What Happened
Lebanese President Michel Aoun said Dec. 19 that he had asked former Education Minister Hassan Diab to form Lebanon's next government. Diab, a Sunni, won backing for his nomination from the March 8 alliance, which is dominated by Shiite militant group and political party Hezbollah and its parliamentary allies. By constitutional custom, Lebanon's prime ministerial role must be filled by a Sunni. However, Diab's nomination earned the support of only a handful of Sunni lawmakers.
Diab is not expected to be warmly received by the Lebanese protest movement, which has pushed for a change in the way the country is governed. Many protesters blame Lebanon's poor economic performance on a culture of corruption perpetuated by the country's entrenched political elite. Although Diab's career has been centered more on education (he has taught at the American University of Beirut since 1985) than politics (his stint as education minister from 2011-14 was primarily in a technocratic role), he is perceived as not being far enough removed from the political establishment. Furthermore, outgoing Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri and his Future Movement have announced they would not participate in the next government, creating the prospect that a Diab government would need to rely heavily on the March 8 alliance to maintain power. If the United States sees his government as too tightly aligned with Hezbollah, Washington could move to once again withhold aid from Lebanon or impose sanctions.
Why It Matters
Diab's nomination shows the degree of political clout that Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, has managed to gain in the midst of Lebanon's political paralysis. Beyond the risk of renewed U.S. sanctions that Diab's ties with Hezbollah could draw, his appointment would do little to address the political demands of the protest movement, likely leaving the country's political logjam intact. A continued political stalemate would mean further delaying necessary structural reforms and discouraging the international aid needed to pull the country out of its economic tailspin.
Hezbollah's participation in Lebanon's government already had drawn limited U.S. sanctions on its banking sector and held up aid to Lebanon's military as the United States works to stifle Iranian influence in the country. The aid was finally delivered after a few months of delay, but should Washington view Diab as a tool of Hezbollah, it could suspend it once again — and threaten or impose wider sanctions to undermine Diab's government and force him from power. Even the prospect of sanctions would deter the foreign investment Lebanon has tried to attract. Diab's Hezbollah ties and his service in a previous government brand him more of a political insider than Lebanon's protesters may tolerate. That means they would likely continue to pressure whatever government he might form, dragging down the economy, stirring unrest and risking clashes with Hezbollah and the Shiite Amal Movement. The likelihood of ongoing street protests risks making Diab's investiture as prime minister only a temporary bridge to yet another political crisis. He could find it difficult if not impossible to govern, and the ineffective government would be prone to collapse. That would leave Lebanon right back where it started and could even open the revolving door to another government led by al-Hariri, who remains a favorite of the country's political elite.
Background
Lebanon needs a workable government that can satisfy its multiple strong, competing interests. Its widespread protest movement that transcends sectarian divides wants a technocratic government that excludes the familiar faces who have dominated Lebanese politics for decades. Lebanese unhappy with the status quo object in particular to the politicians and their allies who have held sway since the civil war era. The protest movement has shown resilience in the face of intimidation tactics by armed partisans of Hezbollah and Amal and has continued to stage persistent demonstrations.
Meanwhile, the political parties in power will resist losing their influence to a technocratic government. Hezbollah, in particular, which has managed to achieve its best position of power since joining the government, will push against losing those gains. Hezbollah is not the only insider fighting back. Its ally Amal and the Christian-dominated Free Patriotic Movement, along with insiders from numerous other parties along Lebanon's political spectrum, are also pushing against protesters' desires as they scramble to preserve their influence — and wealth — in the face of looming austerity.
Overshadowing the political morass is Lebanon's looming economic crisis that has no simple solution. The country's ratio of debt to gross domestic product is the third-highest in the world, at over 150 percent, and fears of a sovereign default are growing, especially as major bonds start to mature in March 2020. Its economy relies on a banking sector hobbled by partial U.S. sanctions (with more possibly to come) and grappling with capital controls. Fears that increasing unrest could hit the tourism sector and a Syrian refugee population of almost 1 million add to the economic pressure.
While in the past, Lebanon has been able to rely on bailouts from allies to keep its economy afloat, the international community has largely lost its appetite for offering money that does not produce long-term stability. Additional aid is being conditioned on economic reform — and a likely dose of austerity — but to even start down that path, Lebanon needs a working government and a public that trusts it enough to allow some reforms to take place. Even if Diab does take the helm, neither will be easy to achieve.
