The U.S. Congress and the European Union are mulling sanctions to punish Turkey for its military operation in northeastern Syria. U.S. Sens. Lindsey Graham, a Republican, and Chris Van Hollen, a Democrat, have introduced legislation that targets high-level officials in President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government and Turkey's defense industry. Their bill would also activate sanctions against Turkey that Congress previously passed under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The Europeans are more broadly considering action against Turkey, and Norway and Sweden, which supply Turkey with small arms, already have suspended new arms exports. To prevent Turkey from ending its 2016 refugee agreement with Europe and flooding the Continent with refugees from Syria, the European Union has offered up to $1 billion in additional support to help Ankara feed and shelter them in Turkey.
Threatening Sanctions
International outrage over Turkey's military operation in Syria is forcing nominally allied states to condemn Ankara. In the United States, in particular, this outrage is propelling sanctions legislation. For now, President Donald Trump appears positioned to veto the legislation in part because of his political desire to reduce the U.S. footprint in the Middle East, and in part because of his warm relationship with Erdogan, whom he has invited to visit the White House on Nov. 13.
But Congress may have the bipartisan support it needs to override Trump's veto — which would be a first during his presidency. The Republican Party is less unified behind Trump on Turkey and Syria, and the party's base is more split on the Turkish incursion against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) than just about any other issue, in large part because of the SDF's positive reputation as a partner in the campaign against the Islamic State. The strong political incentives to punish Turkey also means the current sanctions legislation may herald more action: Members of Congress can expand or add to the penalties as they see fit.
Though Congress is likely to pass sanctions in some form, the measures are not necessarily as wide-ranging as they appear. They are meant to intimidate and to deter Turkey's incursion. But it will still take time for Congress to vote on and implement them, if they survive a Trump veto. By then, the Turkish operation might be over, and the United States and Turkey can negotiate to reduce the threat of sanctions.
Willing to Endure the Pain
Turkey will take the sanctions pain. Its military operation is broadly popular with the Turkish public, which largely sees the SDF as an extension of Turkey's own insurgent Kurdistan Workers' Party. Erdogan also has little left to lose on his economic record. A rebellion within the ranks of the ruling Justice and Development Party is already in full swing, attacking Erdogan for his economic stewardship, and Turkey has not yet recovered from a recession early this year. Instead, Erdogan is leaning on nationalist policies to maintain legitimacy, especially with his parliamentary majority dependent on the Nationalist Movement Party to govern.
Moreover, Turkey's economic problems and fortunes are bigger than the sanctions threat. The penalties may worsen its economy, but other major factors such as the weak lira, slowing construction and manufacturing sectors, large private debt and weakened investor sentiment drive the ups and downs of its economy. For Turkey, disruptions to its economic relationships will be worth the payoff if it succeeds in stopping a Kurdish statelet on its border.
