with little direct U.S. support for Turkey expected in Idlib. Rhetorical support was forthcoming, but even as Ankara called for no-fly zones and military equipment (specifically U.S. Patriot missile systems), Washington showed little inclination to involve itself in Syria further, setting up Russia as the more valuable partner for Turkey.

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