What Happened
The International Atomic Energy Agency distributed its quarterly report on Iran's nuclear activities to member governments March 3, including a second document detailing Iran's alleged stonewalling of IAEA efforts to resolve questions about past nuclear activities. This is the first report since Iran took the position that it is not obligated to provide the IAEA with access to three sites that have not been inspected before. During an inspection in 2019, the IAEA found traces of uranium at Iran's Turquz Abad site. The IAEA also reported that Iranian officials have indicated they will deny access to additional sites.
The report also showed that Iran had increased its stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) from 372 kilograms in early November to 1,021 kilograms at present, with monthly production rising to about 170 kilograms per month. Part of this acceleration came from the reactivation of two cascades of IR-1 centrifuges at the hardened Fordow facility. Some additional production capacity also has come from advanced centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. Not all of the current LEU production is at the maximum 4.5 percent U-235 level, however; some of it is as low as 3 percent.
Why It Matters
The acceleration of enrichment beyond what most observers had previously expected means the point when the United States or Israel might begin to consider preventive military action to stop Iran's nuclear activities has drawn closer. Iran will now achieve enough LEU to make one device sooner, no later than April now. Based on rough calculations assuming current throughput capacity and Iran's ability to reactivate some additional IR-2 centrifuges it is not using at present, the current breakout time — or the time that would be needed to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for one warhead if Iran began processing LEU to HEU — is now probably around four to six months.
This report did not, however, contain evidence of breakthroughs on advanced centrifuges. Iran continues to perform research on a number of new models, but has not deployed anything beyond one cascade of IR-6s. It has not added more machines as powerful, or more powerful, than the IR-6 beyond what we knew was possible based on the last IAEA report in November 2019. Evidence of breakthroughs on the development of even more advanced machines or preparations for the deployment of additional IR-6 cascades, combined with having enough LEU for one device, would raise immediate alarms for the United States and Israel due to the potential for an extremely short breakout time of below two months; the new IAEA report does not suggest such a crisis is imminent.
Still, the leap in LEU accumulation will reignite the debate in the United States and Israel about where exactly the red line should be, and what can be done to slow Iran's progress. The high percentage of time Iran's centrifuges are operational indicates that any covert efforts by the United States, Israel or others to take them offline are not very effective. (There is no evidence in this report pointing to a new Stuxnet-like operation.)
U.S. pressure on the Europeans to bring the issue back to the U.N. Security Council and trigger a "snapback" of Security Council sanctions is likely to increase. But this is unlikely to trigger an immediate change of policy on Iran's part. Recent comments by U.S. officials have hinted that the United States will not seek to invoke snapback before the expiration of the Security Council sanctions on conventional arms sales to Iran lapses in October.
